NOT IN OUR NAME

THE LOST GENERATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?
Clark McCauley
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Jihad as a Lifestyle
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Jacob Bundsgaard
Crime Undermines Education
Crime Deepens Inequalities
Freedom From Fear Magazine

Not in our name
The lost generation of violent extremists

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It is easier to lead men to combat, stirring up their passions, than to restrain them and direct them toward the patient labors of peace

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A call for real heroes

Today the sound of the unsheathed scimitar gives rhythm to the videos produced by ISIS. Watching the videos’ merciless acts we ask ourselves “How is it possible a human being can generate such level of horror? How is it possible a person with a family, with dreams and skills has come to the point that the life of another human being is worth nothing?

The nexus of desensitization, dehumanization, and disengaged youth is a lethal combination. The desensitization to violence through repeated exposure via sight (e.g., videos, computer games, television) and sound, (e.g., music) has been a topic of research for several decades, with the majority of findings indicating that there is a reduced reaction to the stimuli – thus desensitization. When this is combined with the dehumanizing process, which also is found in the same media, it appears logical that those who are less sensitive to violence would be easier and more quickly moved through the process of dehumanizing another group of people. Dehumanization is the process of demonizing the perceived enemy or systematically reducing one group of people to a level of subhuman or animal, which allows the humans to treat the subhumans as dangerous game animals to be hunted and exterminated. The dehumanizing process has been used for centuries to legitimize unspeakable acts of violence on one group of people by another group (e.g., Nazi’s against the Jews and the Roma; Khmer Rouge against the “enemies” of the revolution; Hutus’s against Tutsis during Rwandan Civil War). But who does these acts? Who is most likely to join in the hunt? Each person has a “pile of empathy” in their mind, which helps them react appropriately when violent acts are observed or heard. Those whose “pile” is already eroded would be the easiest to persuade to join in the hunt. In other words, those who are already disengaged from their family and greater society are more likely to grasp at the promises of belonging and contributing to a group. When the desensitization process joined with dehumanizing rhetoric meets the disengaged and searching youth, and significant protective factors are not available, a lethal result may be looming.

Recruiters use various methods to pass their message. For example, they may use beheadings and crucifixions in the media to demonstrate power. These shocking images serve multiple purposes, including the step by step desensitization where horror becomes acceptable. A toxic mix of medieval and video games imaginary is building an army. The individual dehumanization process is conducted through a series of incremental steps: the call of duty videos are followed by training and participation in collective acts of brutality. This is the initiation package offered to these searching youth.
The best candidates to join an army are those who have not yet discovered their path in life, those who need to belong to something, those who feel anxiety and stress about the future and those who feel angry and powerless because of injustice and suffering in many countries of the world. There are those who think they need to do something truly meaningful and unique: becoming a hero. Often they feel compelled to embrace together both a cause and a gun. Who are those best candidates? Certainly young people meet the profile.

“So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight (...) raise your ambitions, O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue...” the words of the self-appointed caliph of the self-proclaimed Islamic state attempt to appeal to this lack of belonging and desire to make a mark. Similarities can be seen with the thoughts of other brutal dictators: “To avoid parents being a retrograde force in the home, we must arm the child with an inner light so that he can repel this influence. Some fathers have escaped our hold for various reasons, but a young boy is still in our hands... The family unit must comply with centralised customs, ruled by revolutionary positions and traditions.” Saddam Hussain

“He alone, who owns the youth, gains the future (...). The weak must be chiselled away. I want young men and women who can suffer pain. A young German must be as swift as a greyhound, as tough as leather, and as hard as Krupp’s steel.” Adolf Hitler

Listening to the words of some of the indoctrinated youth of today also provides a chilling reminder of the success of the rhetoric.

“All my brothers, come to jihad,” says a fighter, who has been identified as British. “Feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness that we are feeling.” They come from different places and background they speak different languages, they have different
reasons to fight but finally find their answer and mission in an ideology that reminds us the one of Heart of Darkness "Exterminate all the brutes"! Suppress who is not part of the group of enlightened, those who have a different ideology, a different religion, or simply do not want to join!

There is a striking contrast in some of the images which are posted by ISIS, portraying the victim and the executioner. The victim is often a humanitarian aid worker or a journalist and often the executioner is a violent extremist. The similarities are many: both of them young, both devoted to their cause, both recruited over the internet and travelling from afar to assist in the cause and both believing that they are doing something to make the world a better place. After this, the contrast could not be clearer: the victim will be remembered for devoting their life to protect and shed light on the situation of the most vulnerable, while the executioner will be remembered for having murdered an innocent person in cold-blood.

What if we start accepting some of the responsibility for the horror we are witnessing in many parts of the world with different extremists groups marching against civilians? If so, we, as a society, must address the root causes of the problem. We must work even harder against the rituals perpetuated on the internet. Unfortunately, until now while the global community engaged in discussion on human rights, development and peace, weapons and financial resources continued to flood into the hands of militants.

Those who use these weapons and resources and violate human rights are as guilty as those who collaborate in business with them. Both groups should face tangible sanctions, investigations and criminal trials.

Let us follow the example of the young people who are putting their life at stake to bring food and water to vulnerable populations. As a community, let us engage our youth to ensure they are seeking a sense of belonging or answering a call to "honor" that is peaceful.
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Western Muslims volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq: Why do they go, and what should we do?

by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko

In this paper we first put ISIS volunteers in context by considering other examples of Americans citizens fighting in someone else’s war. Next we consider poll results indicating that many U.S. Muslims perceive a war on Islam and prejudice against Muslims; at least ten percent of younger U.S. Muslims justify suicide attacks in defense of Islam. Against this background it is perhaps surprising that only a few hundred U.S. Muslims have volunteered to fight in Syria. In the absence of accurate data about U.S. volunteers, we review what has been learned about the thousands of European volunteers for ISIS, many of whom seem
to be pushed to action by individual-level mechanisms described by McCauley and Moskalenko in 2011. Finally, we raise doubt about current efforts to criminalize and block would-be volunteers.

Precedents for volunteering in a foreign war
A front page article in the New York Times provides a useful starting point for understanding Western volunteers for combat in the Middle East.1 “Unsettled at Home, Veterans volunteer to fight ISIS” describes a small number of Americans, many of them former military, who volunteered to fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. “Driven by a blend of motivations—outrage over ISIS’s atrocities, boredom with civilian life back home, dismay that an enemy they tried to neutralize is stronger than ever - they have offered themselves as pro bono advisers and riflemen in local militias.” The article cites a Kurdish militia spokesman who estimated that over 100 American citizens are fighting against ISIS in Syria. The first thing to notice about this article is the blend of motives described, in which emotion and personal circumstances are as important as political opinion in moving individuals to volunteer against ISIS.

In addition, this article about volunteers against ISIS differs from articles about volunteers for ISIS by recognizing several previous examples of American volunteers who joined armed groups in another country. “Pilots flew for the Allies in World War I and II long before the United States officially declared war. In the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, Americans formed a contingent of more than 2,500 troops.” In a more recent example, U.S. citizens numbered about 2000 in the Israeli Defense Force at the time of the I.D.F. incursion into Gaza Strip in 2014.2 In short there is history and precedent for U.S. citizens volunteering to fight in someone else’s war.

Many U.S. Muslims see a war on Islam and discrimination against Muslims
There have been two national polls of U.S. Muslims, the first in

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2007 and the second in 2011; both were conducted by the Pew Research Center. Each poll included over 1000 respondents in a representative sampling of U.S. Muslims that cost more than a million dollars. Results in 2007 and 2011 were broadly similar. When asked about the U.S. war on terrorism, about half (55%, 41%) saw the war as “insincere.” When asked whether suicide bombing or other violence against civilians is justified to defend Islam from its enemies, a small minority (8% both times) said often or sometimes justified. This small minority projects to 80,000 of the approximately one million adult U.S. Muslims. Although the percentage is small, the number of U.S. Muslims with this extreme opinion is not negligible.

The same two polls show that many U.S. Muslims do not feel accepted in the U.S. Most respondents (53%, 55%) report that being a Muslim in the U.S. is more difficult since 9/11. About a quarter (26%, 28%) say that people have acted suspiciously toward them, and about a fifth (15%, 22%) report being called offensive names. In a land of immigrants, U.S. Muslims do not always feel welcome.

Muslims who do not feel welcome in the U.S. are likely to identify more as Muslims and less as Americans. Especially younger Muslims, born in the U.S., are likely to be more open to extreme opinions. Thus U.S.-born Muslims and U.S.-born Black Muslims tend to be more open to seeing suicide bombing as justified often or sometimes (11%, 16% vs. 8% for all U.S. Muslims in 2011).

Of course 2007 and 2011 were years earlier than the rise of ISIS in 2014, and opinions of U.S. Muslims may have changed. But the best polling data available indicate that antipathy to the war on terrorism is not uncommon among U.S. Muslims, and justification for suicide bombing in defense of Islam is not negligible, especially among younger U.S. Muslims. Given this distribution of opinion, it is not surprising that some young U.S. Muslims might be ready to take up arms in defense of Islam. But in fact, only a few turn to violence. Only 100-150 U.S. Muslims have joined or tried to join ISIS.

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Press briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest,”

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few volunteers and would-be volunteers from the hundreds of thousands of U.S. Muslims who see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam but do not volunteer?

Only 100-150 U.S. Muslims have joined or tried to join ISIS

Unfortunately there is currently no report available that details the characteristics of the 150 U.S. volunteers. In the next section we look instead at the characteristics of European volunteers for ISIS. Study of European volunteers has profited by the fact that they are relatively numerous and that much more information about them is available.

Characteristics of European volunteers for ISIS

The most recent and penetrating report on Euro volunteers to ISIS estimates that nearly 4000 European youth, predominantly male, have gone to fight in Syria since 2012. Coolsaet cites CIA estimates according to which ISIS has 20-30,000 fighters, foreign fighters appear to account for over half of these, and fighters from Middle Eastern countries represent the largest contingent among the foreigners. It is important to note that Western volunteers are at most twenty percent of ISIS foreign fighters and U.S volunteers less than one percent of ISIS fighters.

Coolsaet divides his analysis into push factors (situational pressures to leave home) and pull factors (the attractions exerted by ISIS). Cultural push factors begin with the economic weakness and lack of job opportunities that have afflicted Europe since 2010.

It is important to note that Western volunteers are at most twenty percent of ISIS foreign fighters and U.S volunteers less than one percent of ISIS fighters

Many young people feel depressed and hopeless about the future, and young Muslims in Europe are particularly likely to drop out of school and fail to find work. Right-wing movements in many European countries make many Muslims feel unwelcome, even those born in Europe.

Then there are personal push factors. As described by Coolsaet, these can be categorized in terms of the mechanisms of radicalization suggested by McCauley and Moskalenko.

Political grievance: some are outraged by Western indifference to the plight of Sunni Muslims suffering from Shi’a in Iraq and from Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite minority government in Syria.

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Personal grievance: Even educated young Muslims with a job can feel the weight of white European discrimination against Muslims. Love: some go to Syria because a friend or relative has gone, or is going. Unfreezing: some have lost family, friends or job and seek new connections in the brotherhood of men at war. Escape: some go to ISIS to get away from debts or prison or family problems. Status and risk seeking: some seek thrill and adventure, and status as warriors. Coolsaet tellingly describes this factor as the chance to go “from zero to hero.”

After noting that Western hyperbole has given ISIS the cachet of “winner,” Coolsaet identifies the pull factors that bring volunteers to ISIS.

Most important, it has a catalogue of solutions on offer for every one of the personal motives the potential volunteers carry with them. ISIS seemingly offers meaning, belonging, fraternity, respect, status, adventure, heroism and martyrdom. It provides an alternative to drugs and petty crime, and an alternative society with clear and straightforward rules. It also offers material improvement: a salary and perhaps a villa with a pool. It offers, for those who join in, power over others, and, for those who would never admit it, the pleasure of sadism in the name of a higher goal. Moral absolutes are part and parcel of the ISIS attraction, and all the more so to the extent that these can be applied immediately in large areas of Iraq and Syria. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda was never in a position to offer so much.

Against a background of poverty, pessimism, and perceived discrimination in Europe, personal push factors move some young Muslims to action and ISIS offers the strongest promise of personal success in a “successful” cause. In Coolsaet’s view, Western volunteers for ISIS will diminish as its military successes diminish and the internal stress-
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es of administering a would-be state increase.

ISIS offers the strongest promise of personal success in a “successful” cause

What is to be done?
With the notable exception of Denmark, Western governments have begun to criminalize volunteering for ISIS. Some Muslims are caught before leaving their Western country, some are caught after returning from Syria and Iraq. They are charged with something like support for a terrorist organization and sent to prison when convicted. There are several downsides to punishing ISIS volunteers. Disenchanted ISIS dropouts would make credible spokespeople against setting out for Syria. But effective persuasion is difficult to advance from a prison cell. Also, blocking ISIS volunteers but not volunteers joining other armed groups can alienate Muslims in Western countries, who may see this distinction as another example of Western discrimination against Muslims. Perhaps most important, blocking their departure leaves would-be ISIS volunteers with a choice: forget about fighting for Islam, or stay home and attack fellow citizens with whatever bomb, firearm, or automobile may be available.

Also, blocking ISIS volunteers but not volunteers joining other armed groups can alienate Muslims in Western countries

A case in point is Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, a Libyan-Canadian convert to Islam. In October 2014 he went to Ottawa to apply for a Canadian passport but was held up as Canadian authorities weighed concerns about whether he might go to Syria to join ISIS. He also applied for a Libyan passport renewal, and his application was refused. Days later, on October 22, 2014, Zehaf-Bibeau shot and fatally wounded a sentry at Ottawa’s...
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Communication relating to this paper to Clark McCauley, Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, 19010, U.S.A. cmccaule@brynmawr.edu

Acknowledgment. The preparation of this paper was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grant number N00140510629. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; a short time later Zehaf-Bibeau was himself killed in an attempted attack on the Parliament Building.

Is it worth keeping individuals like Zehaf-Bibeau from going to join ISIS? As already noted, Western volunteers are a minority of ISIS fighters. If all Western volunteers were blocked, ISIS would persevere. Western governments are concerned about the threat of returned jihadists, but many volunteers will die and others will not be interested to return. It might be easier to keep track of returnees - even helping returnees as the Danes do - than to pay the cost of domestic attacks by those blocked from joining ISIS.

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Talking to terrorists: What drives young people to become foreign fighters for ISIS and other terrorist groups and what can be done in response

by Anne Speckhard
The draw for young people to join a terrorist group has never been as strong as it is today. I know because I have spent over a decade interviewing over four hundred terrorists around the world and, in the case of suicide bombers who are already dead, interviewing their family members, close associates and even the hostages they held. My questions always centered on what put these (mostly young) people on the terrorist trajectory. Could their movement along this trajectory have been prevented? Once on the trajectory, could they have been moved back off it by some sort of intervention?

From my research I learned first-hand what makes up the prime ingredients of the terrorist cocktail. First, there is a group with a political aim that has framed a problem and its solution in violent terms — a group that is willing to use terrorism. Second, the group’s ideology argues that the group’s political aim and purpose is so important to justify the use of terrorist violence — this is always argued wrongly because there is no cause ever that justifies intentionally attacking civilians. Third is some level of social support within the individual’s community for choosing this path. And fourth are the individual vulnerabilities and motivations exposed to the group, its ideology and its social support.

I found that in conflict zones individuals primarily resonate to terrorist ideologies out of revenge and trauma that arises out of violence they have endured or witnessed. There are numerous other motivators but trauma and revenge are primary. In non-conflict zones the motivators are more likely to include discrimination, marginalization, frustrated aspirations, a desire for adventure, romance, sex, purpose and personal significance, a desire to be heroic or even to live up to stereotypical gender roles.

There are numerous other motivators but trauma and revenge are primary

Recruiters in non-conflict zones are also adept at bringing what is happening in the conflict zones into the discussion via raw video footage and images of violence. These can induce a secondary trauma if the individual relates to those in the conflict zones as “fictive kin” — that is like in the case of the Muslim ummah for instance where downtrodden
Palestinians, Chechens, Kashmiris, Iraqis and Afghans are referred to as one’s brothers and sisters.

Belonging is also a big part of it. Youth often follow their peers and some may simply want to be part of what is becoming known as “jihadi cool” or “gansta” jihad. Likewise when young girls demand that their men be willing to “martyr” themselves or join as mujahideen they may also sign up - not for the promises of the virgins in paradise but for sex right now.

The current militant jihadi actors - namely al Qaeda and now ISIS have also become extremely adept at using ideology to motivate individuals both within and outside of conflict zones to join their cause. Both groups have mastered social media and have hammered away on a now well-known and sadly well accepted (in some circles) narrative that the West is attacking and occupying Muslims, Islam itself and Islamic lands. Those who are facing perceived or real injustices and who are angered over foreign policy decisions that don’t sit well with them, not surprisingly, may resonate to this message.

ISIS has taken it a full step further in claiming a Caliphate in the Middle East and capitalizing on scriptures and beliefs about the end times. In their apocalyptic vision they claim that every Muslim has a duty to make “hijra” - that is moving to the place of jihad and fighting jihad. Anwar al-Awlaki, now killed by a U.S. drone strike in particular lives on and continues to convince youth that militant jihad and joining groups like al Qaeda or ISIS is their duty via his very charismatic sermons still circulating on the Internet - messages that keep him an active recruiter from beyond the grave.

ISIS is also peddling a vision of a utopian state in which Muslims of all nationalities, ethnicities and races are brought together to - according to their claim - live under Islamic ideals. While the reality is a far cry from that, young women are called to come and marry “real men” - mujahideen - who are fighting to bring about this utopian ideal and the men are called to be the fighters idealize this utopian vision and resonate to it. The women who go idealize their role to populate the new Islamic State and support their men, while the men resonate to the idea of being tough, strong and important. In both cases frustrated individuals are being fed the hope of escaping dull lives by stepping into an adventure where they are promised the possibility of living up to male and female ideals while
living a pure and good Islamic existence. Of course, it never materializes, but the young star struck recruits taking off for Syria and Iraq can not know that - until he or she arrives.

**Frustrated individuals are being fed the hope of escaping dull lives by stepping into an adventure**

The fight against today’s terrorist groups is necessarily multi-pronged and needs to be contextual, just as the call to terrorism is. What works well in one setting might not work in another. Firstly we must focus on prevention. The ISIS and al Qaeda narrative has been around for some years now and needs to be addressed head on because those concerned with injustice will resonate to it in varying degrees. One way to approach the narrative is to include it in middle school curriculums to teach youth how terrorist groups recruit and why intentionally attacking civilians is never a good answer. Nations may make mistakes and may cause collateral damage but a core value that can be taught to inoculate youth against the idea of terrorism is to teach that intentionally targeting civilians is always wrong and then provide case examples that show clear ways to solve problems that do not include violence and case examples of where terrorism failed terribly. Similarly, we can work with former extremists and terrorists to tell their stories in compelling ways so other can learn why they entered the terrorist trajectory and how it did not work out as they hoped. Disillusionment, deradicalization and disengagement in others can serve as a learning example of why not to engage. The more creative ways in which these stories are told - by video, via the Internet, in short but emotionally convincing ways, and so on - can make them more compelling and more likely to reach a wider audience with a profound teaching effect.

**Disillusionment, deradicalization and disengagement in others can serve as a learning example of why not to engage**

Since so much of today’s terrorism in non-conflict zones is motivated by a desire for significance, purpose, adventure, life meaning and to impress others it is also wise to find tools to survey vulnerable persons and what they are posting on social media. Most of today’s extremists who join ISIS cannot resist bragging about it on social media and many brag well before they buy a plane ticket to Syria. Jon Cole of Liverpool University developed the Inventory of Vulnerable Persons (IVP) a tool similar to what we used to access extremists when I designed the psychological component of the Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to 20,000 detainees and 800 juve-
niles. This program consisted of the traditional Islamic challenge carried out by imams who were to gain rapport with detainees and then point out to them reliable scriptures that contradicted their militant jihadi views. Alongside of this we also added psychological interventions to address the trauma of living in a conflict zone, having been arrested and detained and responses of wanting to fight back, revenge, etc. This combination was aimed at taking apart the terrorist ideology as well as addressing the individual vulnerabilities that had made the ideology resonate for them. The IVP can be used as guidance to identify early on those who might be taking it all the way to terrorism and then intervention can occur before they do. Jeff Weyers, a doctoral student and policeman in Canada has already used it for exactly that purpose and found that it led to actionable evidence against would be and real terrorists in three hundred cases in various countries around the world. While tools of this sort are useful in monitoring the trajectory into terrorism we need also keep in mind that they are guidance for law enforcement and not scientific tools to categorize people and predict their behaviors with certainty.

There are so many good answers to terrorism and many of them involve fighting for social justice and dignity for all people. While that is a tall order we need to start somewhere.

The author

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The semiotics of violent jihadist propaganda: The message and the channel

by Massimo Leone

On the one hand, **terrorism is the antithesis of communication.** It does not aim at transmitting any message to its victims, but at annihilating them. On the other hand, yet, **terrorism is extremely powerful communication** for those who witness the tragedy, directly or through the media, and are either terrified or fascinated by it. Terrorist acts revolutionize the social attitudes of individuals and groups, pushing them to radically change their lifestyles. Those acts instill fear, but can also attract supporters’ admiration. From September 11 on, terrorist jihadist groups have resorted to **increasingly sophisticated** strategies to propagate their message and recruit new followers.

ed communication in order to accompany and influence the reception of their violent deeds. Obeving to a global tendency, for jihadists it was not sufficient to perpetrate violence and instigate terror. It was equally fundamental to let the world know that violence had been committed, and what was the appropriate cognitive, emotional, and pragmatic interpretation of it.

However, whereas in the first years after the 9/11 attacks terrorist jihadist groups would create messages to be transmitted by mainstream media (e.g., Osama Bin Laden’s videos broadcast by Al Jazeera), from the second half of the 2000s on, these groups have increasingly aimed at developing their own media. The shift has been also a consequence of the world-wide diffusion of social media. Through them, indeed, terrorist jihadist groups can not only reach large audiences, but also learn how to become increasingly proficient at it. As several analysts have already underlined, there is a technical abyss between the amateurish videotapes that Osama Bin Laden would broadcast through Al Jazeera and the sophisticated visual editing by which the so-called Islamic State (IS) flaunts its tragic accomplishments to the world. Moreover, whereas in the past a temporal gap would occur between perpetration of a terror act and communication interpreting it for the global audience, nowadays the gap has practically disappeared. As some commentators have pointed out, whilst in the past war acts were accompanied by rolling of drums, today terrorist jihadist violence is simultaneously ushered by drones of Tweets and YouTube videos. Timing and technique are not the only elements that have marked the evolution of terrorist jihadist communication in the last decade. Also the target of such communication has changed. Osama Bin Laden’s videos were primarily addressed to an Arabic-speaking and Muslim audience. Most Westerners could access their content only through the linguistic and cultural mediation of translators and interpreters. Moreover, these videos predominantly targeted Westerners as addressees of threats. On the contrary, communication developed by IS, especially from the second half of 2014 on, has had a different communicative agenda: it addresses Westerners not only as targets of terrorist threats, but also as potential affiliates. That is why IS communication increasingly resorts to European languages, and mainly to English and French, but also to Russian, German, Spanish, and Italian, in order to communicate with its audience. In these messages, the visual dimension is becoming more and more preponderant, yet it too seems to adopt the codes and styles of Western visual communication (for instance, Hollywood narratives and visual effects). Made by Western affiliates for other potential Western affiliates, the current IS communication seems to more and more bridge the gap between state war propaganda and terrorist communication; social media have enabled terrorists to directly reach a global audience as effectively, and sometimes even more, than traditional state broadcasting propaganda.

IS communication increasingly resorts to European languages, and mainly to English and French, but also to Russian, German, Spanish, and Italian

In particular, the purposes of IS communication toward Western citizens is manifold:

1. Accompanying, describing, and interpreting terrorist acts in order to make their own geopolitical narrative globally predominant against the geopolitical narrative diffused by western governments and mainstream media;


2. **Instilling terror** so as to push to a destabilization of Western lifestyles and consequent sociopolitical tension;

3. **Gaining ideological and financial support** among old and new sympathizers, as well as **winning the competition for leadership** against other terrorist groups;

4. **Recruiting** new members. This last goal represents the real novelty of IS terrorist jihadist communication. With more than three thousand IS fighters holding European passports, the phenomenon is difficult to underestimate.

From the specific point of view of European countries, the shift in communication by IS involves three major security risks:

1. The risk that especially young European citizens are indoctrinated by IS propaganda and persuaded to join terrorist activities in the Middle East, mainly in Iraq and Syria. Fight casualties in these countries already include hundreds of young European citizens;

2. The risk that some of these European fighters **return to their countries** after being indoctrinated and militarily trained, with the agenda and the ability to perpetrate major terrorist attacks against civilians in European cities, such as those that recently took place in Belgium, France, and Denmark;

3. The risk that supporters of IS who are European residents, even without training outside of Europe, are given detailed knowledge, mainly through the Internet, about how to perpetrate major terrorist attacks against civilians in European cities.

**Today terrorist jihadist violence is simultaneously ushered by drones of Tweets and YouTube videos**

Given these risks, a major effort of intelligence is required. This effort must aim at several goals. On the one hand, **short-term investigative goals**; it will prove increasingly fundamental to:

- Know history, evolution, present state, and prospective lines of development of...
jihadist terrorist media agencies;
• Analyse media strategies adopted by these agencies;
• Analyse texts produced and distributed through these agencies;
• Study the circulation of these messages through the web;
• Gather evidence and formulate hypothesis about the cognitive, emotional, and pragmatic impact of these media campaigns and messages on Western audiences;
• Investigate the potential and actual Western targets of jihadist terrorist propaganda, in order to understand whether they share a common social, cultural, or psychological background.

On the other hand, investigative goals should be paralleled by long-term comprehension goals: jihadist terrorist propaganda is not an isolated phenomenon in history, but one that can be compared and contrasted with other instances of violent confessional persuasion that emerged in other socio-cultural contexts, historical periods, and religious domains.

The evolution of media technology pushes toward new levels of efficacy

Research must therefore put jihadist messages in cross-cultural, trans-historical, and interdisciplinary perspective, in order to understand the transversal features of violent religious propaganda. Gaining authority through reference to sacred texts and values; labeling the Other as “the infidels”; inciting believers to forced conversion or to the annihilation of “infidels”; evoking through words, images, and other signs the idea of an idolatrous enemy to be violently subjugated; instilling the desire of embarking on dangerous religious missions and invoking the sweetness of martyrdom; destroying the cultural and religious artifacts of the Other: all these elements appear recurrently in history, often adopting expressive and emotional formulae that thin lines of cultural genealogy link to past representations, but that the evolution of media technology pushes toward new levels of efficacy.

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Jihad as a lifestyle

by Rik Coolsaet

‘Pop-jihad as a lifestyle’, so the Dutch Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism opined, when expressing his worries about the appeal of jihadist symbols to young Europeans.1 Starting in 2012, many thousands Europeans have travelled to join jihadist groups in Syria, in particular the so called Islamic State (aka ISIL or ISIS). Numbers vary from 3,400 to 5,000. By July 2015, from Belgium alone some 440 individuals have gone to the region (included are the 50 or so who never made it to Syria). But looking into the motivations and backgrounds of this relative large group from a small country might help to shed a light on the journey of Westerners to “a country they do not know, in a culture they are not familiar with, and where a language is spoken that they do not understand.”2

In past decades, Europeans have been joining jihadi battlefields. But today’s European foreign fighters are difficult to compare with the jihadis of the past decades. Several characteristics set them apart from

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2 According to Ben Hamidou, who plays the role of ideological leader of a group of men leaving for Syria, in Djihad, a successful theatre play in Brussels theaters in 2014.
their predecessors. The first difference is related to their age: the Syria fighters are on average many years younger than their predecessors. In previous decades, the average age was 28 years and the typical age range 25–35. Nowadays however, it is more likely to be close to 20, and the age range of the foreign fighters from Belgium seems to be typically 20–24. Unfortunately, teenagers are no exceptions, and neither are entire families, and mothers with small children travelling to Syria.

The suddenness of their decision to leave for Syria is also a striking characteristic for most of the youngsters. As a result of this, and of their younger age, their religious knowledge is even more superficial than their predecessors’, as is their acquaintance with international politics. Geopolitics is less important to them than to their predecessors, who felt motivated by the struggle against the superpowers. Injustice was often a starting point in their predecessors’ journey towards extremism and terrorism. Now, personal estrangement has become the primary engine.

Once in Syria and Iraq, their yearning to place themselves at the centre of events (with numerous selfies and social media posts on trivia like kohl make-up for boys and other teenage themes) reflects a degree of narcissism that was largely absent among their older predecessors.

However the uncomfortable truth is that just as in the terrorist campaigns of the past, today’s foreign fighter phenomenon is rooted in the characteristics of our modern society. It is fair to characterize the current foreign fighters phenomenon as part of a youth subculture that has developed against a very specific social and international context. Moreover, it is a generational conflict. Up to a point, the very same mechanisms were at play during the protest movements in the 1960s and the 1970s, when parts of the younger generation also rebelled against society, to the bewilderment of their parents, who couldn’t possibly comprehend their youngsters’ discontent.
But society now differs significantly from society in the 1960s and 1970s.

To begin with the most obvious transformation, society today puts much greater pressure on young people than it did 40 years ago. Individualism and the lifting of traditional political, religious and ideological fault lines leave youngsters much earlier to their own devices and exposed to society than their peers back then. At a much earlier stage, today’s young people have to make their own decisions in a society that offers incomparably more choices in all dimensions of life. Simply put, it is more demanding to be young today than it was back then.

Struggling with identity and self-image might have been demanding for youngsters since time immemorial, but modern times gave it a new label: ‘teenage angst’

Firstly, struggling with identity and self-image might have been demanding for youngsters since time immemorial, but modern times gave it a new label: ‘teenage angst’. Today, moreover, this happens in an environment that has become very complex, with fewer benchmarks and points of reference, as a result of the dynamics of globalisation and the post-industrial revolution. And on top of this, the future doesn’t look bright: “The generation coming of age in the 2010s faces high unemployment and precarious job situations, hampering their efforts to build a future and raising the risk of social unrest.”

Secondly, pessimism rules today. All European countries have been increasingly under the spell of pessimism, according to surveys. This pessimistic outlook stands in stark contrast to the optimistic zeitgeist of the 1960s and 1970s, when the horizon looked bright, activism thrived, and radical changes for the better appeared to be within reach. But when pessimism is all-pervading, ideals die, resignation is omnipresent, and the energy to strive for change fades away.

Thirdly, an additional factor of potential estrangement puts pressure on a specific segment of youngsters in Europe. Exactly 30 years ago, a French weekly featured the portrait of a veiled Marianne to illustrate the cover story: “Serons-nous encore Français dans trente ans?” (“Will we still be French in 30 years?”). Nowadays, the children and grandchildren of the migrant workers are still being confronted with their origins. They are still routinely labelled ‘migrant communities’ – notwithstanding the fact that these families have now been present on European soil for three or four generations, and that many of them have acquired Belgian (or other European) nationality.

Moreover, after 9/11 a general stereotype developed to equate ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’. The significant diversity within diasporic communities from Muslim-majority countries was thus compressed into a single monolithic category of ‘Muslim community’, conflating ethnicity with religion, and setting them apart as group. Prompted by this ‘stigma’, many started to think of themselves first as Muslims rather than as citizens of their country. ‘Proud to be a Muslim’ became the theme in lyrics and Facebook accounts. Around 2008, a ‘Cool Islam’ movement emerged, developing into a youth subculture, with its own rap, designer clothes and magazines. Some who could afford to started to look for opportunities to emigrate to more welcoming places, like Montreal or New York.

6 Maruta Herding, “Inventing the Muslim cool: Islamic youth culture in Western Europe,” Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014.
Nowadays, the children and grandchildren of the migrant workers are still being confronted with their origins.

But not everybody has this opportunity. Last but not least, this cultural divide in Europe is indeed also intimately intertwined with real inequalities that have been growing in European societies too. Socio-economic inequality is one of them. Citizens with a non-European background are overrepresented in the lower rungs of most socio-economic categories (unemployment, housing, health, education). Compared to their peers, youngsters in this group are confronted with a number of real obstacles, in particular discrimination on the job and the real estate market and educational deficiencies. Within migrant communities, despair, discouragement, and even fear about their youngsters’ chances of overcoming these situations in the foreseeable future, has been prevalent for some time now. Some of these youngsters feel as if they have ‘no future’ as their horizon. ‘Un sentiment d’abandon’ (‘a feeling of abandonment’), was the prevailing sentiment Latifa Ibn Zieten, the mother of one of the soldiers killed by Mohammed Merah in 2012, had sensed when speaking at schools in the French cités.  

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Citizens with a non-European background are overrepresented in the lower rungs of most socio-economic categories

This is the conducive environment for the wide array of personal, age-related motivations through which youngsters may be tempted by a departure for Syria. Frequently they refer to the absence of a future, to personal difficulties that have to be coped with in everyday life. Often their stories point to a desire to leave all this behind, to be ‘someone’, to be accepted. Ultimately, to find refuge in a more welcoming environment. Straightforward moral absolutes appeal to them, as a way out of the complexities of their environment. More malicious motives are at play too, evading prison sentences, kicking on Rambo-style violence, adventure seekers, looking for something more thrilling than everyday life in Belgium. To all these push factors, IS provides for an outlet.

Posts on social media sometimes refer to Tupac Shakur, icon of American gangsta rap. His life and his rap lyrics indeed seem to fit well into the world outlook of this group. The foreign fighter phenomenon is rooted in a specific youth subculture that has developed in reaction to an environment young people feel and perceive as complex, demanding, unequal and devoid of hope for improvement. It is no longer the result of a more or less protracted process of political radicalisation. It is foremost an escape from their estrangement from society and the apparent lack of empathy of society to their situation.

Often their stories point to a desire to leave all this behind, to be ‘someone’, to be accepted

This fault line between society and part of the younger generation that gave birth to the subculture in which this new generation of foreign fighters thrive, is barely acknowledged by mainstream politics, and is essentially overshadowed by the reductionist debate on the compatibility of Islam with western values.

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The author

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F3 Magazine
Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists
Jihad as a Lifestyle

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The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence

by Mia Bloom

We remain fascinated by terrorist acts and how seemingly normal people transform into cold-blooded killers. We have certain preconceived notions about who becomes a terrorist and why. Much of the conventional wisdom and preconceived notions are more conventional wisdom that empirically based on reality and facts. Mohammed Emwazi previously known as ‘Jihad John’ an educated middle class British citizen who became notorious for beheading Western aid workers and journalists in Syria.

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1 This work was supported in part by a MINERVA N000141510835 grant on State Stability under the auspices of the Office of Naval Research. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Defense, the Office of Naval Research or the U.S. government.
surprised many who saw an educated Westernized person with no history of radical views.2 The stereotypes about terrorists include faulty assumptions about sanity, a history of anti-social behavior, poverty, or drug and alcohol abuse.3 More often than not, terrorist groups use these assumptions to their benefit. Among the many assumptions about level of education, wealth, and ethnic background inevitably has also been that of gender.

When most people superficially picture the stereotypical terrorist, they usually think of a male, between the ages of 18 and 30, perhaps of Middle Eastern or Arabic descent. Few people immediately associate terrorism with women even though women have always been involved in terrorism and political violence. From the very beginning as far back as the nineteenth century women have played key roles in violent extremist organisations. The very first person ever to be tried for terrorism, Vera Zasulich, was a woman and an anarchist for the Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) in Tsarist Russia. In January 1878 Vera and her co-conspirator Masha Kolenkina shot Theodore Trepov, the governor general of St. Petersburg with a revolver hidden under her shawl. Trepov survived the assassination attempt. Zasulich was arrested and tried for attempted murder. The trial of the century attracted huge crowds including the entirety of Russia’s intellectual elite. On the stand Zasulich balked at the attempted murder charges levied against her. “I am a terrorist… not a murderer!” She proudly proclaimed. Vera was ultimately acquitted as the crowd lifted her out of the courtroom and carried her on their shoulders in victory. Among Zasulich’s associates in Narodnaya Volya were other women, Vera Figner, Maria Oshanina, Anna Yakimova, and Sophia Perovskaya were all key members of the organization and as much as one third of the core leadership of the People’s Will was female. After the trial, Zasulich was celebrated as a martyr for the oppressed social classes and became the face of the revolution.

Women’s participation in terrorism may be considered a natural progression from their involvement in radical and revolutionary struggles of the past.5 The women of Narodnaya Volya were reportedly more willing to die for the cause than their male comrades.6 Women engaged in anti-colonial and revolutionary struggles in the Third World for decades.

Historically women’s primary contribution to political movements was to give birth to the future generation of fighters and raise them to be ideologically steadfast and perfect soldiers. In the modern period, to the extent that women were involved, they tended to play a more peripheral role by providing support to terrorist groups.

Beginning in 1968, women became involved in all manner of insurgent and terror groups from the Marxist organizations in Europe, to the nationalist movements of the Middle East. Female militants came from all parts of the globe and from all walks of life; Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Baader-Meinhof group, the Black Panthers, the Weathermen, and the Japanese Red Army included prominent women.7 For the organiz

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2 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/02/26/mohammed-emwazi_n_6759714.html
4 Ana Siljak, Angel of Vengeance: The Girl who shot the governor of St Petersburg and sparked the age of assassination. NY: St Martin’s 2009.
organizations that addressed women’s equality as part of their political platform, women rose through the ranks and became leaders in their own right.

**Women became involved in all manner of insurgent and terror groups from the Marxist organizations in Europe, to the nationalist movements of the Middle East**

In the 1960s and 1970s, women played key roles in some of the European groups. Ulrike Meinhoff helped found the Baader Meinhof group also known as the Red Army Faction in Germany. Her partner in the organization, Astrid Proll was a vital operative in several attacks. While Meinhoff lent her name to the group as its key ideologue, most women did not emerge as leaderships. Russell and Miller’s landmark study analyzed 550 terrorists from 1966 to 1976 in which women were associated with terrorist movements such the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse). The study assessed membership in the major left wing and nationalist groups in South America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Japan. Despite the highly visible exploits of a handful of women; the general pattern for most terrorist organizations was that women were dramatically underrepresented. Aside from the German Red Army Faction and Revolutionary cells (that included a substantial female involvement) women represented less than 20 percent of the total. More importantly, women often played secondary roles to men. Leonard Weinberg and Bill Eubank explained, “Women who carried out attacks or who served as leaders were exceedingly rare.”

Women nevertheless provided a powerful symbol of the struggles and were featured in the organizations’ propaganda. In part this might have been an attempt to portray a more egalitarian society or perhaps to attract male recruits. So while they were not leaders, they were important elements of the propaganda. One such example was Leila Khaled who became the poster child for Palestinian militancy as a member of the PFLP (Popular Front

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for the Liberation of Palestine). Khaled was involved in multiple hijacking operations between 1969 and 1970 and became an icon of Palestinian resistance, inspiring poems and songs in six different languages.

Another female source on inspiration (terrorist ‘cover girl’) was Mairead Farrell of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland. Shot in Gibraltar in 1988 during an operation to bomb British soldiers, Farrell was a leading member of PIRA. She participated in the dirty protests (refusal to bathe or wash) and even led several women to join the hunger strikes in 1981. As the leader of women in Armagh jail, Farrell was so revered that she is still lionized by Republicans and dissidents alike.

While they were not leaders, they were important elements of the propaganda

Farrell was not the only woman involved with the Provisional IRA. Women’s roles ranged from banging garbage can lids to alert the men that the British soldiers were coming, (as portrayed in the film ‘71), to involvement with active service units (ASUs) by sisters Dolours and Anne Price who intimidated in their ability to kill and deceive the British Authorities.

While women have been involved in violent extremism in Europe for decades, the face of Islamist extremists and Salafi Jihadis has traditionally been male because of patriarchal interpretations about women’s freedom of movement and expectations about the appropriate role a woman can and should have. For the past few years, this has ceased to be the case. Groups that previously eschewed engaging women now recruit and engage women with increasing lethality. Women have played a variety of roles in terrorist groups, as recruiters, propagandists, quartermasters, fund-raisers, and even as suicide bombers. Groups that previously eschewed women’s involvement now recruit women and girls deliberately.

Between 1985 and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks (representing about a quarter of the total) on behalf of many different terrorist organizations. The percentage of women since 2002 in some countries exceeds as much as fifty percent of the operatives. The women have killed hundreds of men, women, and children and their acts have maimed, blinded or crippled thousands more. Dozens more women have tried and failed, and allegedly hundreds are being trained for the future. The numbers have increased in the past five years partly because groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, the Taliban and others have begun to deploy female operatives in greater numbers. While Al Qaeda was a late adopter of this tactical innovation, by 2005 it became clear that women could do things men could not.

Groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, the Taliban and others have begun to deploy female operatives in greater numbers

The media fetishizes female terrorists and contributes to the belief that there is something unique, something just not right about the women who kill. The Western media make assumptions about what the women think, why they do what they do, and what ultimately motivates them. Women are hardly the

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13 Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone, “The Western Mujahirat of ISIS” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, April 2015.

14 French police were on the alert for Algerian female suicide bombers, October 2010.

15 Page Whaley Eager, From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and
Innovative terrorist groups exploit gender stereotypes and cultural clichés to their advantage

Assumptions that women are inherently more peaceful or not a threat have lulled security forces into complacency. As late as 2006, US soldiers in Iraq were told not to invasively search Iraqi women in the Sunni triangle for fear of antagonizing the local population. A former U.S. Marine officer who fought in the Battle of Falluja said, “If we are not allowed to look at Iraqi women, then how can we search for the bomb under the abaya?”

Between 1985 and 2010, female bombers committed over 257 suicide attacks (representing about a quarter of the total) on behalf of many different terrorist organizations

Female suicide bombers appear to be ideal operatives as they can penetrate the defenses of the security forces. Women bypass security checkpoints, often manned by male members of the security apparatus or military. The traditional and modest robes easily conceal a vest or belt packed with explosives. The improvised explosive device (IED) is placed under traditional and loose fitting clothing, strapped around the woman’s midsection to give the impression of a late-term pregnancy. Security personnel make assumptions about the inherent peacefulness of women. An expectant mother carries with it a host of additional stereotypes and expectations.

If anything, the appearance of late-term pregnancy has discouraged invasive body searches and frisking for fear of alienating and antagonizing the local population.

Women bypass security checkpoints, often manned by male members of the security apparatus or military

Alternatively, depending on the context in order to throw off security personnel, instead of loose billowing robes, female bombers might hyper Westernize their appearance, wear heavy make up and immodest clothing like mini-skirts, midriff baring shirts, and revealing tank tops. This transformation of traditional women from demure to attractive, distracting and invisible has been convincingly portrayed in the film “The Battle of Algiers” wherein Algerian women cut and dye their hair, put on makeup and Western dresses to smuggle weapons through French military checkpoints and plant bombs in cafes.

Fifty years on, using female operatives remains one of the best ways to get through checkpoints, because even after all the years
of female terrorists and suicide bombers (since 1987 and across over a dozen different conflicts) people are still amazed when a woman is involved (e.g., recently Hayat Boumedienne in the Paris attacks).

Women provide an excellent cover when they are acting individually or in teams. If the authorities are on the lookout for male perpetrators, the presence of a woman (often posing as part of a couple) can help avoid detection - as was often the case with male Active Service Units of the Provisional IRA or male/female teams in Somalia for al Shabaab.19 A couple with a child (posing as a family) is even more effective. For several years the US military had in place a profile for car and truck bombers with one exception, if there was a child in the car, there was no need to worry. Al Qaeda in Iraq used this to their advantage and began to strap children into their car bombs to use as decoys to evade the profile.20

Female operatives are especially useful when the groups target civilians and other “soft targets.” When the terrorists want to kill civilians, what better choice than an operative who resembles the target? Women more easily access markets and restaurants where they kill scores of civilians. Recent attacks by Boko Haram at Global Cell Phone markets or the Chicken Market in Yobe and Borno states provide an illustration of this dynamic. Not only did the terrorist organization use women, but also very young girls aged 10-12.

When the terrorists want to kill civilians, what better choice than an operative who resembles the target?

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In South Asia, women actively participated in the fight for Tamil Independence as part of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In 1987 the Tamil Tigers created separate units for women led by women. While many people incorrectly assume that the LTTE invented female suicide bombing, the reality is that they improved the technique to create the perfect stealth weapon. Female bombers have managed to kill several Presidents and Prime Ministers and using women allowed the armed group to get up close and personal with the target, again because they can get access to the target.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1991, Thenmuli Rajaratnam code-named Dhanu (aka Gayatri) was selected to kill former Indian Prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. As Gandhi was campaigning for reelection in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE sent Dhanu to an election rally with a garland of flowers. As former Prime Minister Gandhi bent down to accept the offering, she detonated 700 grams of explosives strapped around her waist, killing herself, Gandhi and eight others, including the photographer who captured the scene.\textsuperscript{22}

US military had in place a profile for car and truck bombers with one exception, if there was a child in the car, there was no need to worry. Al Qaeda in Iraq used this to their advantage and began to strap children into their car bombs. This assassination was a turning point for the LTTE. It was significant not just because the attack killed a major political figure, but also because the perpetrator was a woman. Women proved to be indispensable to the LTTE and comprised as much as 30% of the total number of suicide attackers from 1991-2007.\textsuperscript{23} Women also formed specific attack units that were highly successful.


on the battlefield\textsuperscript{24} including the all female tank unit able to rout the Sri Lankan military on a regular basis for example, the Battle for Elephant pass.

While women in the LTTE initially appeared to join voluntarily, journalistic reports have emerged in which several women admitted to being mobilized and recruited coercively sometimes at the behest of family members or as the result of gender based violence. In this respect, the recruitment process mirrors that of the Jihadi Salafi groups who found new and innovative ways to exploit women. While the secular or left-wing groups may welcome women as front-line soldiers or suicide bombers, Jihadi groups have included a wider variation of women’s involvement.

Diverse groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Hamas have used women to devastating effect in the past two decades. While the total percentage of female to male suicide bombers never exceeds 30\% (except for the LTTE and Chechen Black Widows)\textsuperscript{25} women are able to accomplish tasks as operatives that men cannot.

To understand female suicide bombers we need to examine the phenomenon from two perspectives: one from the vantage point of the terrorist group and the other from the women themselves. For terrorist organizations, there are enormous benefits to using female operatives and especially female suicide bombers.

\textbf{Several women admitted to being mobilized and recruited coercively sometimes at the behest of family members or as the result of gender based violence}

Extremist groups tend to use women on the front lines at specific periods during conflicts. As explained, women are better at avoiding detection and better able to penetrate checkpoints. During the course of a anti-terrorist campaign, it becomes increasingly difficult for men to travel, pass through checkpoints or reach their intended targets. Security personnel, police and counter-terrorism professionals create profiles to help pre-empt bombers and make it impossible to succeed in their mission.\textsuperscript{26} The organizations are cognizant that stereotypes exist and adjust the kinds of tactics and operatives accordingly. During the course of research conducted on mapping the adaptation of terrorist networks to counter terrorism (CT) strategies, we determined that the terrorists pay close attention to the policies and tactics employed by the police and security personnel. If the police have a specific profile, the groups alter their operatives to fall under the radar screen. If a standard operating procedure is put into place, terrorists adapt at a far faster pace unencumbered by bloated bureaucracies that make changing police or military procedures time consuming and difficult.\textsuperscript{27} Because of existing stereotypes about the inherent peacefulness of women, CT officials, and security personnel have been glacially slow to adapt and consider that women might be involved in militant activities.

Put simply, extremist groups use the stereotypes of their targets. Nobody expects the bomber to be a woman. Because soldiers in Iraq in 2006 were instructed that invasively searching women was a cultural faux pas and would cause great offence to the local Iraqi population. Iraqi militant groups and terrorists like Abu Musab al Zarqawi identified a tactical advantage. Groups like Ansar al Sunnah and Al Qaeda

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in Iraq started to send women to deliver bombs to civilian targets. Women can penetrate a target more deeply and gain better access. While a male operative might be stopped at the entrance, a woman will usually be able to get to the back of the room. This allows small amounts of explosive to have the destructive capability of larger bombs.

**Terrorist leaders have relayed to me that they believed that the women were ‘more expendable’ than men. They found it easier to manipulate women to become bombers. Understanding the social pressures, they knew that women would want to prove their dedication to the men of the community and show that they were just as fierce as their brothers, fathers and sons. Terrorist groups understand the public relations benefit of deploying female bombers. During the course of my research about women and terrorism I observed a pattern that when terrorist groups used female operatives, they garnered significantly more media and press attention for the story. The result could be as much as 8 times as many stories compared to when the groups use a male bomber. Because publicity and the media are the lifeblood of terrorism, this is a huge benefit women bring to terrorist organizations. Extremist groups likewise understand Western gender stereotypes as well as those that exist within their own cultures. When the extremist organizations face challenges in recruitment, using a woman will goad more men into participating. The groups are able to shame men into joining the cause because failure to do so may make the men appear weak and unmanly by allowing women to do their job.

**When terrorist groups used female operatives, they garnered significantly more media and press attention for the story**

This has been punctuated in the women’s last will and testament martyrdom videos, in which female suicide bombers have made the point of saying that they are stepping forward to carry out the martyrdom operation (which they call ‘amalyat ishtishada’). Because the men are unwilling and not man enough to do it themselves.

Finally, female suicide bombers are able to do something that a man could not easily accomplish, to disguise the bomb as late term pregnancy. Anoja Kugenthirasingh was tasked with killing the chief of the Sri Lanka military in charge of the government’s campaign against the Tamil Tigers. For several weeks prior to the attack she visited the maternity clinic at the military hospital in order to establish an alibi that she was in fact pregnant and make sure the sentry guards at the gate knew her. After three weeks she was ready. As Gen-

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30 Sjoberg, Laura, and Caron E. Gentry. “Reduced to bad sex: Narratives of violent women from the Bible to the War on Terror.” International Relations 22.1 (2008): 5-23.
33 Bloom, Mia M. “In Defense of Honor: Women and Terrorist Recruitment on the Internet.”
eral Sarath Fonseka’s limousine approached the entrance she waited with her suicide belt strapped around her waist and detonated her explosive. She failed to kill Fonseka but killed several of his aides and herself in the process.

**Women have used their gender to imply, if you were a REAL man, you would go to Iraq and fight the Jihad**

While several groups engaged women on the front lines as fighters and bombers, many of the more traditional Jihadi Salafi groups tended to hold back on tapping 50% of the population. In the past ten years, women have been increasingly involved in terrorism via new technologies such as the Internet and recently, social media. In the 1990s, most al Qaeda training camps required relocation to Afghanistan or the Sudan. The emergence of the Internet allowed people to become radicalized in the comfort of their own homes and with a click of the mouse. Supporters of al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist groups now meet on the Internet, in password protected chat rooms and on social media. There are cases of women using these forums to goad men into action. Women have used their gender to imply, if you were a REAL man, you would go to Iraq and fight the Jihad.

**Women, the Internet and social media**

Women on the Internet and social media have now become a crucial element in the recruitment of foreign fighters going to Syria or to inspire homegrown lone actor attacks within North America. When a woman from Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, Colleen La Rose was arrested in October 2009, the reaction to a blonde convert was one of shock and surprise. Online her nom de guerre was ‘Jihad Jane’ and she was arrested and found guilty for planning to kill Danish cartoonist Larks Vilks for mocking the Prophet Mohammed. La Rose did not fit the conventional profile of an Al Qaeda terrorist operative – she was white, from Michigan and had no known connections to violent extremism. She converted to Islam in 2005.

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and via the Internet, La Rose plotted to kill Lars Vilks with her friend Jamie Paulin-Ramirez (Jihad Jamie) and six other co-conspirators. Vilks remained on Al Qaeda’s most wanted list (along with Charlie Hebdo cartoonists and Ayaan Hirsi) and was the target of the attack in Denmark in January 2015 when an ISIS inspired supporter attempted to finish off the job.

Women online and on social media have provided a platform for Jihadi messages or venues for posting videos and other audio-visual propaganda in the service of terrorism. In Belgium, Malika El Aroud created a website, Min Bar - SOS, dedicated to inciting her readers to join the Global Jihad. Aroud’s first husband was the first suicide bomber in Afghanistan and killed Ahmed Shah Masood, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance two days before 9/11. Being the wife of a martyr transformed Aroud into one of the most prominent female jihadists in Europe. She used her fame and notoriety to goad “Muslim men to go and fight” and rally “women to join the cause” on her website. Aroud’s transformation set the tone for other women who followed a similar trajectory first as wife and then as source of emulation. The wife of 7/7 bomber Jermaine Lindsay, Samantha Lewthwaite became known as the White Widow when in the aftermath of his death she joined al Shabaab and recruited for the Global Jihad. The transformation from wife to heroine has been a powerful lure for women and explains how ISIS is both able to convince Western women to join the I-
Islamic State and cast the benefits of being a martyrs’ wife.

Redemption, Revenge, Respect, Relationship and Rape
To explain women’s motivation, we can summarize the phenomenon as the five R’s: Redemption, Revenge, Respect, Relationship and Rape. While it should be stressed that women are motivated by multiple sources and overlapping reasons, there are not significant differences between what motivates men versus women in joining extremist organizations. It is equally important to stress the fact that the conventional wisdom that portrays women as motivated by emotion while men are motivated by politics, religion or nationalism has established a false dichotomy. The reality is far more complex and in fact women and men are all motivated by a combination of reasons, some personal and some political although perhaps in different percentages or at different times.

To explain women’s motivation, we can summarize the phenomenon as the five R’s.

Redemption, Revenge, Respect, Relationship and Rape

It is often alleged that any woman involved in terrorism has done so for personal reasons. A conventional wisdom among scholars of terrorism is that women who become suicide bombers are seeking to redeem themselves through an act of martyrdom. If a woman has something shameful in her past for which she needs to atone, this singular action will clear the slate and anything that transpired before is forgotten. The only thing that people will remember about the woman is that she was a martyr for the cause. Another equally popular explanation for women’s involvement has been that women are seeking revenge for the loss of loved ones. Chechen female suicide bombers are alleged to have lost fathers, brothers and sons during several wars with Russia since 1999. The Russian authorities have christened them ‘Black Widows” although a detailed examination of women in Chechnya and Dagestan who have perpetrated acts of suicide terrorism include several who were unmarried or were radicalized well before the death of a loved one. Furthermore, Chechen women have tended to join Imirat Kavkaz in groups and while the loss of loved ones may contribute to their personal motivations to become involved, after two Chechen wars one would be hard pressed to find women who have not been affected in one way or another. The loss of a loved one may be a necessary though insufficient explanation. By this same token, many of the male suicide bombers have also lost loved ones (sons, brothers, fathers or female family members). One is struck by the fact that Chechen bombers (like Irish militants and activists) have often joined as part of family units and history is replete with siblings acting in concert or in coordinated attacks.

There is a view that women seek the respect of their peers. Through violence, women can show that they are just as dedicated to the cause. Although this perspective is most often argued by Feminist scholars research has shown that few women involved in terrorist movements consider themselves to be Feminists.

The R the best predicts a woman’s involvement in political violence is “relationship.” In particular if a woman has a male relative who is already a member of the group, this exponentially increases the likelihood that she will be welcomed into the organization. In many contexts involvement in terrorism becomes the family business. Involving members of the same family is also the best way for terrorist groups to prevent infiltration and ensure that a new recruit is not an informer. A woman whose family member is also a member, is less likely to change her mind at the last moment for fear of causing embarrassment or disappointment within her kinship network.

Although many women have joined terrorist groups for a variety of political and personal reasons, in the past few years another major reason has emerged. Rape. Women have been vul-
nerable to sexual exploitation or attack especially at checkpoints or during nighttime search and seizures of their homes. When women are raped in traditional and patriarchal societies, they are subject to existing honor codes, which hold women responsible for their sexual propriety and blame women who have shamed their families for having been raped. Terrorist organizations provide a haven for these women. By becoming a suicide bomber, the shame of rape disappears and is replaced by the pride associated with being a martyr for the cause.38

By becoming a suicide bomber, the shame of rape disappears and is replaced by the pride associated with being a martyr for the cause.

While historically, the women were raped by soldiers on the other side, the terrorist organizations are increasingly raping the women or arranging for women to be raped. In Iraq, Samira Ahmed Jassim is alleged to have orchestrated the rape of 80 women to turn them into suicide bombers for Ansar al Sunnah, an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) the precursor group to ISIS.39

Several cultures around the world extol the virtues of martyrdom and self-sacrifice. These cultures of martyrdom exist in Islamic societies and in Tamil society - although in a secular form (self gift or thatkodai).40 Teenagers and youth in contexts that laud martyrdom will idolize famous suicide bombers. Parks, squares and streets are named after the deadliest bombers.41

The appreciation for violence has pernicious effects on young people whose priorities and role models are distorted in favor of violent terrorists. Specifically, such cultures of martyrdom convey an insidious message to women, they can accomplish more with their death than they ever could with their lives. One such example comes from Iraq when a fifteen-year-old girl, Rania Mutleg told her family she wanted to become a doctor. They scoffed at this goal and explained it was unlikely that she would grow up to be a doctor but certainly she could become a martyr.42 She was preempted by Iraqi National Police en route to a Shi’a girls’ school before she could detonate the explosive device strapped around her midsection.

Terrorist organizations are increasingly raping the women or arranging for women to be raped.

In a variety of settings and across several regions, women who sacrifice their lives are celebrated. In Belfast, murals on the Falls Road depict Mairead Farrell, the leader of the women in Armagh prison as a heroine. In Palestine, Ayat al Akras, a Palestinian bomber is immortalized. Wafa Idris, the first Palestinian suicide bomber has graced the cover of Time magazine, was the subject of a series of novels about her life and her image is emblazoned on posters and pamphlets. According to one watchdog organization, there is even a training camp for young

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By being a bomber she transformed herself from being a source of shame to her family (her husband divorced her after she could not bear children) to a source of great admiration in the community. In Sri Lanka, the Tigers have a museum dedicated to their memory.

They scoffed at this goal and explained it was unlikely that she would grow up to be a doctor but certainly she could become a martyr

While we are familiar with the male face of terror, there are new faces primed to take their place. The face of yesterday was Bin Laden’s, today it is perhaps Samira Ahmed Jassim, and tomorrow, who knows, we are seeing more and more children manipulated into becoming violent extremists. This is an insidious form of child abuse and as we move into the future, we should know that the face of terror always changes.


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The author

Mia M. Bloom is a Professor of Communication at Georgia State University. Bloom is the author of Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror and Bombshell: Women and Terrorism. She is currently writing a book on children’s involvement in terrorist networks in Pakistan, the Middle East and North Africa entitled Small Arms: Children and Terror with Dr. John G. Horgan for Cornell University Press (2016). She can be reached at mbloom3@gsu.edu.
A training workshop targeting law enforcement authorities and legal professionals will be held in Rome from 27-29 October 2015.

The event will be organized by UNICRI as a component of PRISM – Preventing, Redressing and Inhibiting hate Speech in new Media – a project funded by the FRAC Programme of the European Commission, in cooperation with the Institute for International Legal Studies of the National Research Council of Italy (CNR) and the other partners.

The 15 hour-training course will take place at the offices of CNR and will cover a wide range of topics: including an overview of the concepts of racism and anti-discrimination, the legal frameworks for dealing with hate speech and hate crime at the international, EU and Italian levels, and information on how to investigate and report these issues, with a focus given to victims’ assistance.

The workshop is free of charge, and approximately 30 participants will have the possibility to attend. Lawyers participating in the specialized training will be awarded Educational credits issued by the Bar Association of Rome. The working language will be Italian.

For more information and to register, please contact Ms. Elena D’Angelo at dangelo@unicri.it and visit UNICRI’s webpage dedicated to the PRISM Project, which can be found at: http://www.unicri.it/special_topics/hate_crimes/
Extreme violence rose to unprecedented levels in 2014, leading to a dramatic increase of grave violations against children. Children have been disproportionately affected and were often the direct targets of acts of violence intended to inflict maximum casualties, terrorize entire communities and provoke worldwide outrage.

A tactic of extremist groups is the targeting of schools since they fundamentally object to the goal of universal education for children because they are an emblematic target. In other instances, schools located in areas controlled by extremist armed groups have had their curriculum changed to reflect the groups ideology.

[...] The military responses to the threat caused by extreme violence have also raised serious child protection concerns. In a number of situations where extreme violence is prevalent, military operations led by regional or international coalitions or by neighbouring countries have resulted in the killing and maiming of children.

Children have also been subjected to sexual violence and recruited and used by pro-Government militias. An area of particular concern related to the response to extreme violence is the deprivation of liberty of children due to their alleged association with extremist groups.

The report includes the list of parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim children, commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, or engage in attacks on schools and/or hospitals in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council.
Some highlights from the Report
Violations are thought to be largely underreported because of lack of access and limited monitoring capacity on the ground.

AFGHANISTAN
- 48% increase in child casualties
- 163 attacks against schools
- Parties in Afghanistan:
  - Afghan National Police, including the Afghan Local Police
  - Haqqani Network
  - Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
  - Taliban forces, including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
- 464 cases of new recruitment
- 146 children killed and 289 injured
- rape of 405 girls and 1 boy, between the ages of 7 and 17
- at least 34 abductions
- Parties in Central African Republic
  - Ex-Séléka coalition and associated armed groups
  - Local defence militias known as the anti-Balaka
  - Lord’s Resistance Army

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
- The UN released 121 children
- 241 new cases of recruitment
- 80 children (52 boys, 28 girls) were killed and 92 maimed
- 334 cases of sexual violence
- Twenty-two schools were attacked
- at least 108 children abducted
- Parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
  - Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
  - Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)
  - Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)
  - Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)
  - Mayi Mayi Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) “Colonel Janvier”
  - Mayi Mayi “Lafontaine” and former elements of the Patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO)
  - Mayi Mayi Simba “Morgan”
  - Mayi Mayi Kata Katanga
  - Nduma Defence Coalition (NDC)/Cheka
  - Mayi Mayi Nyatura
  - Lord’s Resistance Army
IRAQ

- At least 45 Yezidi children died (shortages of food and water)
- 679 children killed
- 505 injured
- 1,297 children abducted
- 67 attacks on schools
- Parties in Iraq:
  - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

ISRAEL AND STATE OF PALESTINE

- At least 561 children (557 Palestinian; 4 Israeli) killed and 4,271 injured (4,249 Palestinian; 22 Israeli)

LEBANON

- Children joined armed factions in Palestinian camps and Syrian Arab Republic
- 40 children killed and 4 injured

LIBYA

- Children’s access to health care severely affected
**SOUTH SUDAN**

- 81 children recruited
- 147 abducted
- 90 killed and 220 injured
- 490 bodies of children in mass graves

Parties in the Central African region:
- Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
- SPLA in Opposition
- White Army
- Lord’s Resistance Army

**MALI**

- Hundreds of children engaged in hostilities
- 38 incidents of sexual violence against girls

Parties in Mali:
- Mouvement national de liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA)
- Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO)
- Ansar Dine

**MYANMAR**

- 53 escaped from the Tatmadaw, 13 arrested on charges of desertion

Parties in Myanmar:
- Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)
- Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
- Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA)
- Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council
- Karen Army (KNPP/KA)
- Shan State Army South (SSA-S)
- Tatmadaw Kyi, including integrated border guard forces
- United Wa State Army (UWSA)
SOMALIA

- 1,870 violations against children documented
- 819 children recruited in armed groups
- 340 incidents of killing and maiming affecting 520 children
- Al-Shabaab carried out public executions, including of children
- Parties in Somalia:
  - Al Shabaab
  - Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ)
  - Somali National Army

SUDAN

- 75,000 children in need of food and medical care
- Parties in Sudan:
  - Government security forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Sudan Police Forces
  - Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
  - Pro-Government militias
  - Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid
  - Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi
  - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N)

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

- Recruitment of children
- Sexual violence and forced marriage
- Parties in the Syrian Arab Republic:
  - Ahrar al-Sham al-Islami
  - Free Syrian Army (FSA) — affiliated groups
  - Government forces, including the National Defence Forces and the Shabbiha militia
  - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
  - al-Nusra Front (Jhabat Al-Nusra)
  - People Protection Units (YPG)
Recruitment and use of children as young as six years of age by armed groups

**Yemen**
- 156 boys recruited between the ages of 9 and 17
- Parties in Yemen:
  - Al-Houthi/Ansar Altah
  - Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)/Ansar al-Sharia
  - Government forces, including the Yemeni Armed Forces, the First Armoured Division, the Military Police, the special security forces and Republican Guards
  - Pro-Government militias, including the Salafists and Popular Committees

**Colombia**
- At least 9 children were killed and 60 were maimed, landmine incidents
- Parties in Colombia:
  - Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
  - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP)

**India**
- Recruitment and use of children as young as six years of age by armed groups

**Nigeria**
- Recruitment and use of boys and girls
- 314 children killed at school
- 276 girls abducted at school
- Parties in Nigeria:
  - Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad also known as Boko Haram
PAKISTAN

- At least 132 boys, as young as 8 years of age were killed. At least 133 persons were injured, the vast majority of them children.

PHILIPPINES

- Military use of several schools and one hospital
- Parties in the Philippines:
  - Abu Sayaf Group (ASG)
  - Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)
  - Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
  - New People’s Army (NPA)

THAILAND

- Recruitment and use of children by armed groups. Administrative detention of children for alleged association with armed groups
- 10 students killed - 15 students injured
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I am deeply concerned at the increase of grave violations outlined in the present report and call upon all parties to immediately end, and take all measures to prevent, grave violations against children.

Accountability is crucial to preventing grave violations, and I urge Member States to place it at the core of national and international responses to violations.

I call upon Member States to ensure that their response to threats to peace and security are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law. Member States should ensure that responses include specific mitigating measures for the protection of children.

I strongly urge all parties listed in the annexes to the present report who have not yet done so to enter into dialogue with the United Nations to agree on and implement measures to end grave violations and assist victims.

I call upon Member States to allow independent access to the United Nations for the purposes of monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children.

I also call upon Member States to facilitate contact between the United Nations and non-State armed groups for dialogue and follow-up on action plans in order to bring an end to violations. Such dialogue does not prejudge the political or legal status of those non-State armed groups.

I urge Member States to consider alternatives to the deprivation of liberty or prosecution of children for their alleged or actual association with armed groups or as part of counter-terrorism measures. At a minimum, Member States should ensure that procedures or trials are consistent with international juvenile justice standards and the principle of the best interests of the child.

The recruitment and use of children by extremist groups pose new challenges with regard to their protection, rehabilitation and reintegration. I encourage Member States to highlight and address the need for prevention and appropriate measures to rehabilitate those children recruited and used, including education programmes and vocational training, in compliance with the principle of the best interest of the child and respecting the child’s primary status as a victim.

I encourage Member States, regional organizations, international mediators and special envoys to continue including child protection provisions in peace negotiations and agreements.

I welcome the leadership and contribution of regional and subregional organizations in the protection of children. I call upon regional and subregional organizations to continue integrating child protection considerations in their policies, planning of peace support operations, training of personnel and conduct of operations.

I call upon all parties to respect the civilian character of schools and cease attacks against them and attacks and threats of attacks against students and teachers.

I call upon the Council to expand the tools available to child protection actors to gather information and report on the abduction of children, including through adding abductions as a trigger violation for listing in the annexes of the present report.
I also call upon the Council to continue to support the children and armed conflict agenda by strengthening provisions for the protection of children in all relevant mandates of United Nations peacekeeping, special political and peacebuilding missions. I also welcome and encourage the inclusion of grave violations against children as criteria for sanctions in Security Council committees.

I welcome the engagement and progress made so far regarding the “Children, Not Soldiers” campaign. I call upon all Member States to continue to mobilize political and financial support to ensure that progress achieved is institutionalized and durable.

I again urge all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its three Optional Protocols.
ISIS and illicit trafficking in cultural property: Funding terrorism through art

by Annelies Pauwels
This section of Freedom From Fear includes the opinions and analyses of young people. Young people represent the most valuable capital countries have. Their opinions have to be heard and considered while designing and planning new strategies to build better societies.
The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) recently shocked the world by destroying a number of archaeological sites throughout the region under its control, among which were the ancient Assyrian cities of Nineveh and Nimrud. Determined to impose its culture as the dominant one in the region, Daesh – the Arabic equivalent of ISIS – calls for the destruction of all cultural property of other religious groups, as well as Islamic artefacts it considers haram or forbidden in Islam, such as religious shrines and art depicting human faces. In reality, the trade in looted artefacts from Syria and Iraq to the rest of the world represents a major source of income for the terrorist group.

Taking over the Mesopotamian antiquities trade
Surely, ISIS is not the first group that saw the financial benefits of illicit trafficking in the region’s cultural property. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, different groups involved in the conflict have engaged in such activities in order to acquire their weapons. Reportedly, not only have rebel groups taken advantage of the trafficking in looted artefacts, but Syrian regime soldiers as well.1 In Iraq, the looting of archaeological sites has been practiced before the current conflict. Both during the country’s isolation after the first Gulf War and after the 2003 invasion, plundering and antiquities trafficking became a common source of income for insurgency groups.2

The trade in looted artefacts from Syria and Iraq to the rest of the world represents a major source of income for the terrorist group

After taking over vast areas of northern and eastern Syria and Iraq, ISIS has become the major player in smuggling the region’s cultural goods. Despite the fact that it did not “invent” the practice of archaeological looting in both countries, ISIS is believed to have intensified and accelerated the pre-existing situation.3 In fact, the current looting in the region is estimated to be massive and its unprecedented scale has

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The value of cultural heritage

Amidst the long list of war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious human rights violations and possibly even genocide attributed to ISIS, the destruction of cultural property within these war-torn countries might seem to lack importance and significance. Nevertheless, the region’s cultural heritage, comprising some of the world’s oldest traces of civilisation, belongs to human patrimony and should be protected by the international community. Additionally, one should not ignore the economic and development opportunities tourism could offer to both countries once the region stabilises. For instance, before the beginning of the uprisings in 2011, tourism in Syria accounted for an estimated 5% of the GDP. Moreover, the potential healing power of cultural property, which might help bringing together communities within such heterogeneous societies, should not be underestimated.


Additionally, one should not ignore the economic and development opportunities tourism could offer to both countries

Perhaps, a more persuasive reason for the international community to intervene is the enormous amount of financial resources the illicit trafficking in stolen art and antiquities offers to ISIS. In February 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted its resolution 2199 (2015), which extends to Syria the prohibition of trade in cultural objects already in place.
for Iraq since 2003 under resolution 1483. In its resolution, the UNSC expressed its concern that the Islamic State and others “are generating income from engaging directly or indirectly in the looting and smuggling in cultural heritage items (...) to support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks”. While oil revenues represent a significant portion of the group’s income, other primary income sources are generated from systematic extortion in the areas under its control, private foreign donations, kidnap ransoms, and looting of banks and stealing from the local population. Its involvement in illicit trafficking in cultural goods allows ISIS to diversify their financing. It has been estimated that more than a third of Iraq’s 12,000 important archaeological sites are now under ISIS’ control, while the smuggling of archaeological artefacts represents their second largest source of funding.


The route of smuggled Mesopotamian artefacts
Further research is needed to deepen knowledge of ISIS’ exact level of involvement in and modus operandi of the antiquities trade. Nevertheless, Daesh is believed to play an active role in controlling the trade; not only is it in charge of the looting by providing permissions and levying taxes to looters, but it also monitors the artefacts and decides which objects are to be sold or destroyed. The useful and transportable objects are smuggled by intermediaries to the neighbouring countries Turkey, Jordan and Iran through traditional smuggling routes. At this point, internationally connected antiquities dealers and collectors are thought to act as a link between the illicit and licit trade.

A large number of artefacts supposedly end up in antiquities markets in Jordan, where they are being sold to tourists. The internet has enlarged the possibilities of this illicit market. In fact, antique dealers are selling stolen antiquities from ancient Mesopotamia not just through the traditional channels, but also through the Deep Web. Even certain auction houses have been reported to sell on the open mar-
kets illegal artefacts from ISIS controlled regions, accompanied by false documentation. Such antiquities appear to be particularly desired by private buyers in Europe and the United States, and also in the Gulf countries and China. In fact, many of the stolen artefacts end up in private buildings, where they are being displayed as a status symbol. However, it is also expected that a majority of the stolen cultural goods are being held in storage rooms for future sale at higher prices.

It has been estimated that more than a third of Iraq’s 12,000 important archaeological sites are now under ISIS’ control

International efforts to fight illicit art trafficking

Undoubtedly, international cooperation and coordination are key aspects in the response to trafficking in cultural property. Antiquities smugglers are facilitated by the “open” borders surrounding both Syria and Iraq, some of which are extensive and difficult to control. ISIS makes use of smuggling networks that operate through long-standing routes, often passed on within families from generation to generation. The same routes are also used for trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings.

Even certain auction houses have been reported to sell on the open markets illegal artefacts from ISIS controlled regions

Additionally, antiquities smugglers take advantage of gaps in the relevant legislative framework or in its implementation. Since the 1970s, a number of international conventions as well as soft law agreements, aimed at reducing illegal trafficking of art, antiquities and cultural property, have been agreed upon. One of the main instruments is the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural objects, which obligates antiquities buyers to check the legitimacy of their purchase. This convention, however, has not been ratified either by Syria and Iraq or by some of the main States in which illicit Mesopotamian artefacts end up. In December 2014, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of non-binding guidelines aiming to assist Member States in the development and strengthening of their criminal justice policies, strategies, and legislation as well as cooperation mechanisms with regards to the trafficking in cultural property.

Other key aspects in the fight against the illicit trade in cultural objects are the development of documentation of the artefacts’ origin as well as inserting such information into inventories, both at a national and international level. Similar databases might assist authorities during investigations of trafficking in archaeological artefacts, but also guide auction houses in checking the provenance before selling cultural objects. Examples are INTERPOL’s Stolen Works of Art Database and the so-called “red lists”, issued by the International Council of Museums (ICOM). In addition, it is necessary to raise awareness that collecting looted antiquities is a crime that contributes to the financing of terrorism. In March 2014, three UN agencies started such an awareness-raising initiative, aimed at travellers and the tourism industry.

10 Franklin Lamb, “Looting is the Greatest Threat to Our Cultural Heritage in Syria.”
Conclusions
Although ISIS in appearance is a religiously inspired group, its funding operations resemble those of an “ordinary” organised criminal network. By raising money through a wide array of essentially criminal activities, ISIS appears to be a self-sustaining organisation that makes most of its money from the territory under its control, rather than relying heavily on foreign money flows, such as private donations. It is, therefore, critical to tackle their financial resources, including the money generated by the illicit art trade, which constitutes one of their main sources of income.

The effectiveness of traditional channels used for tackling financial terrorist funding, such as closing bank accounts and blocking money transfers, may decline in the case of ISIS. In fact, being a cash-based organisation that also heavily relies on hawalas or informal money transfer networks, ISIS is able to avoid legitimate banking channels. It is, however, essential to enhance border controls, in particular with the neighbouring States, and establish additional custom operations to prevent smuggling. The international community should also focus on promoting States’ adherence to and implementation of the relevant international legal framework, encouraging the documentation of archaeological sites in the affected States, enhancing the monitoring of the cultural property market, and raising public awareness on the seriousness of the issue.

The relevance of the involvement of Daesh in the illicit trade in archaeological goods from ancient Mesopotamia should not be underestimated. Despite the fact that this criminal activity seems to fade away among the horrendous atrocities that continue to be perpetrated in the region, its financial impact appears to be vital to the organisation.

Being a cash-based organisation that also heavily relies on hawalas or informal money transfer networks, ISIS is able to avoid legitimate banking channels.

The author
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The governance of Roma people in Italy: A shifting paradigm

by Alberto Mallardo
This section of Freedom From Fear includes the opinions and analyses of young people. Young people represent the most valuable capital countries have. Their opinions have to be heard and considered while designing and planning new strategies to build better societies.
Foreword
As suggested by the sociologist Luigi Manconi, Roma people are unpleasant to many people and there is no doubt that some of them live committing crimes and inducing their children to beg. Although the Roma, like everyone else, are accountable for their actions, other factors have concurred to shape this situation. This article analyses the effectiveness and the outcome reached by the different policy measures towards Roma people adopted by the Italian Government since the spring of 2008.

The Italian context
The European Commission identified in 2004 the condition of Roma people as one of the ‘most pressing political, social, and human rights issues facing Europe’. In 2013, also the United Nations expressed concern for the very serious human rights and development issues related to these communities, particularly in Europe. In comparison to other minority groups, Roma communities are confronted with higher child mortality rates, shorter life expectancies and limited access to health services, exclusion from schools and low educational attainment, poorer housing conditions and constricted by the scarce availability of sites.

The European Commission identified in 2004 the condition of Roma people as one of the ‘most pressing political, social, and human rights issues facing Europe’

Roma people living in Italy are estimated to range from 110,000 to 180,000, representing about the 0,23% of the total population. A majority of them, about 60%, are Italian citizen, live mostly in permanent houses, and do not adopt any type of nomadic lifestyles. The bulk of the remaining 40% includes groups of Roma that arrived in Italy in recent times. Only 8% of them still practice some form of nomadism while the vast majority of the other Roma people living in Italy have no experience of nomadism.

Roma communities are confronted with higher child mortality rates, shorter life expectancies and limited access to health services

In the light of the aforementioned data, Roma groups currently living in Italy do not compose a homogeneous community but rather have different cultural identities. Nonetheless, these groups are often identified with the exonyms zingari (gypsies) and nomadi (nomads). The former has been adopted even in official documents to indicate the considerable number of Roma communities in Italy while the latter expresses the belief that all or most of these people live a nomadic life. Both terms emphasise and objectify the idiosyncratic traits of these communities, contributing to shape the Gypsy stereotype.

As argued by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 2008, often

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1 Within this work, the term Roma is adopted to indicate groups of people that share similar cultural characteristics, such as Sinti, Camminanti, Kale, Travellers, Gens du voyage etc.


5 Ibidem


8
Gadje (non-Roma people) and Roma communities have been perceived as dichotomously opposed. Analysing the governance of Roma people in Italy allows us to unveil some of the factors that have contributed to generate such an unbearable situation both for Roma and non-Roma communities.

The vast majority of the other Roma people living in Italy have no experience of nomadism.

**The State of Emergency**
In the run-up to the general election of 2008, the growing number of illegal camps and settlements of Roma people, the many Roma children begging in the streets and the presence of unaccompanied Roma minors increasingly raised local tensions and contributed to amplify the echo of the past but still existing stereotypes and prejudices. Moreover, the atrocious murder of an Italian woman in the outskirt of Rome by a Romanian Roma in November 2007 made the ‘Roma issue’ a topic of national importance. Roma people climbed the public arena, appearing in the political and media agenda as a major concern for the Italian national security. From the Italian Parliament to popular talk shows, numerous debates were held on what has been called the problem of nomads (problema nomadi). Different voices from both ends of the political spectrum used buzzwords such as emergency, urgency, threat to public safety and public enemy.

Roma groups currently living in Italy do not compose a homogeneous community but rather have different cultural identities.

Consistent with their promises, immediately after the election in May 2008, the newly formed right wing Government declared

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10 Ibidem p.7
a ‘State of Emergency in relation to nomads’ community settlements’ and conferred special powers to the prefects of Milan, Rome and Naples to solve the so-called emergency. The adopted measures ranged from the mass collection of biometric data of Roma groups, to the demolition of shantytowns and the repatriation of EU citizens allegedly posing a threat to public security. These measures were justified as necessary to provide support to individuals in camps and to prevent further degradation of their living conditions, as well as to identify people involved in criminal activities.

However, as suggested by Alessandro Simoni, associate professor of comparative legal systems at the Department of Law of the University of Florence, besides indicating the inclination of the Italian Government towards an emergency approach over a long-term and structural planning, the extraordinary measures undertaken could have contributed to construct a highly racialized ethnic category.

International and national responses
Among the different concerns raised at the international and national level, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe considered the above-mentioned adopted measures: ‘disproportionate in relation to the actual scale of the security threat related to immigration and the situation of Roma settlements’. The former head of UNICEF in Italy, Vincenzo Spadafora, expressed serious concerns about the situation of Roma children in Italy, emphasising the fact that ‘the government would be acting in a discriminatory fashion unless it would have fingerprinted every child in Italy’. Even the former President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano meeting a group of students on the 18th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child argued: ‘We have been told – that they are evil - not only the Roma but also to the Romanians - and therefore we should be scared of them. Nevertheless, we must not be scared. We need to help them to integrate into society.’

Eventually, in November 2011, the Italian Council of State ruled that the ‘State of Emergency’ declared by the Government was unlawful, claiming that some aspects of the Decree constitute de facto a form of racial discrimination. The Council of State ruled that there was no evidence of a causal link between the existence of Roma’s settlements and an extraordinary and exceptional disruption of order and public security. Hereupon, all the measures undertaken based on the ‘State of Emergency’ were declared illegal.

We have been told – that they are evil - not only the Roma but also to the Romanians - and therefore we should be scared of them

Further policies: the National Strategy
In 2011, increased attention was given to the inclusion of Roma communities due to the enhanced efforts of the European institutions. The European Commission clearly defined the condition of many of the estimated 10–12 million of Roma people living in the continent as unbearable because of the growing prejudices, intolerance, discrimination and social exclusion experienced by them.

Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists
The governance of Roma people in Italy: a shifting paradigm

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16 Set. n. 6050 Cons. St., November 16, 2011.
17 Although the Italian Government appealed to the Court of Cassation in April 2015 the appeal was rejected by the Court. ERRC ‘Italy: a report by the European Roma Rights Centre,’ 2012, http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/italy-country-profile-2011-2012.pdf.
18 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions: An EU framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020,’
The European Commission established the EU framework for national Roma integration strategy defining the improvement of the Roma situation as a social and economic imperative for the EU and its Member States. 19 In 2012, the Italian Government translated the European indications into action and put in place the new National Strategy for Roma inclusion.20 The then Minister for Integration Policies and International Cooperation, Andrea Riccardi, strongly supported the adoption of the National Strategy for Roma Integration and on several occasions stressed the importance of changing the security-driven approach on Roma issues to a more inclusive strategy.

In line with the EU framework, the new strategy established four key areas of intervention: education, employment, health, and housing. However, although at the national level the need to put a definitive stop to mainly security-based measures was reaffirmed, at local level the endorsed principles of social justice and equity were not fulfilled. A number of reasons had in fact, limited the implementation of the planned measures. According to the non-profit organisation 21 Luglio, which stands up for the rights of Roma, a number of weaknesses has to be identified in the lack of clear targets, absence of performance indicators, poor budgeting and lack of monitoring and evaluation tools.21 Considering the lack of such clear requirements in terms of planning policy, local authorities have continued to postpone the implementation of the strategy, substantially posing at risk the whole policy design.

The UN has assisted in general social inclusion policy processes in EU frameworks, such as by supporting the development of National Action Plans for social inclusion targeting a number of vulnerable groups including Roma. In May 2012, a report on the situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States provided comprehensive data on the socio-economic status of Roma while also examining discrimination and rights awareness. The data also served as background for the European Commission’s simultaneous Communication on progress in this area, as reflected in the National Strategies for Roma Integration.

As stated by the UN “the strategies need to be followed by concrete action”. Too often, capacity in this regard is still poor, particularly at the local level where the real problems are and need to be addressed. For the national strategies to succeed, they need to be operationalized into tangible, results-oriented interven-

Towards a more effective policy

Over the years, a number of reasons have limited the social and economic inclusion of Roma communities in Italy. Although the Roma share part of the responsibility for the lack of integration, other causes have played a key role in this failure.

First, Roma communities have been largely misunderstood and as a consequence anti-Roma sentiments are widespread throughout the country. In 2011, a survey carried out by the Italian Senate Commission on Human Rights found that most of the population have partial or very limited information on the Roma living in Italy. Yet, 84% of the participants presumed that the majority of Roma people adopt nomadic lifestyles; another 92% thought that petty theft and shoplifting are an integral part of the Roma culture; while 82% of the participants believed that those communities have deliberately chosen to live in camp sites at the edge of ‘our cities’.23

As Nando Sigona – one of the most prominent experts on


Roma issues and fellow at the University of Birmingham – has pointed out, the portrayal of Roma people as nomadic population has been used to reinforce the idea that those people are stateless and deserve different rights from the rest of the population. Nonetheless, most of the groups of Roma that moved to Italy in the last decades had lived a settled life for centuries. The Roma in the camps tends inevitably to ghettoize in that dimension of social marginalisation and self-government, which is the perfect substrata for illegal business and illicit activity. In the meanwhile, those who live near those settlements are progressively convinced of the fact that Roma people represent a constant threat that have to be addressed.

The portrayal of Roma people as nomadic population has been used to reinforce the idea that those people are stateless and deserve different rights from the rest of the population. In this context, it is difficult to find space for integration and empowerment. Nonetheless, one factor could be particularly relevant in planning and implementing policies towards Roma people. The demographic profile of these communities shows that most of the Roma living in Italy are minors. Rather than reinforcing their racial segregation and fuelling a racing marginalisation process, which trap them in a vicious cycle of inequalities, the Italian Government and the Italian local authorities should invest in education, vocational training and in work placement programs. Twenty-nine million euros have already been allocated by the European Union for the Roma inclusion in Italy, non investing properly these resources would have consequences on many future generations both of Roma and non-Roma.

The author

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IN A CHANGING WORLD...
SOME RULES ARE TIMELESS

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New threats: knowing, informing, protecting
The economics of ISIS
A case of theft or money laundering?

by Svenja Berg and Killian J. McCarthy

Introduction
Founded in 2004, the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has striven to set up what they call an Islamic state within what is currently Syria and Iraq (Mirror, 2014). Since its inception, ISIS has prospered and expanded. According to CIA estimates, it has recruited 20-30,000 fighters, conquered a large swath of land and makes as much as two million US dollars a day.¹

Observers have already suggested that ISIS is probably one of the largest and wealthiest terrorist organizations in the world. For scholars, this raises a number of interesting questions. From a business perspective, ISIS poses a striking organizational and operational case, whereas for legal scholars the goals of ISIS, in terms of setting up a new state, also present noteworthy subjects. When looking at the organization from an economic angle, however, probably one of the most important issues to raise is: How does ISIS make its money? Does it simply steal it or does ISIS participate in the international economy and operate in the money laundering market?

The ISIS Business Model

ISIS has created a number of revenue streams. Firstly, ISIS acquires a large part of its revenues through plundering. The looting of banks in Mosul in 2014, for example, caught the public's attention, and boosted the organization’s coffers to about two billion US dollars.2

Secondly, ISIS has acquired a number of assets that allow it to generate revenues. In 2012, for example, it commandeered the oil fields in Eastern Syria, and since then has managed these resources as a source of income.3

Thirdly, ISIS is known to be engaged in activities such as smuggling (people, drugs, and archaeological artifacts), racketeering and tax levying. In certain areas such as those densely populated, this can lead to significant revenue generation.

How does ISIS make its money? Does it simply steal it or does ISIS participate in the international economy and operate in the money laundering market?

Finally, it is known that many rich individuals, particularly from the Gulf States, have made sizable donations to ISIS. For example, Tariq Bin-Al-Tahar Bin Al Falih Al-‘Awni Al-Harzi was known as a high-profile ISIL member, he worked to raise funds, recruit and facilitate the travel of fighters for the terrorist organization.4 He donated two million (US) dollars to ISIS, using normal financial transfers.5

Of the four financial streams, donations are the least significant source of income in terms of scale.6 The majority of ISIS’ income, therefore, is generated illegally. For most criminal organizations – such as the drug cartels in South America – generating a large share of the organizations’ revenues by illegal means creates problems. Legally generated cash, or ‘clean’ money, can be consumed, converted and invested, while illegally generated money can only be consumed.7 The so-called ‘dirty’ money, thus, has fewer uses, and it is therefore worth less. To maximize the value of its revenues, most criminal organizations, therefore, have to ‘wash’ their money, using money laundering services, aimed at “conceal[ing] or disguise[ing] the nature, location, source, ownership or control” of money.8 And of course such services cost: research suggests money laun-

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Some of the world’s best known and most respected financial institutions have been involved in the financing of criminal and terrorist organizations.

So does ISIS launder money?

If ISIS establishes its own cash-based economy, and limits its activity to that economy then no, the terrorist organization has no incentive to engage in money laundering. If, however, ISIS aims to become active outside its current economy – because, for example, it needs to buy supplies on a legitimate market – then yes, it will need to disguise the origin of any illegally generated money. In order to disguise the origin of its funds, ISIS needs to lodge them into the financial system. Local banks in the countries they operate or have connections are likely to be the first target for this. Having done so, ISIS will be able to access financial institutions and markets in Europe, the USA and Asia. It has already been observed, however, that ISIS has been sending people to other countries, be-

However, a significant difference between ISIS and other terrorist organizations is that ISIS has managed to establish its own economy that is mostly cash-based. This makes it impossible to track down the occurring money flows. In accordance with their operating pattern, ISIS has been described as a “half-mafia-style commercial enterprise, half pious international charity”, meaning that ISIS openly employs illegal practices to acquire funds, such as theft and extortion, but at the same time is working economically when selling oil, even at discount prices. As such, ISIS is a new type of terrorist organization; one “grounded in territorial control, annexation and declarations of sovereignty”.

9 Shane Chroucher, 2014
ed-10825.
Beyond the region, with large sums of money. In other words, we can presume that ISIS is making use of money laundering practices.\textsuperscript{12}

**The financial system, as it stands, is generally quite vulnerable to terrorist organizations**


**But who would help ISIS?** Unfortunately, some of the world’s best known and most respected financial institutions have been involved in the financing of criminal and terrorist organizations. Many multinational financial organizations, including Western-based institutions have been convicted for having being involved in money laundering, financing of terrorism and organized crime. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has established standards to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. FATF assess countries’ level of compliance with and progresses achieved in the implementation of these standards, address recommendations and publish the list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{13}

At the top of the list FATF high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions there are Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Algeria, Ecuador and Myanmar. The financial system, as it stands, is generally quite vulnerable to terrorist organizations. One of the major concerns, especially in regards to the financing of terrorism, is the fact that a vast amount of circulating cash complicates the tracking of financial transfers and therefore

\textsuperscript{13} The FATF Recommendations: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatf-recommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html.
also diminishes the opportunity of impeding these flows. Another obstacle is characterized by the variety of financial systems and their regarding institutional contexts. Overall, a common approach needs to be established, which is difficult to achieve, though, as the implementation of such is dependent on the laws and regulations prevailing in the country. Additionally, the fact that terrorism financing and the role of financial institutions and systems is a rather new one, points towards a lack regarding the establishment of proper measures and indicators what terrorism financing actually encompasses. The United Nations has already taken action in this domain by issuing the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Article 2 of this Convention considers committing an offence any person who by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in acts of terrorist. In this framework, also donations from wealthy individuals can be regarded as illegal. Due to the interdependence between the political and financial systems, it is difficult to obtain information about the destination of the transaction as these individuals are likely to be politically influential or the country is lacking sustained political commitment to execute anti-money laundering measures.

The United Nations has already taken action in this domain by issuing the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

Apart from the aforementioned Convention, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) represents an efficient UN body dealing with the problem of terrorism financing and how to mitigate it. Progress can be seen in the report issued by the CTITF in 2009, whose findings and recommendations have built the base for an Action Plan developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to facilitate the implementation of these recommendations.

Conclusions

We argue that, while ISIS has a number of ways of funding its operations in a domestic setting, if the organization is to operate outside of this sphere, it is also likely to be involved in the money laundering market. The problems that European and US banks face in terms of detecting money laundering, and the complexity of ISIS’ cases – in which a fledgling state is actively attempting to undermine the systems’ detection mechanisms – means that ISIS is very likely using the same banks that we do to fund its murderous campaigns in Syria and Iraq. This emphasizes the pressing urgency to further work on developing a common approach for all banking systems in order to disclose such streams or at least establish a platform of collaboration between banks from different institutional contexts in order to identify possible niches ISIS is making use of. The fact that ISIS is equally employing the same banks as we do plus the inability to expose these streams presents a sobering thought, and one which we hope that regulators and academics will dedicate attention to in future.

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F3 Magazine
Not in our name - The lost generation of violent extremists
The economics of ISIS – A case of theft or money laundering?

The authors

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University of Groningen, the Netherlands, Faculty of Economics and Business
Please outline the main elements of the Aarhus model to prevent radicalization.
Generally speaking, the essence of the Aarhus model is preventing radicalization by working with at-risk citizens to improve their possibilities for inclusion in society and to help them develop better life skills. The specific intervention depends on the situation - for example, counselling parents or at-risk youth themselves, mentorship programs or parent networks. Regardless of the intervention, the aim is to include these at-risk youth in society again as active, participating citizens. But don’t get me wrong. If someone has committed a criminal offence, that person will be prosecuted and convicted as a matter of course. This is not some kind of get-out-of-jail-free card, but a combination of dialogue and a firm hand. That’s why it’s also important to emphasize that this initiative is being carried out in close cooperation between the City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police, as well as involving Aarhus University, the Prison and Probation Service, and other partners.

What are the main achievements?
Well, for example we’ve succeeded in reducing the number of young people travelling to Syria to participate in the conflict from 31 in 2013 to one in 2014 and two in 2015. We can’t demonstrate a causal relationship, but we believe that our efforts have had a significant impact. We’ve established a dialogue with the milieus and minority groups with a history of recruitment to violent extremism.

In 2004, the City Council in Aarhus adopted the Aarhus model for citizen involvement based on the values of the city: reliability, respect and commitment. How did this process impact your deradicalization programme?
The citizen-centric model for citizen involvement inspired the central role citizen involvement plays in the City of Aarhus’ integration policy (2007), in which our anti-radicalization efforts are anchored. Although the model for citizen involvement in relation to the prevention of radicalization is significantly more differentiated, it is still based on our values.

The Aarhus’s exit programme builds on a longstanding, integrated approach to crime prevention that has operated for decades, what are the main strengths of this approach?
A major strength of our approach is the close collaboration that has been established between the different government agencies, particularly between the city and the police, because
provides unique opportunities to identify and intervene in relation to youth who may be at risk for radicalization, just as the involvement of several local government agencies makes it possible to take a holistic approach to intervention.

Please explain how citizens are involved in preventing radicalization and promoting deradicalization.

Dialogue is central to our approach to prevention, for example in relation to identifying young people who are already on the path to radicalization. To facilitate this, we have a number of concrete initiatives, such as an ‘Info house’ that parents, caseworkers, teacher and youth club staff can contact if they’re concerned that a person is at risk of radicalization. This is also relevant in relation to prevention in general; we facilitate dialogue-based workshops for young people in lower secondary school and youth education programs, and we have established parents’ groups for relatives of people from Aarhus who are suspected of participating, are currently participating, or have participated in the conflict in Syria to provide them with counselling and support.

What is the role played by minority groups in addressing the risks of violent extremism?

This depends on what specific minority groups are in question. But because our efforts in the most general sense are aimed at inclusion, maintaining respectful but critical dialogue with the city’s various minorities is an important factor in strengthening our anti-radicalization efforts. However, it’s also clear that in relation to a milieu such as the highly publicized Grimhøj Mosque, they have to decide whether they want to be a part of the problem or a part of the solution.
Who are the main actors engaged in your deradicalization programme, how many experts are involved?
The City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police. We also work with the Prison and Probation Service and Aarhus University. There are also additional partners at a national and international level. It’s difficult to provide a concrete ‘head count’ of the employees involved, both because they also have other functions, and also because of the broad nature of our efforts, which means that schoolteachers and after-school club staff can also play a role.

Do you have former extremists involved as mentors?
No former extremists are involved as mentors.

How many at-risk youth and returning foreign fighters have been involved in the programme?
This depends on which part of the programme you’re referring to. Parts of the preventive programme (for example workshops (150+) in schools and at youth education institutions/public meetings) have been aimed at hundreds of young people. We have had 165 specific cases of at-risk youth reported to our Info house over the last four years. Most of these cases have been dealt with through counselling. So far, nineteen people have been involved in the mentor programme. Eight individuals are still being mentored; some of them are foreign fighters, some of them are at-risk youth - in relation to political as well as religious extremism. To the best of our knowledge, we have had thirty-three individuals who have left for Syria/Iraq from Aarhus, of whom sixteen have returned and five are presumed dead.

Would you share with us a success story?
For obvious reasons, I can’t share individual case stories with you. However, I can say that we regard the fact that we have stopped or significantly reduced the traffic to Syria as an unconditional success story.

Please explain how the rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for former terrorists are perceived by the citizens of Aarhus.
They have been positively received, although there will always be critical voices. This is why it’s been important to us to emphasize at every step of the way that although the programme can never provide any kind of guarantee, our results document that it works in relation to a large majority of the at-risk youth involved. In this way, the Aarhus model is also important to our citizens’ sense of safety and security.

What are the main challenges and main criticism you have received in Aarhus and in Denmark?
Criticism of the model has been limited. The major criticism has been that our approach is too soft, which in my view is misdirected. It’s important for me to point out that our work is based on two pillars: efforts based on social dialogue and efforts based on police involvement. This is not a get-out-of-jail-free card for people who have committed or who are committing crimes.

Do you think the perceived threat of terrorism is increasing the clash of values, discrimination and polarization of the societies, putting at risk efforts to build cohesive
and inclusive communities?
At worst, I fear that this may be case. That’s why it’s important for the City of Aarhus to link the prevention of radicalization with efforts to promote citizenship and reduce discrimination. We want to be a social cohesive city with equal opportunity for all.

How much do you think that unemployment, the sense of alienation and frustration young people experience in our modern society are determinants in generating violent extremism?
That’s a difficult question, because there’s no clear-cut answer. However, there are many indications that discrimination is one of the most significant factors in creating the conditions that favor radicalization. And this is one of the reasons that we place such a high priority on citizenship, inclusion, cooperation with our citizens, and employment.

To which extent do you think the Aarhus model is adaptable to different environments? What are the main challenges of promoting such model in societies where civil society participation and dialogue with institutions are weak?
I don’t think that it’s necessarily a good idea to copy others’ approaches, but on the other hand I do believe that we can find inspiration elsewhere and apply that to our own local contexts. That said, however, cooperation with citizens, influence and trust are important parameters no matter where you are. If you don’t have that trust and that cooperation with your citizens, you have to ask yourself why not? And start there.

A modern society pretending “to enforce laws to legislate on how people think, feel or believe”, is a weak society undermining democratic values as well as the possibility of creating the ground for peace and development. What is the strategy you suggest to achieve people security without undermining human rights and fundamental freedoms?
The combination of dialogue and trust - or the development of this combination where it does not already exist. Constructive, positive citizenship instead of oppositional, negative ‘counter citizenship’. Community and shared responsibility.
Police community initiatives to prevent violent extremism: Challenges and opportunities; connectors and the transtheoretical model of change

1 Whilst the Transtheoretical Model (TTM) cannot provide any causal explanations in relation to radicalisation and de-radicalisation, it might help to document the ways in which individuals have experienced change. Like all models, the TTM has attracted some criticism. For example, some researchers argue that in practice, people can go through the different stages of change in a matter of minutes. It might be argued, however, that whether change is viewed as stage-like or as more of a continuum does not detract from the TTM providing an overview of a person experiencing psycho-behavioural change (Prochaska & Norcross, 2010).


by Basia Spalek
The role that communities play in relation to violent extremism is controversial. On the one hand, communities might be viewed as possibly supporting or endorsing violent extremism, on the other hand, communities might be seen as helping to prevent or challenge violent extremism. There is also a wider question about what ‘community’ is, and whether its ill-defined nature means that it is ill-advised to use this as a unit of analysis. These varying positions reflect some of the complexities when trying to design and implement initiatives involving non-state actors and organisations to counter violent extremism.

Counter-terrorism has traditionally been dominated by state-led approaches involving security and policing agencies. However, with the twenty-first century focus upon exploring and developing people-centred approaches - that stress the importance of human security, for example, freedom from fear or want - there has been a rapid rise across many parts of the World in developing initiatives that include both state and non-state actors and agencies.

A growing body of research suggests that programmes involving police and communities can work in relation to preventing violent extremism. This research suggests that effective police and community initiatives include some or all of the following elements: efforts at building relationships and trust between community members and police officers; police officers engaging with communities out of concern for their welfare rather than to gather intelligence; the existence of strict information sharing protocols, with clear boundaries regarding what will and what will not be shared between police and communities; police responding to community concerns, whether those have anything to do with violent extremism or not; and the existence of shared goals that individuals can work together towards.

A large body of research also highlights the challenges and tensions to police and community initiatives. Community members can feel that they are being spied upon, particularly when many initiatives have become intelligence-gathering tools for the authorities. Trust may be difficult to build within a wider
climate of suspicion and distrust, when antagonism between police and communities may have a long and sustained history. Trust can be eroded by heavy-handed techniques and operations used by the police, tactics such as stop and search, surveillance and detention without trial. Community members may also have material concerns about foreign policies and the impacts these are having on individuals in other parts of the World that they identify with, and where these concerns are not taken seriously by state actors trust can be difficult to build. Further challenges lie in risks that both police officers and community members have to take when involved in initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism. Those police officers who manage to build trust with community members, and who are empathic with communities’ concerns, may find that their work is not supported by wider policing cultures that perhaps stress crime fighting over building relationships, and that deny the significance of state foreign policies on community cultures. Those community members who engage with police may be viewed as grasses by their wider networks. As a result, they may come under attack verbally or physically, or they may be ostracised, by their acquaintances, friends and families. Community members are also at risk of losing credibility with their grassroots networks because they can be viewed as helping police reach their objectives rather than helping their own. This is particularly problematic within political and social contexts that stress that extreme views are as dangerous as extreme acts, as there is a risk that community members are co-opted into policing ideas and beliefs rather than providing safe spaces within which extreme mentalities can be discussed and appropriately challenged.

A growing body of research suggests that programmes involving police and communities can work in relation to preventing violent extremism

It may be that we think about the role of ‘connectors’ in dealing with violent extremism rather than communities. Within social contexts marked by significant distrust of the police, where there may be poverty and violence, research that I have
undertaken suggests that there can be state and non-state actors who build important bridges between themselves and with marginalised youth, who may be at risk of committing crime, anti-social behaviour and terrorism. Connectors can be youth workers, they can be police officers and they can also be community members with no formal training. Connectors are people who are excellent at building relationships of trust. The role that connectors play in dealing with violent extremism is perhaps different from the kind of crime control mechanisms that naturally exist within cohesive communities. Connectors may act within contexts characterised by low political and social trust, where there is little sense of agreement regarding the legitimacy of counter-terrorism approaches. It is also important to stress that connectors are not necessarily community leaders. Some connectors may be dissenters, for example, challenging social injustice as and when they perceive or experience it, and so they may be viewed as ‘trouble-makers’, by wider communities or by those in positions of authority. Importantly, it seems that connectors are key components of the intricate networks of connectivity that young people themselves can draw upon in order to manage the multiple impacts of their challenging environments, marked by poverty, victimisation, marginalisation and processes of criminalisation. Counter-terrorism initiatives that aim to include marginalised youth therefore perhaps rely substantially on connectors for their effectiveness and workability. Finally, when examining the experiences and perspectives of former extremists, it might be worth drawing upon the Trans-theoretical Model (TTM).

Trust can be eroded by heavy-handed techniques and operations used by the police, tactics such as stop and search, surveillance and detention without trial

This is a psychosocial model that conceptualises and analyses psychological and behavioural change. When exploring the journeys that former extremists have made in relation to their ideologies, actions, per-
sonal and other identifications, it seems that this model might offer some useful insights. According to the TTM, psycho-behavioural change can be conceptualised through stages, levels and processes of change. There are six stages of change – pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance and termination. There are five levels of change that a person can experience – at the level of their situational problems, their cognitions, their interpersonal relationships, their family relationships and their own intra-personal, conflicts. The processes of change within the TTM explain how people undergo psychological and behavioural change: consciousness raising; dramatic relief; self re-evaluation; environmental re-evaluation; self-liberation; social liberation; counterconditioning; a helping relationship; amongst others. It may be that effective connectors intuitively understand some of these stages, levels and processes of change. It may be that training people in key elements of the TTM, whether these are community members or police officers, might help prevent violent extremism. Further research and analysis is needed.

The author

Professor Basia Spalek obtained a BSc (Hons) in Psychology at Warwick University in 1991; she then went on to complete an MA in Criminology at Leicester University, before then completing a PhD at Brunel University in Victimology. Basia has over twenty years experience of research and teaching, focussing on victimisation, violence, trauma, social justice and violent extremism. Basia was made a university Professor in 2013. She regularly writes journal articles and books and is also regularly invited as an international speaker at academic, policy and practitioner conferences on victimisation, policing, trust and confidence, and community based approaches to violence prevention and counter-terrorism. Basia is currently lecturing on an MA programme at Derby University on Integrative Counselling and Psychotherapy. Basia also supervises a number of doctoral researchers and she leads many international and national research projects. Basia is also a practising psychotherapist, specialising in trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, arising from conflict, violence and other instigators, and working with prisoners.

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News headlines and television clips provide ample evidence of the military side of the ‘war on terror’: bombing raids against Islamic State fighters in Iraq, special forces incursions in Somalia, or ground operations against Islamist rebels in northern Mali. The killings of civilians by such insurgents generally provide the justification for forceful action.

The heat of battle and the atmosphere of urgency often seem to leave government officials and military commanders little time to ask a fundamental question: Can terrorism be defeated primarily through arms?

When pressed, they will likely respond, ‘Of course not’. Addressing why some disaffected youths join terrorist groups is also vital, they may acknowledge, both to shrink insurgents’ bases of support and to prevent future recruitment. As John Brennan, US President Barack Obama’s top counter-terrorism adviser, put it in 2009, effectively opposing ‘ideologies of violence and death’ requires that governments see to the well-being of their citizens through a ‘political, economic and social campaign to meet the
While officials often recognize the ‘soft’ side of combating terrorism, they seem less able to harness enough financing or political commitment to follow through. Even if the resources and will were available, however, identifying the best responses is not easy. Terrorism as such is not always distinguishable from other types of armed strife—and is often labeled so largely for political reasons. Moreover, the factors that precipitate large-scale armed violence are usually multiple, interact in complex ways, and vary greatly from country to country.

One way to pinpoint some of the more common and promising areas for action is to look to the experience of conflict prevention efforts, including in Africa (which this article takes as its focus).

The factors that precipitate large-scale armed violence are usually multiple, interact in complex ways, and vary greatly from country to country.

'Just trying to feed their families'
Although only a small fraction of poor people ever join armed insurgencies, the links between poverty and rebel recruitment are real. Sometimes confirmation comes from insurgents themselves. In 2012-13, most of northern Mali was occupied by armed Islamist groups, which competed not only with the central government but also with an ethnic Tuareg separatist faction, the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA). Referring to the ex-fighters from two of the Islamist groups, Moussa Ag Assarid, an MNLA spokesman, said, ‘I was personally able to witness former combatants who said they were not jihadists, not even Islamists. They were just people trying to feed their families’. When asked about the best way to counter terrorist recruitment, the most frequent answer given by government authorities, security officials, civil society activists and others is development.

When asked about the best way to counter terrorist recruitment, the most frequent answer given by government authorities, security officials, civil society activists and others is development.

Their understanding of that term may be expansive, encompassing economic opportunities, greater education, improved health care and more active citizen engagement. Or it may be more specif-
Both UN and independent analysts detected a notable decline in crime and unrest by ex-combatants in the project areas

Similarly, a variety of ‘Peace through Development’ projects have been implemented by the UN, the US Agency for International Development and non-governmental

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© UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein
groups such as Search for Common Ground in Chad, Niger, Mali and other Sahelian countries where youths have been recruited by insurgent groups. These initiatives usually combine job creation and micro-enterprise promotion with literacy classes, local government capacity building and other ‘soft security’ interventions. The aim is to provide local youths with alternatives to rebel enlistment.6

And what about justice? Government officials frequently seem more than ready to cite economic factors as contributors to terrorism and other forms of armed conflict, especially if that connection induces donor agencies to provide extra financing. Far less often are they willing to undertake deep-going reforms to tackle the fundamental social and political injustices that also motivate young people to rebel.

Surveys and interviews with young former fighters in various African countries and other parts of the world confirm that their reasons for joining insurgencies can be multiple. Many do act on the basis of perceived material interests, believing that victory may bring them jobs, money and other economic opportunities. But apart from ideology or simple self-defense, they also frequently cite social and political grievances: ethnic or other types of exclusion, rights violations, poor governance, and other systemic or institutional failings.7 Those who espouse extremist approaches often try to seize on such grievances to secure support. Yet social injustice, corruption and political exclusion often get only limited attention from national governments or external actors. In the turbulent eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, attempts to address local ethnic tensions, land disputes, and other sources of conflict were largely overshadowed by a focus on demobilizing the remaining armed factions and strengthening the national political process – far away in the capital.8

In the Central African Republic, several peace agreements failed to address the marginalisation of the poor and largely Muslim north, spurring support for a takeover by the mainly Muslim Seleka rebel group in 2013 –


which in turn prompted horrific reprisals by Christian militias.9

Many do act on the basis of perceived material interests, believing that victory may bring them jobs, money and other economic opportunities.

In Mali, the French and African military defeat of the main Islamist insurgent factions in 2013 did not lead to open political dialogue with the Tuareg and other disaffected ethnic groups in the north. Instead it was followed by more central state dominance, ‘failed efforts to decentralize power and growing socio-cultural cleavages’.10

In the language of international peacebuilding, tackling the ‘root causes’ of conflict requires dealing squarely with such inequities and injustices. Yet too often that has remained at the level of rhetoric, with little actual reform. This shortcoming lies not only in the poor countries where armed insurgents are most active, but also in the richer ones where some of their fighters are recruited. Many Muslims living in Europe, for example, have a sense of social exclusion, leaving them more susceptible to extremist ideas, noted Volkan Bozkir, Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs. To counter terrorist recruiters he advised European governments to take action so that their Muslim populations stop feeling they are ‘outside the circle’.11

As one African newspaper columnist put it: ‘The problem of terrorism cannot be resolved without social justice and deep institutional reforms, by both nations and the international community, so as to eliminate all disparities and wrongs. We must attack the problem at its root.’12

The problem of terrorism cannot be resolved without social justice and deep institutional reforms, by both nations and the international community, so as to eliminate all disparities and wrongs. We must attack the problem at its root.12

The author

Ernest Harsch is a writer and academic who focuses on African political and development issues. He earned his PhD in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York, and currently is an adjunct associate professor of international affairs at Columbia University as well as a research scholar affiliated with that university’s Institute of African Studies. He also worked on African issues for more than 20 years at the United Nations Secretariat in New York, including as managing editor of the UN’s quarterly development journal Africa Renewal. His most recent book is the biography Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary (Ohio University Press, 2014), after earlier books on the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and the Angolan civil war.
Responding to foreign fighters: An overview of the main challenges

by Christophe Paulussen

Introduction:

The foreign fighters phenomenon is currently omnipresent on the agenda of police officers, prosecutors, de-radicalisation experts, researchers, policy makers, municipalities, governments, international organisations and think tanks. The problem is too complex and multi-faceted to analyse in just a few pages. Therefore, the following article, based on a speech presented to the Council of Europe’s

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Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy on 16 March 2015, should merely be seen as a quick and elementary snap-shot, providing some basic features of the current problem.

This article will address four points: 1) General information on the scale of the phenomenon; 2) Root causes; 3) Implications for countries/societies of origin and 4) Responses. A special emphasis will be put on the root causes and the responses, which are key elements in understanding and addressing the phenomenon.

1. General information on the scale of the phenomenon

Almost every article or contribution on foreign fighters starts by stating that this is not a new phenomenon and indeed, it is not. Osama Bin Laden is probably one of the most famous former foreign fighters. What is new these days is the scale of the threat. On 26 January of this year, Peter Neumann, Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, wrote for the Study of Radicalisation and the responses, which are key elements in understanding and addressing the phenomenon.


3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


Neumann notes that the highest populated European countries - France, the UK, and Germany - also produce the highest numbers of fighters (1,200, 500-600 and 500-600). However, the most heavily affected countries are Belgium (440, up to 40 per million inhabitants), Denmark (100-150, up to 27 per million inhabitants), and Sweden (150-180, up to 19 per million inhabitants). Nevertheless, it is important to underline the lack of a generally accepted definition of ‘foreign fighters’. Various documents, including the legally binding UN Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), use the notion ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ to define, “individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”.

However, proper consideration should be paid to the fact that not all foreign fighters can be seen as such. In addition, a lack of clarity regarding a universal definition of ‘terrorism’ persists, due to the lack of consensus on this highly political issue. Indeed, what is a terrorist? In some jurisdictions, is considered terrorist an individual committing specific acts of terrorism, target-
ing the civilian population. For others, it may suffice if the person in question joins a designated terrorist organisation, such as the Al-Nusrah Front or ISIS, regardless of that person’s individual acts. It is important to consider that countries adopt different definitions of ‘terrorism’, which will affect their implementation of the provisions of Resolution 2178.\(^\text{10}\)

2. Root causes
There are many ingredients for a person to radicalise, but the recipe is always different. Indeed, each radicalisation process is to some extent unique and individuals will go to Syria for different reasons. This diversity in the radicalisation process makes it extremely difficult to come up with the solution to the problem. This point will be further elaborated in section 4. Reasons why young Europeans radicalise and choose to fight in Syria or Iraq can be, for instance, of a personal, ideological or religious nature. Personal reasons are probably the most important reasons and can include a perceived lack of future perspectives in their country of origin, a desire to achieve status or to feel and become part of a group (comradery), as well as a thirst to find an identity and adventure. Psychological health issues might also play a role.

Terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict

From an ideological point of view, some youngsters leaving for Syria or Iraq face feelings of anger or disillusionment, which may be caused by the events in the Middle East, in particular the injustice suffered by the Syrian people and the perceived indifference of the West. As for the religious dimension, some young Muslims may be struggling with fundamental questions on life. Instead of addressing religious leaders for answers, they create their own Do-It-Yourself or DIY Islam in basements or through the Internet, becoming vulnerable to manipulation and recruitment. In addition, the political climate in some Western countries, as well as the (perceived) discrimination on the labour market, may push away youngsters from their society of origin, increasing their marginalization. It is also important to stress that, as the conflict in Syria evolves, also the motivations of foreign fighters may change. While someone initially may have gone to Syria for ideological reasons, hoping to assist the local population, he or she may have chosen to remain in order to support groups such as ISIS. Others might end up, perhaps also for practical reasons - such as the lack of financial resources - in criminal organisations, involved in the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings. Clearly, there is a need to develop a far better understanding of drivers/push and pull factors of foreign fighters.

3. Implications for countries/societies of origin
Clearly, the impact of the conflict in Syria and Iraq is most serious for these countries themselves, in terms of fear, destruction, loss of innocent lives etc. Also neighbouring states, which have to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees, and which may be confronted with a spill-over of the conflict, suffer greatly from the conflict. However, for Europe, the biggest

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fear is undoubtedly to face a Madrid or London-style attack from foreign fighters returning to their country of origin. But how big is the risk that such an attack occurs? Research has shown that “[…] of all of those who have been convicted of jihadi terrorism related activities in Europe between 2001 and 2009, about twelve percent had been abroad prior to their attack, either for ideological training, military training or participation in foreign conflicts.”

Even though this percentage is relatively small, the absolute numbers of foreign fighters are rising, and thus are the chances of an attack, in view of the applicability of that same percentage to higher numbers. Furthermore, it should be considered that, despite all calculations based on percentages, in the end only one returnee may suffice to execute a successful attack, as exemplified by the attacks in Toulouse and Brussels. Additionally, sympathisers with or emulators of violent jihad might also pose a risk, even if they do not go to Syria or Iraq. These extremists might engage in copycat crimes at home that can also cause serious harm, without having crossed any borders, as was the case in recent incidents and attacks in Australia, Canada and Denmark. In addition to lone actor attacks, there is also the risk of the formation of new or the strengthening of existing terrorist networks. Al Qaida was basically established by a network of former foreign fighters at the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Since the beginning of the armed conflict in Syria in 2011, a higher number of foreign fighters has been identified than during ten years of Afghan war. It is believed that networks are now being formed between individuals (either within Iraq and Syria or with individuals residing in other

countries, including their home countries) and organisations as such (see for instance Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State).12

4. Responses
To stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and to counter the risk returnees may pose, various responses are available at both the national and international level. These include de-radicalisation programmes, criminal prosecutions and administrative sanctions, including the withdrawal of passports and even citizenships. Even though the most recent national and international agreements demonstrate a greater focus on the preventative side than was the case in the past – an example is resolution 2178, which greatly emphasizes the importance of international law – in practice, States are drawn by repressive measures. However, repressive approaches alone might not be effective and could even be counterproductive.13 A balance should be made between various measures, and States should arguably focus more on prevention policies, instead of fighting symptoms, which do not really address the underlying issue. Preventive measures, however, will contribute to effective policies in the long term. Despite the fact that the success of these ‘soft’ measures is more difficult to assess than repressive measures – in fact, how can you prove that someone did not radicalise? – States should invest in prevention, addressing the root causes and contributing to a sustainable approach of the foreign fighters’ phenomenon.

States should arguably focus more on prevention policies, instead of fighting symptoms, which do not really address the underlying issue

Possible solutions include measures at individual level (i.e. establish an emergency phone line for parents with radicalized children), at group level (offer a credible counter-narrative, preferably from a former and disillusioned foreign fighter), but also at the level of the State (eradicate discrimination in the labor market, offer job opportunities and encourage social inclusion). Too often, statements by political leaders undermine the positive effects of social inclusion policies and deteriorate the situation. Additionally, several repressive measures are nowadays being proposed and adopted by a number of governments, but their effectiveness and necessity might be debatable. An example is the call for new terrorism legislation, while the necessity is dubious, and the inadequacy of the existing legislation not proven. Also the effectiveness and necessity of the measure aimed at withdrawing a foreign fighter’s passport and even citizenship should be critically examined. It rather appears to be simply a symbolic measure, meant to brand the foreign fighter as an outcast of society. Indeed, there is a clear need for an effective monitoring and evaluation framework to analyze impact and effectiveness of existing and future policies and practices.

In addition, there is a need for an increased exchange of experiences and best practices between governments, as well as a coordinated approach of the different initiatives organized by a growing number of organizations, with a view to avoid overlapping.

Conclusion:
The foreign fighters topic will stay with us for many years to come. It is therefore of the utmost importance to quickly

13 See also M. Singleton, ‘Paris 7-8 January: Darkness in the City of Light’, ICCT Op-Ed, 9 January 2015, available at: http://icct.nl/publication/paris-7-8-january-darkness-in-the-city-of-light/ (last accessed 13 June 2015): “Empirical data indicates that the perceived legitimacy of counter-terrorism policies is the primary factor shaping the willingness of Muslim communities in the US and the UK to support and help. Aggressive counter-terrorism policies, on the other hand, have had the effect of alienating Muslim communities everywhere. We should never allow the attacks in Paris on civil rights and liberties to open up another Pandora’s box of draconian measures that, in the end, only serve to limit the foundations of our societies and render us more vulnerable.”
deepen our knowledge of the root causes of this phenomenon and to take adequate responses accordingly to bring results in the long term. This should be done in the above-mentioned order, i.e. focusing first on the root causes and then on the responses. The current responses sometimes appear to point to a lack of strategy and understanding, and also their necessity and effectiveness is not always clear. Although it is quite understandable that politicians will adopt as many measures as possible, in the hope of not getting the reproach afterwards by their constituents of not having done enough to thwart an attack, we should continue to strive for necessary, proportionate, sustainable and international law and human rights-respecting responses only.

The author

Christophe Paulussen is a senior researcher international humanitarian law/international criminal law and coordinator of the Public International Law cluster at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in The Hague. In addition, he is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). The T.M.C. Asser Instituut is a foundation with the purpose of performing and maintaining scientific research and education in the areas of international and European law and the ICCT is an independent think tank and knowledge hub that focuses on information creation, collation and dissemination pertaining to the preventative and international legal aspects of counter-terrorism.
The conflict between Israel and Palestine influences not only the Middle East region but the entire world. Many initiatives have been undertaken during the years to bring peace, give hope and alleviate the suffering of the people in conflict zones. However, even if political solutions are important, they are not effective if there is not trust and reconciliation among the population. Sport is an extremely powerful element to bring young people together, to help them create harmony and bring down the barriers of diversity. This project wishes to be a support in creating the conditions necessary to constitute a platform of reconciliation and education towards young people through football.

The idea was born years ago, more precisely in 2008, following a meeting with the Palestinian Minister of Sport, Abu Daqqa and, successively with the Israeli Minister of Sport, Majadle. The suggestion was that an international NGO could create a meeting point in a neutral zone between Israel e Palestine. Proposals supporting this initiative also came from Jordan, in particular, to help in the training of Israeli and Palestinian referees. How can football contribute to the construction of peace?

- It educates about the real sense of sport – football helps young people to develop values of teamwork and fair-play. It promotes wellbeing – football promotes a healthy mind and body and helps to develop positive physical strength.
- It gives a positive direction to young people – football brings joy and inspiration and channels the energy of young people towards positive goals.
- It resolves conflicts and prevents violence – football gives young Israeli and Palestinians an opportunity to get to know each other as future leaders of their respective nations.

However, a favourable neutral environment is necessary in order that this very process of reconciliation through sport can begin. Italy is viewed both by Israel and Palestine as a favourable nation, a meeting ground without prejudices and non-partisan. This project is inserted in the framework of peace initiatives in the Middle East and as such, will have great prominence in the scope of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
Goals of the Project:
To bring mixed youth teams (Israeli–Palestinian) – starting with under-13, under-15 and under-17 – to play friendly football matches with their Italian counterparts.
To allow young people to meet each other and create team spirit and friendship in freedom (a very complex aspect to bring about today in Israel and Palestine).
To give young people a special occasion, an emotionally unique moment: a meeting with the great Italian football tradition and, compatibly with the sporting commitments, with important reference figures: football heroes of the past and present.
To continue visit and exchange projects between football teams and trainers supporting Football for Peace, as international support for the realization of a platform for peace in the Middle East through football:
  - The diffusion of the project in football sports centres for young people of all the parties in conflict
  - The support of their respective prerogatives
  - The construction of an environment for the formation of a club composed of Israelis and Palestinians.

Messages from the children who visited the UN Campus in Turin

Abed Elmagid:
I was really grateful and astonished for being able to participate in this delegation. It gave me a feeling of joy and happiness, that I could meet some wonderful people from my neighbourhood, that I never had a chance to meet and become good friends with. I still keep close contact with them, this was all due to the delegation. I found the experience interesting and am so grateful for the chance to go abroad, it was my first experience out of the country.

Moemen:
The experience as a whole was like a beautiful dream. I had many fears and was anxious about the experience in the beginning, especially being away from home and in another country. But I came to really enjoy myself and loved my time spent in Italy.

Mahdi:
I was so happy to receive an invitation to participate in this once in a lifetime trip, I was so grateful to be able to travel with my parents abroad, but more grateful to be a part of this wonderful delegation. Had I not been there, I couldn’t have met some wonderful new friends from the Jewish community of Affula, and I regularly keep contact with them.

Ahmad:
This experience abroad was so great I will remember for years to come. We played so much football I couldn’t have been happier. The Italians really respected us all and it really left a feeling of acceptance and gratitude and I was so very impressed. We travelled the country, and visited many impressive and important places in Italy. The feeling I had, having the opportunity to participate in a football game with Juventus, was of overwhelming gratitude. Such an amazing experience! I try my best to stay in touch with the other children who participated from Affula.

Mohammad:
I really appreciate and thank all the people who could help in giving us and especially me the chance to participate in this life changing delegation. I feel the program as a whole was spectacular, and really hope that there will be many more opportunities to participate in activities like this in future, both for myself and many others.
**Ward:**
I really enjoyed my time spent with the wonderful people in this delegation, and made some wonderful new friends. We visited many places all across Italy that held great importance to all of us. I still stay in contact with the children in Affula and hold them in high regard.

**Abdallah:**
This delegation that I could be a part of was splendid. I am really so grateful to the organisers and those in positions of responsibility, for giving all of us this wonderful opportunity. I liked all the activities we could participate in, but I really enjoyed the time we could spend playing football. I really came to appreciate the children from Affula and keep in contact with them.

**Din:**
I really enjoyed spending time to play with all of the various groups across Italy. I found it exciting and enjoyable to visit the different places, particularly a museum for cars. I had the opportunity to learn a lot of new things, but above all about the organisation of UNICRI. It’s an experience I will never forget.

**Shahar:**
What I liked most during this trip to Italy, were the wonderful sites we were able to visit, the buildings, the sculptures, I liked them so much. I really enjoyed the time spent with the children playing football. Playing with the Italians gave me a feeling of overwhelming joy. And to be together with the Jewish and Arab children was a very nice experience.

**Menachem:**
I am so eternally grateful to the organisers and to UNICRI for the wonderful opportunity to be able to participate in such an important delegation such as this one. Without these wonderful organisations I would never have been able to participate. It was such a wonderful experience to visit the places of Italy, particularly Juventus and Torino left me with a happy feeling.

**Minoy:**
This experience I received was that of once in a lifetime. It was the very first time I had been offered to play on a real life football pitch, and was so grateful to be able to watch a professional game abroad and in the flesh. The time I got to spend together playing in Juventus and Torino was magnificent, and a time I will really never forget.

**El Roei:**
Like all my friends I enjoy watching top league football games. It was an experience of a once in a life time. I also enjoyed playing with the local Italian children from those games. I enjoy the art in the museums we visited. I would like to show my deep gratitude for all the people that help this deep experience happen. I personally feel honoured to participate in a delegation that only few people could have joined. Thank you!

**Sahar:**
I would like to show my gratitude for opening for us the door for such a special experience. I would like to thank all the people that made this happens, to all the people who donated their time, money, enthusiasm, determination and heart. I love Italy.
Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: Ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach

by Andrea Cerase, Elena D’Angelo, Claudia Santoro
The rise of racism in Europe
In recent years online racism has seen a quick and serious growth in many European and non-European countries, till to become a worrying global phenomenon. One of the most striking examples of such process is the rise of White Supremacist Movements online. Their strategy mainly consists in disguising their hidden political agenda and attempting to subvert and destroy civil rights by presenting their standpoints through an overturn of the rhetoric of the civil rights movement. Undoubtedly, the increasing racism which is rotten in hidden racist expressions, is exploiting “favorable” conditions as the financial crisis, the increase of social conflicts and the rise of populist issues in politics. In Italy, as an example, UNAR, the Italian national anti-discrimination Office, documented that complaints for online racism weighed for 30.9% of the overall cases involving the media (UNAR, 2013). Similar situations also occurred in other European countries such as Slovenia, Finland, Hungary and United Kingdom, as it emerged by part of the research carried out within the framework of the European project LIGHT ON3. Nowadays, racist claims are often hidden under a subtle and sophisticated rhetoric. In fact, a huge amount of disguised racist contents is currently published on the Internet in form of occasional bigotry or individuals’ outburst, whereas they are, as a matter of fact, intended to foster racist attitudes among people and to support the “normalization” of racism. Some scholars defined as “common sense racism” or “rational racism” talking against immigrants, refugees, minority members (as well as homosexuals and disabled) as undesirable and avoiding to be labeled as “racist”.

Internet and the normalization of racism
The Internet is playing a crucial role in the so-called normalization of racism: racist movements are well aware about the potential of social media in the diffusion of hate speech. They exploit the social media “virality” by cloaking the real source(s) of such messages and promoting sharing of such contents, with the final aim of manipulating people worries and outrage5. Some scholar argued: “One gets the impression that they have now crossed the weak shelters of censorship and self-censorship that until recent years made difficult to explicitly pronounce racist discourses in public. Topics such as «anti-social behaviors» of the Roma people, the identification of immigration with crime, the danger of certain «races», the invitation to sink immigrants’ boats - that once a time was a domain (or prerogative) of the [Northern] League’s rhetoric [in Italy] - are now spoken publicly without any shame, and not only by right wing speakers”.

3 LIGHT ON project, JUST/2012/FRAC/AG/2099, co-financed by Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the European Commission.
6 The Lega Nord (Northern League) is a federalist and regionalist political party in Italy, established in 1991 by Umberto Bossi. This party advocates for secession of the North of Italy and its members are very often involved in racist and xenophobic political talk (see Avanza, M. (2010), “The Northern League and its ‘innocuous’ xenophobia,” in Mammone, A., and Veltri, G. A. (Eds.) (2010), “Italy today: The sick man of Europe,” Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 131 – 142).
Hate speech online is therefore a dangerous weapon that potentially everyone, including violent extremists, can use to promote hate and perpetrate hatred behaviors. “Extremists and violent extremists are using the Internet and social media to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people to their cause, whether as passive supporters, active enthusiasts or those willing to become operational”\(^8\). The extremist groups were among the early users of the Internet, or more in general of electronic communication networks\(^9\). As explained by the Crown Prosecution Service (UK), there are a number of offenses that can be considered when dealing with violent extremism, and these include “offenses arising through spoken words, creation of tapes and videos of speeches, internet entries, chanting, banners and written notes and publications”\(^10\).

An ethical dilemma
The complex and controversial issue of hate speech and its use also by violent extremist groups touches upon an important ethical dilemma: how can we tackle this phenomenon without undermining freedom of speech?

Hate speech online is therefore a dangerous weapon that potentially everyone, including violent extremists, can use to promote hate and perpetrate hatred behaviors

The question has been effectively summarized by Nils Mužnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe. As it is recognized, hate speech is not about freedom of speech: it is a threat against the rights of others and public safety, since hate speech and violent action appear to be tightly intertwined. Many incidents occurred in the recent past easily demonstrate how hate speech can be actually perceived as an authorisation to engage in violence, which is likely to lead in committing real-life crimes. That is why it is necessary to deal simultaneously with hate speech and hate crimes\(^11\).

Populist movements often exploit racist arguments in their discourse; in all cases allegations of racism, and especially of racist hate speech, must be substantiated by evidences and every complaint must be proven to be realistic.

How can we tackle this phenomenon without undermining freedom of speech?

Since hate speech is per se a controversial concept, and at the moment broadly accepted definitions are still missing, policy makers and law enforcement agencies must deal with the intrinsic ambiguity and the polysemy of such contents. Given that these messages can result in different interpretation by different people, it is more essential to ground reporting, assessments and legal prosecution on objective and factual arguments, taking carefully into account all the available information about the source and the context in which

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\(^10\) https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html

messages have been spread. Indeed, online communication strategy of hatemongers is often grounded on old style propaganda techniques, in which authorship, source, or real intention of a publication or broadcast are intentionally cloaked or disguised.12

Hate speech is not about freedom of speech: it is a threat against the rights of others and public safety

Light On Project: breaking up the vicious cycle
The transnational experience of the LIGHT ON project shows that defining whether a content is racist or not can be facilitated by joining experiences from different sectors. Indeed, investigations on a suspected hate speech case, and the related prevention policies, must take into account diverse information about the source and the context in which messages have been spread: “Collecting and analyzing the different expressions of contemporary racism is essential to understand the phenomenon and to design new strategies to contrast it”13.

Furthermore, looking at this type of online monitoring from a broader perspective, it clearly emerges that a transnational approach is needed, as it is demonstrated by the findings of the research carried out by national teams in five European countries, using tools such as a visual database and a collaborative glossary, which are presented on the LIGHT ON website. These digital tools, that allow users to filter entries per country, target, typology and target group, demonstrate “[...] how European Nazi and Fascist groups are tightly connected, in order to create a wide racist network across Europe. Many racist watchwords and symbols are indeed the same in different countries and Nazi websites often have many shared inbound and outbound links with their correspondents in other countries.”14

In particular, the LIGHT ON project research has found many examples, ranging from the so-called “black” propaganda, aimed to deceive target groups by spreading false material through a disguised source, to the “grey” propaganda, in which sources are not identified and contents are at least partially true, although carefully selected to induce certain effects such as persuasion and mobilization.15

Some of the main tools developed within the project LIGHT ON (database, glossary, training manual, toolkit, guide on ‘how to spot online racism’ etc.) can provide some non-arbitrary evaluation parameters in order to differentiate between what constitutes an actual instigation to hate from what does not, also in view of the ethical dilemma concerning hate speech vs. freedom of speech (further discussed later on in this paper) – unfortunately at the core of the dramatic events which took place in Paris at the beginning of 2015, one of the worst security crisis in French in decades which began with the massacre at the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo16. Considering incidents happened in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo attacks could help to better understand how hate speech and hate crimes are intimately related. In fact, only five days after the murders in Paris, Tell Mama17 – a...
UK Muslim advocacy project monitoring, measuring and classifying anti-Muslim attacks - reported at least fifty attacks (bomb blast, arsons and graffiti) against Muslims in France; even London Mosques received threats, hate mail and offensive drawings. The above-mentioned relation should be assessed as the provisional result of a vicious cycle process. According to Carey’s ritual model of communication, media consumption (including discriminating or hatred contents) is a complex social process aimed to portray or confirm our particular views of a conflicting world, dramatically calling for engagement and action. Hence, we may consider that hate speech and hate crimes are not only tightly intertwined, but they reinforce each other. In particular, ritual model can be adopted to explain how racist speech produces and retains a social climate of discrimination and hatred, facilitating an unequal treatment of groups grounded on race, gender, and sexual orientation, in order to reinforce historical asymmetrical relationships among ethnic or minority groups. Since single hate incidents may not produce an immediate and visible harm, their cumulative impacts actually produce, maintain, transform and repair a reality of rising submission and self-reinforcing hate.

The normalization of racism in mainstream media, social media and political discourse is often shaped as a wave of sensationalist news after an incident or a crime involving immigrants and ethnic minority members. This kind of media coverage is regularly followed by “common people’s” comments on popular social platforms and/or by flaming politicians statements intended to depict immigrants and minorities as threats to be countered, using every possible means. Furthermore, such statements and comments contribute creating a vicious cycle of fear, anger and contempt, often en-tailing a pretended right to a violent self-defence. Other similar examples of such vicious cycles effects are also found in hatred discrimination against LGBT people, disable people, as well as in cyberbullying.

Modern narratives and imagery of racism: notes from a preventive approach

One of the main aims of the LIGHT ON research was to investigate modern verbal and visual manifestations of racism and xenophobia. Very often racist symbols and im-

19 The adjective provisional stays to indicate the possibility of overturn the process through monitoring and community actions.
20 We should not focus only on “information acquisition, though such acquisition occurs, but of dramatic action in which the reader joins a world of contended forces as an observer at play.” In: Carey (1989), “Communication as culture: Essays on media and society,” New York, Routledge, p. 17.
The LIGHT ON project brought together experts working in different fields, bringing their contribution on the state of national legislations, political issues on national agendas, policies for prevention, media reporting and relevant academic literature. They contributed to the data collection phase with their multi-sectorial expertise: victim support groups, for example, stressed how certain contents have the precise scope to harm people, and thus must be discerned from jokes, irony and satire, and labeled for their strong negative impact. Such synergy among different stakeholders suggested the importance of a victim-centered approach, and also the importance of the cooperation among civ-


Certain contents have the precise scope to harm people, and thus must be discerned from jokes, irony and satire, and labeled for their strong negative impact.

It also stressed the role of national authorities and groups providing legal support in addressing the racist cases identified during the monitoring or reported by victims. Indeed, despite online monitoring can be intended as a deterrent and a tool to prevent - or control – racist contents, its effectiveness results stronger when monitoring is linked to the action of support groups or national authorities at national level, in order to show the impact of monitoring and also to encourage self-reporting.

Going back to both prevention and action against hate speech, among the most important findings of the LIGHT ON project, the monitoring role of users and their key function in reporting online hate speech and racist propaganda emerge as an essential component in the fight against these phenomena, also in view of improving and increasing the response of the law enforcement authorities. Understanding the main reasons why hate speech on the Net often go unreported is a starting point to draw guidelines for reporting and tips for monitoring online materials promoting violent extremism. Some of these reasons are linked to the lack of confidence in the police by the victims, concern

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about revenge attacks or fear of retaliation, acceptance of violence and abuse (nothing will change anyway!), fear of having privacy compromised, fear of jeopardising immigration status, cultural language barriers or lack of victim support system.

Moving in this perspective the LIGHT ON project elaborated, within the training manual on Investigating and Reporting Hate Speech Online, a set of general tips for online reporting, with a particular focus on the main social networks as one of the main vehicles for spreading violent extremism and populist propaganda.

One of the first “tips” for users to report correctly an online hate incident is to evaluate the content of the speech and select the best strategy accordingly. The user should consider whether the content is generated in his/her own country and thus subjected to national legislation. However, authors are well aware that this could make their identification easier, therefore they place the contents out of their country, violating the national rules on servers located abroad. The main suggestion in this case for the users is: always have a backup of the content of the hate speech incident! The LIGHT ON training manual includes a list of different concrete steps on how to backup, among other tips).

The main steps for reporting violent extremism on the most used social media (Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube) are also outlined in the LIGHT ON training materials: acquiring this knowledge makes it easier for law enforcement to adopt a victim-centered approach and effectively help victims by pointing them to the right path of reporting online.

Always have a backup of the content of the hate speech incident!

Going back to the importance of recognizing hatred contents, in order to properly address them, the huge dilemma regarding the relation between populist arguments and violent extremism on the Internet, on one side, and freedom of speech on the other can not be left aside, especially in these dramatic days in Europe.

“Reconciling rights which are at the core of democracy, such as freedom of belief and religion and freedom from discrimination, with the right to freedom of expression represents a significant challenge. When comedy and dark humour are included in the picture, establishing clear boundaries between what

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31 Mnet (2012), “Responding to Online Hate,” Media Awareness Network, Ottawa, Canada.
constitutes freedom of expression and what falls under the category of hate speech becomes an ever more complex challenge". But where do we draw the line? Even if comedy and satire, as forms of expressions, are protected by laws dealing with freedom of expression they also come with duties and responsibilities and, as such, may be subjected to restrictions or penalties as prescribed by law. This implies that in democratic societies, governments may limit freedom of expression where necessary, but only in so far as they are regulated by law and in a manner which is proportionate. The test against which such limitations are evaluated is a strict one.

33 UNICRI (ed. 2014).

The authors

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Green corruption
More than “victimless” crimes

by Vittoria Luda Di Cortemiglia and Annelies Pauwels, UNICRI
The estimated economic loss caused by green corruption in Italy amounts to circa 10 billion euro per year in terms of gross domestic product, circa 170 euro per year per capita income and more than 6 percent in terms of productivity. Perfect accomplice of eco-criminals, corruption allows those involved in illegal activities in the environmental field to make significant profits at the expense of the environment and citizens. Exploiting essential and inalienable goods of the community, the so-called phenomenon of “green corruption” represents a particularly serious form of corruption. In fact, illicit activities regarding the environmental sector pose a major threat to the preservation of the environment and to the health and safety of citizens, but also have a disastrous impact on the economy. With a view to fill the knowledge gap on the relationship between corruption and environmental crimes, UNICRI initiated the research “Green Corruption - The case in Italy”. The research provides an accurate view on the phenomenon in the specific case of Italy; thanks to the important cooperation of many Italian law enforcement and judicial institutions, it analyses some of the many and various investigations conducted by the main Italian law enforcements agencies involved in the fight against corruption, environmental crimes and other related illegal activities. The research also provides an accurate overview of the relevant legal framework and mechanisms and presents some of the initiatives aimed at preventing and repressing environmental corruption.

More than “victimless” crimes
Although often referred to as “victimless crimes”, the devastating effects of corruption and environmental crimes on the Italian society and economy do not have to be underestimated. The estimated economic loss
caused by green corruption in Italy amounts to circa 10 billion euro per year in terms of gross domestic product, circa 170 euro per year per capita income and more than 6 percent in terms of productivity. However, one should not forget the indirect damages including its impact on youth unemployment, but also its effect on the credibility of the economy.

Recurring aspects of green corruption
The analysis of the judicial investigations in UNICRI’s publication aims to point out the dynamics, the situational background and the key actors involved in the illegal activities. The cases taken into consideration allowed the identification of a number of characteristics of green corruption in Italy.

Three sectors appear to be more exposed to environmental criminality, namely the waste management, the construction sector’s industry and the renewable energy sector. Throughout these sectors, there are several recurring aspects: the presence of significant availability of money, the trans-regionality of those involved, and no geographical limitations of the operations. It also appears that, despite the presence of a variety of actors, public officials are always involved in the corrupt practices.

The links between corruption and environmental crimes appears to be favoured by a number of circumstances. First of all there are several conditions that favour the recurrence to corruption: in particular a high tax burden, an excessive regulation of the legal markets and excessive bureaucratic regulation in general, and high public spending. In addition, green corruption seems to thrive well due to a high level of moral acceptance and a low sense of statehood, vulnerabilities in control and authorisation systems, and the existence of complex criminal systems, mafia and non, able to condition the normal functioning of democracy. Moreover, from a legal point of view, the link between corruption and environmental crimes is facilitated by a legal approach that in Italy - as in most OECD countries - is formalistic, i.e. focused on legislation that would punish environmental crimes on the basis of abstract danger, regardless of the actual damage caused.

Three sectors appear to be more exposed to environmental criminality, namely the waste management, the construction sector’s industry and the renewable energy sector

The judicial investigations examined in “Green Corruption – The case in Italy” demonstrate that environmental corruption is a poison that impacts on the whole country; the analysed cases involve 15 Italian regions and have been addressed by 34 public prosecutor’s offices evenly distributed between the North (15), Centre (11) and South (10) of Italy. Although the data analysed by geographic area show on the one hand a record for number of arrests in the North-Western regions (39.9%), on the other hand, it shows the incidence of the phenomenon in the regions...
traditionally affected by the mafia (Campania, Apulia, Calabria and Sicily), with 36.9% of the national total of arrest warrants.

Several conditions that favour the recurrence to corruption: in particular a high tax burden, an excessive regulation of the legal markets and excessive bureaucratic regulation

The “ecomafia”
As suggested by the above-mentioned figures, organised crime networks appear to be environmental crimes key actors. Italian mafia groups, as well as other criminal groups, are keen on controlling public resources by influencing the activities of the public administration, both at local, provincial, regional and national level.

Among the numerous examples illustrating the involvement of organised crime networks in environmental crimes, it is worth mentioning the anti-mafia investigation whose code name was Araba Fenice. In December 2013, this investigation led to the arrest of 47 people in Calabria. For various offences, including criminal association with the mafia, fraudulent transfer of assets and illegal financial activities. This specific case saw the involvement of the Calabrian mafia in the construction sector’s industry: some of the clans of the ‘ndrangheta had created a joint criminal group which dealt mainly with the construction of private building. As a result of the investigation, 14 companies and a total of 90 million euro were seized, and 90 raids were carried out in Calabria, Piedmont, Veneto, Lombardia and Apulia.

The way forward
Over the last years, a number of initiatives, tools and databases have been put forward with a view to fight green corruption. Examples include the REBUILD and the REVISUAL systems, which are information systems that provide valuable information on companies and that can serve as monitoring tools for the law enforcement agencies. Another essential prevention tool is the Carta di Pisa. This code of ethics was adopted in 2012 by the Association Avviso Pubblico, the Italian national network of local entities for the civil training against the mafia, with a view to promote the rule of law and transparency of local authorities.

In the research report, a number of suggestions to the sectors’ policy makers are put forward. Firstly, the existing environmental standards, which are currently scattered in several texts, codes and decrees, should be systematised. A specific section on crimes against the environment should be inserted in the Penal Code, providing effective and proportionate penalties as requested by the European Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law. In addition, a legislative simplification of the processes regarding environmental protection is needed, in order to make the system less vulnerable to corruption.

It is necessary to improve the institutional collaboration between the different agencies and stakeholders involved in environmental protection

In terms of repression, it is necessary to improve the institutional collaboration between the different agencies and stakeholders involved in environmental protection, which are currently characterized by a kind of mutual distrust impeding effective collaboration and exchange of information. In addition, virtuous public-private partnerships regarding environmental protection should be promoted. It is to be noted that Italy has recently approved a new law

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2 Calabria is a Region of Southern Italy. The ‘Ndrangheta, one of the main Mafia-type organization is based in this Region.
to counter corruption (legge 27 maggio 2015, n. 69). The new law, which will be enforced starting from 14 June, aims at fighting corruption and in particular is addressed to corrupted public officials, companies, and mafia-type organizations. The new law will increase sanctions and monitoring mechanisms with specific attention paid to the Government's monitoring of corruption related to crimes against the environment.

**Conclusions**

The investigations UNICRI analysed thanks to the availability and cooperation of the Italian authorities shed lights on a phenomenon that affects many countries and many actors. The case of Italy offers many important insights in the modus operandi and the enabling conditions of green corruption. It is clear that corruption in the environmental field, by draining resources from the legal circuit and channelling them into the illegal circuit, impoverishes the country on the economic, political, cultural and environmental level. It poses a serious threat to the credibility of the economy, the stability of public finances, and domestic and international investments, but also puts the health and safety of citizens at risk. Consequently, green corruption is an issue that should occupy an important position in the political agenda, not only in Italy but in all countries affected by this phenomenon.
China strengthens the judiciary not the rule of law

by Giovanni Nicotera

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The fourth plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CPC) Central Committee ended on 24 October 2014. For the first time in the history of China this important party session was devoted to the rule of law. Considering that the country is ruled according to the one-party system without separation of powers, the event has led many to hope that time has come for China to initiate her path toward constitutionalism and democracy.

Indeed, the importance of this high-level meeting can be compared to the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee held in December 1979 when Deng Xiaoping announced the opening-up policies. On that occasion, Deng made it clear that at least a Soviet-style legal system would be indispensable because without law, it would be impossible to re-establish State authority throughout a country laying into the moral and material ruins following the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, he had understood that laws would be indispensable for attracting foreign direct investment and technology transfer. Thus legal reforms had started in China with a peculiarity with respect to many other countries: the primary motivation for undertaking legal reforms in China was economic, and it was not a question to bring the rule of law to the Chinese people at least in the Western sense of separation of powers, human rights and democracy.

For the first time in the history of China this important party session was devoted to the rule of law

In between these two historical events, rule of law appeared a very few times in the government agendas, moreover never in position of pre-eminence as at it is the case of this October’s session, with only one exception. In 1999 the concept was endorsed by adding the following sentence to Article Five of the Constitution: “The People’s Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.” After that the government focused back on economic growth, and the rule of law did not have again the centrality it has gained in recent times.

What has happened? The Communist Party has now other priorities beyond economic growth. Its main concern is ensuring stability which is threatened by an increasing income gap between rich and poor and by the widespread corruption among local officials who abuse their powers for personal gain. The enforcement of existing laws by a more competent and, more independent and less corrupt judiciary - rather than the adoption of new laws - has become in the last years a top priority that the leadership wants to address more resolutely.
and without delay.

In fact while progress was achieved with respect to the 1980s and 1990s when cases were adjudicated by former police officers or decommissioned military officers without legal training, much more needs to be done. The percentage of graduates from law schools, which has increased over the years, all too often have no practical legal experience before joining the courts in their 20s and, moreover, they have to cope with an expanding workload. In fact, according to the Supreme People’s Court, in 2013 Chinese courts accepted 14.2 million cases, including appeals, retrials and enforcement hearings: a 7.4 percent increase compared to the previous year that obliges judges to handle an average of 750 cases a year. The main concern, however, is related to the perception of corruption: if Chinese believe that judges, prosecutors and police can be bribed, or their decisions influenced by officials who control their careers and budgets, the stability and growth of the society is undermined.

The October plenum has essentially sought to address this very specific problem and has adopted the following measures. Firstly, it has addressed the territorial competence by basical-ly creating judicial districts that do not overlap anymore with administrative divisions. In this way local party leaders have less opportunities to interfere in the judicial process. Secondly, and still to avoid interferences, it has established circuit courts whereby judges can now hold sessions at several different locations for pre-specified periods of time. Thirdly, measures have been adopted to strengthen judges’ training, their supervision and punishment as well as to increase their salaries, to bring their appointments, and promotions, and the courts’ budgets away from local authorities to avoid corruption and undue pressure.

In 2013 Chinese courts accepted 14.2 million cases, including appeals, retrials and enforcement hearings

Here the plenum stopped in its reform efforts and fell short of addressing the key issue that prevents the judiciary from becoming independent and China from achieving more progress towards the rule of law. The Political and Legal Committees which are present at any level in the government have not been abolished and their representatives may continue interfering with the judicial process if they decide to. Moreover, the plenum failed to address criminal law, the system of rules which most needs revision if work on rule of law is to be truly effective. It is exactly these measures that have been left out from the plenum’s deliberations that elucidate that the party was not aiming at introducing rule of law at this stage of the Country’s development. The real intent was another one: strengthening the judiciary to reinforce central power over local officials who, through corruption, abuse of power and ignoring Beijing’s directives, damage the party’s reputation.

Nevertheless, even if this fourth plenum did not bring about the landmark changes hoped for by many in the West, the outcome of this important communist conclave must not be discarded as it definitely improves the Chinese legal system. In fact, and if the announced measures will be implemented as announced, the plenum has addressed a sense of lack of justice among the majority of Chinese who can now expect a betterment in the way legal cases are handled.

The author

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Online CBRN awareness training — Five lessons learned

by Bryan Lee
The challenge

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents pose a rising threat to global safety and security. Many industries such as mining, pharmaceuticals, and health care rely on these materials to make the products or deliver the services all of us use every day, but these same materials can cause great harm in the event of an industri-
al accident or deliberate misuse. Unfortunately, many countries do not have the resources to prepare themselves adequately to respond to this threat. Equally troubling is the fact that international training and assistance programs are also under budgetary pressure, with many lacking the resources to develop the sustained follow-on training and cooperation necessary to address this threat fully.

Many countries do not have the resources to prepare themselves adequately to respond to this threat

The Solution

One way to address this challenge is through technology. We are living in the midst of an education revolution. For example, Stanford University in the United States recently offered a so-called Massively Open Online Course (MOOC) in computer science to any student with an internet connection. The result was an astonishing class enrollment of more than 150,000 students from around the world. Such online training seems almost tailor made to address the challenges mentioned above. Training platforms and software are free to use for both trainers and recipients, and publicly available content sharing services such as YouTube or Wordpress allow training materials to be hosted indefinitely at no cost to the user or the developer. Finally, online formats allow for easy and centralized modification and updating of course materials. This ensures materials are current and conform to international best practices.

Recognizing these advantages, in April of 2012 the European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative (EU CBRN CoE)1 issued a call for proposals to develop an online CBRN awareness course. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies - in Monterey, California - was selected to create the course which is currently in its pre-release version (www.cnscourseware.com). What follows are five lessons we learned in creating “Project 10” for the CBRN community.

One way to address this challenge is through technology.

We are living in the midst of an education revolution

Five Lessons Learned

#1 Know your audience

The first and most important task in developing online training is to identify the training audience. Besides the obvious role this plays in curriculum development, the audience also drives how the content is presented and marketed. It is counterintuitive, but a small audience is much harder to reach and market to than a large audience because it has a narrower preference for training. A group of medical doctors, for example, might only be interested in a course if it corresponds to their specific specialty. A large audience is much easier to reach, but there is a risk of watering down the course content to the point that the training value is diminished. The solution is to work closely
with the existing set of contacts in a country. Project 10 relied heavily on the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Regional Secretariats coordinators. Working through these officers allowed us to reach out directly to the Regional Secretariats and the corresponding National Focus Points - points of contact established by the host nations themselves - which narrowed the target audience for the courseware to officials most in need of this type of overview training.

# 2 Assign a Project Manager
When developing an E-learning course, there is an understandable impulse to rely on a lead instructor or subject matter expert to manage the course development. This approach works well for a traditional course, but less so for online learning. Unlike a traditional classroom course, an E-learning course is a hybrid of the educational process of curriculum design and the business process of software delivery. There are many pieces that must be integrated into a functioning whole, and must be done so on time and on budget. To accomplish this, strong project management planning and implementation skills are required and one project leader should be assigned to ensure consistency and unity of effort.

# 3 Use an Instructional Designer
Asynchronous E-learning models using pre-recorded lectures work well for introductory courses. They do not require instructor interaction, and students are able to learn at their own pace and spend more time with the course materials. The danger of such a semi-automated course is it can come across as simplistic or too standardized. To avoid this, online course managers should include an instructional designer as part of the project team. Instructional designers are experts in adult learning and can help to ensure course materials and assessments take full advantage of the online medium while maintaining the optimal flow and se-
quence of course content to improve learning. They also serve as valuable referees between subject matter and technology experts, helping to maintain balance between engaging course content and technical feasibility.

# 4 Mind the Technology
The explosion of free and standardized open-source software is a boon for E-learning. Today there is no need to use expensive and complicated commercial software or hosting services to conduct E-learning courses. Popular free blogging platforms such as Wordpress offer a suite of sophisticated course management tools, and numerous video hosting sites such as Youtube or Dailymotion allow course lectures to be hosted and viewed for free.

While these technologies certainly make creating an E-learning course cheaper and easier, they do not remove the need for technical expertise. To be successful, the technical and instructional teams must work side-by-side. Video editing, website coding and patching, and software compatibility issues are only a few of the tasks that the technical team must be prepared to address. If the technical team is integrated into the instructional development process at the very beginning, many of the technical difficulties can be addressed and resolved before they become major obstacles.

# 5 Allow Plenty of Time
A final key to success is to allow sufficient time to develop and fully test the E-learning course. Unlike traditional courses, E-learning requires instructors to spend significantly more time preparing and presenting materials. For example, a video lecture may require several separate filming sessions as well as the preparation of a complete written transcript. In addition, explanations and questions that work well in a live session may have to be changed or adapted to suit video lectures. The technical team may also require more time than they are used to as they try to find optimal video and software solutions to convey the entirety of the instructional materials. Our team, for example, found an elegant solution for an online quizzing feature, only to discover later that our Arabic translations caused it to malfunction. When working with complex materials and new technologies, such difficulties are as unpredictable as they are inevitable. Recognizing this fact and building extra time into the project schedule at the outset is the best way to ensure project success.

Conclusion
Online courses can provide a cost-effective and sustainable training solution for partner nations. Free software solutions and expanding internet access means even the most remote government outpost can today have access to training materials developed and presented by world-class experts.

Online courses can provide a cost-effective and sustainable training solution for partner nations

To take advantage of this E-learning revolution requires an up-front investment of technical expertise, planning, and project management skills beyond that required for traditional classroom training. The results, however, can be leveraged in ways that far exceed what is possible in a classroom. The ultimate success of this or any other training effort lies with the people reached and the contacts developed. With their reach, flexibility, and sustainability, E-learning courses offer a new and powerful tool for engagement.

The author
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It is estimated that about 3 billion people across the planet are connected to the internet, while mobile-cellular subscriptions have reached almost 7 billion in 2014. If nobody can deny that progress in information technologies is creating new opportunities, advanced services and potential global benefits, it is also true that modern society’s dependence on digital infrastructures has generated the new threats of the hyper-connected world. Cyber warfare, cyber espionage, terrorist use of the internet, online crimes against property and persons embody growing transnational menaces. Conversely, governments’ responses to counter cyber threats and to safeguard national security through the internet are triggering an ethical debate: are security measures putting freedom of expression in danger?

Media is a key component in promoting awareness with regards to potential gains and risks of the digital era. Within this constantly evolving cyber landscape, knowledgeable and accurate journalism, and responsible public information are needed more than ever to frame ethical debates surrounding new digital trends and complex security issues.

To deepen the understanding of these emerging challenges, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) organizes a specialized course on cyber security from 20 to 22 July 2015. The course aims at increasing knowledge, accuracy and accountability with regards to reporting on new threats as well as fostering constructive connections, dialogue and exchange of experiences between different sectors in this area.

www.unicri.it

Choose from over 100 workshops and plenary sessions for new, intermediate, and advanced victim advocates. Educational topics include: counselling and advocacy; restorative justice; program management; identity theft/cyber crimes; spiritual and mental health services; homicide issues; domestic violence and sexual assault; victims in the military; special concerns for children, the elderly, and victims with disabilities; public policy; law enforcement and prosecution models; Native American justice; self care and burnout; interdisciplinary services and collaboration; and much more.

http://connect2justice.ncja.org/events/event-escription?CalendarEventKey=-dcac38ba-b8e9-4604-89c0-8ede6c275ed3&EventTypeKey=&Home=/events/calendar
10-11 September 2015
Birmingham, England
Contentious and Contemporary Issues in the Study of Terrorism Society for Terrorism Research 9th Annual International Conference

Within democratic societies, counter-terrorism is almost exclusively about crime prevention. A broad and holistic approach to preventing terrorism can be based on nine preventive mechanisms: Building normative barriers against terrorism, reducing radicalization and recruitment, deterrence, disruption, incapacitation, protecting vulnerable targets, reducing benefits to terrorists, reducing harm, and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. Counter-terrorist policies which are only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side-effects which serve to enhance the problem rather than reducing it. A more holistic approach, making use of the entire range of preventive mechanisms, may lighten the impact of the “hard” measures by relying more on the impact of the “softer” and more positive measures to build moral barriers, reduce recruitment, and facilitate exit from terrorist movements.

The goal of the conference, hosted by the University of Birmingham, is to highlight ongoing and emerging academic research in terrorism and counter-terrorism; promote collaboration between academia, industry and counter-terrorism practitioners; and explore new ways of translating the results of research on terrorism for multiple audiences, agencies and communities.

http://www.societyforterrorismresearch.org/annual-conference

13 - 17 September 2015
Zurich, Switzerland
20th International Association of Prosecutors Annual Conference

The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) is the only worldwide organization of prosecutors. Established in 1995 has members from over 171 different countries. Its 20th annual conference will focus on White-Collar Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering. Among the Conference themes: prevention of corruption: democracy, guarantee of human rights, indepen-
18 September 2015
London, United Kingdom

What shapes trends in crime?

Drawing on new research, this event will discuss why crime rose so much during the 1980s and the implications for current policy. This event is a unique opportunity to hear from some of the key experts on how economic and social policies influence long-term trends and patterns of crime, victimisation and fear of crime.

Among the themes covered in the event will be: the long-term consequences of social and economic policies from 1979 to 1997 on crime and criminal justice; how changes in crime rates have an impact on the types of criminal justice policies pursued; how the era in which one grew up affects the beliefs one holds about crime and about what works in tackling it; how specific social policies in one arena can create ‘spill over’ effects in criminal justice; the implications for future crime trends in the context of ongoing public sector cuts and austerity.

http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/civicrm/event/info?reset=1&id=75

1-2 October 2015
Brussels, Belgium

Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe

First Vice President for Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Frans Timmermans, in cooperation with EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Víra Jourová, will host the first Annual Colloquium on fundamental rights in the EU. The Colloquium will aim at improving mutual cooperation and greater political engagement for the promotion and protection of fundamental rights in Europe. It will seek to strengthen dialogue between the EU and international institutions, policy makers, academia and civil society, and deepen the understanding of challenges for fundamental rights on the ground. Another key objective will be the identification of gaps and achieving progress on topical fundamental rights issues. For this first edition the central theme will be: Tolerance and respect: preventing and combating antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe. The Colloquium will bring together a selected number of high level participants from across the EU: national Ministers, representatives of leading NGOs and international institutions, MEPs and renowned academics and philosophers.

15 - 16 October 2015

Johannesburg, South Africa

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 6th international conference: National and international perspectives on crime, violence reduction and criminal justice

This premier annual event brings together researchers, academics, policy makers and practitioners with an interest in criminology and associated disciplines to discuss research findings and exchange ideas. The networks established at these conferences have led to collaboration across the globe on crime and justice issues. The event provides an excellent opportunity to exhibit the latest criminological and related research as well as policy initiatives from Africa and beyond.


5-7 November 2015

Berlin, Germany

Europe’s Strategic Choices: Building Prosperity and Security

Launched in 2014, this annual European strategic dialogue will explore economic competitiveness, energy investment and security policy issue bringing together senior politicians, business leaders and academics to discuss how European countries can respond individually and collectively to global challenges, exploring developments between Europe and its neighbours through three themes: security, prosperity and energy.

http://www.chathamhouse.org/Conferences/Europe2015#sthash.yTqxv4Qk.dpuf

16-21 November 2015

Luxembourg City, Luxembourg

Europe’s Strategic Choices: Building Prosperity and Security

The course is organized by SALTO-YOUTH, a network of eight Resource Centres working on European priority areas within the youth field. The training aims at empowering youth activists with practical tools to counter hate speech. It will combine the tools of No Hate Speech campaign and Non-Violent Communication. Time will be devoted for the planning of a campaign, as well as the development of new projects with Erasmus+/ Youth in action.

The course is addressed to young activist involved locally or regionally in the No Hate Speech Movement as well as to persons who have been confronted with hate speech, and youth workers.
Pearse, John

**Investigating Terrorism: Current Political, Legal and Psychological Issues, Wiley, 2015**

The book presents different terrorist cases in the UK, from the debates held in both the Houses of the Parliament, through investigation, arrest, prosecution and imprisonment. It confronts many of the crucial political, law enforcement, legal and psychological issues currently influencing major decision makers. The book provides the reader with an exhaustive and in-depth review of first-hand experiences of a wide range of professionals. Points of view included in the publication are from politicians, prosecution and defence lawyers, detectives, security experts and forensic psychologists.

United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime,


Trafficking in persons is a serious world-wide issue which affected between 2010 and 2012 at least 124 countries. Most of the victims are woman, who too often are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour. Although women are the most frequent victims of this phenomenon, trafficking in persons also affects a significant number of male victims. Among the victims, it is increasing the number of children who every year are involved in this atrocious trafficking. The UNODC ‘Global Report on Trafficking in Persons’ covers 128 countries and provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons at global, regional and national levels, based on the trafficking cases detected. The Report highlights the role of organised crime in trafficking in persons, and includes an analytical chapter on how traffickers operate. The worldwide response to trafficking in persons is also a focus of this Global Report.
Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac, Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Michael Kilchling (eds.)

**Mapping the Criminological - Landscape of the Balkans**

Recently, a new line within the Research Series of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (MPI), Freiburg, Germany was launched—the “Publications of the Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology”. The book series, edited by Hans-Jörg Albrecht & Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac, is published by MPI and the University of Zagreb – Faculty of Law. It will regularly publish research findings of the Max Planck Partner Group for Balkan Criminology (MPPG), a joint venture of MPI and the Zagreb Faculty of Law. More details on MPPG’s research program and further research activities are provided at www.balkan-criminology.eu.

The book is the first volume of the Series. Its introductory chapter – Marking of the Territory – deals with the Balkans as a European region sui generis and sets the stage for the following analyses of criminology and crime in the Balkans. This part is opened by Holm Sundhaussen who defines the basic terms (e.g. the Balkans, Southeastern Europe, etc.) from a historical perspective, focusing on the Balkans’ uniqueness regarding history, geography, religion, legal tradition, and migration. He also critically reviews the image of the Balkans as a ‘violence-prone’ region. The following contribution by Anna-Maria Getoš Kalac concentrates on the Balkans as a criminological region sui generis and in this context presents the concept of a ‘Balkan Criminology’ together with its regional key players – the MPPG and the Balkan Criminology Network (BCNet). The background, methodology, and scope of the ‘mapping’ are presented as well as some of the key findings on the state of art in criminology and crime across the Balkans. The introduction concludes with an analysis of the Balkan’s criminological landscape in terms of networking and capacity building. John Winterdyk & Michael Kilchling put emphasis on the significance of – principled – comparative approaches in modern criminology and discuss the necessary steps for the development of sustainable research structures. They come to the conclusion that Balkan Criminology has the potential to gain a position within European criminology that can develop to become similar to that of Scandinavia. In chapter II the ‘country mappings’ are presented. These capture the current situation in criminological education and research, but also basic crime trends and major criminal justice challenges in a total of 14 Balkan and relevant neighbouring countries. Renowned scholars and experts as well as young academics from the region, all involved in the BCNet, joined in a collaborative research effort that provides for a clear picture of the criminological setting in their countries. Each of the ‘country mappings’ is a unique scientific discovery trip into the criminological and criminal landscape of the respective country providing for a vivid picture of the Balkans’ criminological landscape and also represents essential readings on the specific crime and criminal justice situation. A selection of research projects of the MPPG and first findings are presented in chapter III – Expedition into the Criminal Landscape of the Balkans. Here the members of the MPPG discuss their research questions, explain the designs chosen and present first findings from empirical, literature, and normative research. The subjects addressed cover a wide scope of issues: international sentencing and its enforcement (Filip Vojta), juvenile delinquency (Reana Bezić) and trafficking in human beings in the Balkans (Karlo Ressler), economic crime in periods of transition (Sunčana Řoksandić Vidlička) and problems of how to adequately deal with criminal offences committed by political parties (Aleksandar Maršavelski).
Nowadays the majority of the world’s population lives in urban environments. More job opportunities, better living conditions and access to services and infrastructures have attracted to cities more than half of the world’s population. However, living in urban areas combines these advantages with a number of disadvantages. Therefore, urban policy makers are called to recognise and respond to the emerging and different needs, concerns and interests of urban women, men, boys and girls. This volume attentively analyses how urbanisation processes affect in different ways women and man; examines the consequences of gender inequalities in urban context and highlights responsive interventions which have proved to strengthen gender equality and women’s empowerment in urban settings.

Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other radioactive materials are known, or suspected, to be present. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event. This publication aims to provide law enforcement officials, national policy makers, decision makers, local authorities and technical support personnel with guidance on the framework and functional elements for managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scenes. Such guidance may then be adopted or adapted to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions and competent authorities within each Member State.
Cybercrime and the risks for the economy and enterprises at the European Union and Italian level, 2014

Cybercrime is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. Targeting all types of companies, it is one of the most serious threats to the global economy, steadily growing over the past decade. In addition to large companies, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are increasingly affected by cybercrime attacks. The research study aims to provide a framework to assess the impact of cybercrime on the economy, and to evaluate the vulnerabilities of SMEs to cyber-attacks. The research focuses on the impact of cybercrime at the international, national (Italian) and local level. Targeted interviews and case study analysis have been conducted to provide an overview of the tools currently used by criminals, the most common reasons that lead to these criminal acts, and the major risks and vulnerabilities for businesses. Interviews with institutional players and companies have helped to clarify key problems and suggest a need for a coherent strategy for SMEs to defend themselves against cybercrime.

Voices against Crime in Naples, 2014

The publication presents the findings of a project aimed at empowering victims as agents of change, by taking their stories as the starting point for the definition of crime prevention strategies, assistance and development. The book includes stories from the victims, experts and practitioners contributions, NGO suggestions and UNICRI’s recommendations. The analyses of the stories sheds light on many different type of crime and support the identification of good practices and critical issues to be addressed with respect to victims’ support policies and practices, ultimately with the goal of building resilience. UNICRI’s recommendations highlight the centrality of a national plan for victims, including guidelines on victims protection and support before and after the investigation and judicial process and the enhancement of restorative justice practices. Empowering victims through the assessment of their experience with crime, the understanding of the problems they face and including victims in the designing of new strategies to prevent victimization and awareness to combat violence is fundamental.

As highlighted by the report, actions to promote crime prevention and security in urban settings must involve the integration and convergence of all actors, inclusive strategies, community policing and training and working opportunities for at-risk youth.