Freedom from fear

security

innovative thinking

Ahmed Bah
Radicalization and Dialogue

Robert Orr
Handling Terrorism

Mumbai
A lesson to learn from Interview with B. Powrie
A few days after the election of the new President of the United States, Barack Obama, a
group of terrorists on the other side of the world carried out a spectacular and bloody attack
in the heart of one of America’s most loyal allies, India.

The timing chosen by the extremists, whatever their political or religious affiliation, appeared
to have the aim of reminding the public, the mass media and the new White House
commander-in-chief of the priorities that need to be faced: not the economy, but security.

The innovative doctrine of the elected President, who had previously expressed the will for
a renewed multilateral foreign policy, was aimed to facilitate a smooth transition into the
diplomacy between state and non-state actors in a post-Iraq era. Security at all levels, was
suddenly, and once more, promoted to the top of the International agenda, a position it now
shares with global economic concerns.

This issue of F3 is released as the UN meets in New York to discuss the design and
implementation of innovative security policies. The outcomes of this conference will be
extremely important since the general consensus is that the public sector alone can no longer
provide safety and security tout court. The attack on the Taj Mahal Hotel demonstrates the
critical need for the inclusion of other stakeholders in the quest for security.

A new strategy capable of involving as many actors as possible is called for, in order to tackle
and ultimately solve the threat posed by the modern interconnected world. This is why this
special edition of F3 - Freedom From Fear will try to offer different tools for an innovative
security-oriented governance policy.

Sandro Calvani
UNICRI Director

Hans-Jöerg Albrecht
MPI Director

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40 CHALLENGING IDEAS FOR CHALLENGING TIMES
Managing today’s volatile and uncertain international security environment has become an increasingly important and complicated challenge. This new and radically different international security environment means that, in addition to traditional threats to States, there are new and more insidious ones, brought by non-State actors, that pose real dangers to an increasingly interlinked and interdependent society. National governments and international organisations are urgently examining the significance of this new situation. They recognise that no State can stand alone to face these challenges. What is required are collective strategies, collective institutions, and a collective responsibility. Of equal importance, security now directly involves a broad cross-section of civil society, the private sector, economic development and human freedom.

In order to comply with the necessities of this new international security environment and provide security prospects against new challenges and emerging threats, UNICRI launched its Security Governance/Counter-Terrorism Laboratory. The Security Governance Laboratory develops and implements initiatives with the aim of promoting broader collaboration and participation among different security stakeholders. Its main objective is to make a credible contribution to the development of a sustainable platform for information exchange and effective policies in the fields of security and counter-terrorism.

Starting from the following assumptions, the Security Governance Laboratory elaborated a flexible and interdisciplinary approach that applies the concept of governance into the security area.

Security requires variety of expertise, and engages many different entities. In particular, security and development are strongly interconnected both nationally and globally.

The assessment of threats and the development of strategic responses should involve policymakers from both traditional security and development-oriented disciplines, including diplomacy, criminal justice, socio-economic development, police law enforcement, and post-conflict and peace-building.

Policymakers from these areas should share responsibilities by identifying common strategic objectives. They should also share the allocation of resources to achieve such objectives, while ensuring a fair return on their institutional investments.

In this regard, it has to be noted that a conscious adoption of the Security Governance approach by relevant security stakeholders faces some cross-cultural barriers, which require a degree of cultural sensitivity and flexibility, to develop a strategy of collective leadership and translate global consensus into collective action. Therefore, the Laboratory has identified three primary areas of concern which are interconnected with governance norms and organizational learning concepts:

**Identification of Common Goals:** Security is often conceived as a ‘black box,’ which security policy-makers tend to view as the exclusive domain of, from case to case, intelligence services, the military, law enforcement, or other related agencies. This paradigm makes it difficult to understand the respective commonalities of action and objectives of the different security actors. It also engenders resistance to include the private sector and civil society when traditional and new security strategies have to be designed and implemented in tandem with holistic aspirations. Finally, it creates barriers to understanding connections between threats
posed by non-state actors and the conditions that might foster the spread of social pathologies and threats, such as poverty, political exclusion, lack of good governance, environmental degradation, intra-State conflicts, etc.

**Synchronisation of Resources:** different security stakeholders might duplicate their efforts towards a common objective and not benefit enough from past experience or from the skills and resources already developed within the broad security sector. As a consequence, it might be problematic to strategically perceive the entire picture and understand the short and long-term impact of certain actions and decisions. In addition to this, effective information sharing and exchange is often problematic, not only between two States but also among national agencies within States. The allocation of responsibilities can be fragmented, thus compromising the learning process within agencies, States, and between States resulting in a hectic process of policy-entrepreneurship.

**Establishment of a Common Language:** Strategic policy-makers and security stakeholders with varying expertise and cultural backgrounds might find it difficult to effectively communicate, especially when they engage in technical dialogue. Very often, their attempts to manage ever more complex challenges are hampered by the lack of a common language.

The Security Governance approach engages complex governing mechanisms and applies them to a common zone, which is characterized by a multitude of actors, who are facing identical problems while operating autonomously, thus engendering a minimal level of effective interaction. The application of the Security Governance approach into a common zone provides a credible solution to the above-mentioned areas of concern: through it, strategic security policy-makers can identify common goals and establish mutual support networks, through learning and dialogue – facilitated by multimedia technological systems. Furthermore, innovative methodologies to synchronize available resources are brought forward and a concrete effort is made to facilitate the elaboration of a common language, on the basis of the preliminary acknowledgement of the shared interest toward the highest possible security level.

Therefore, the primary goal of the Matrix is to encourage strategic security policy-makers and experts from different sectors and countries to acknowledge the existence of a common zone where they can identify, as mentioned before, common strategic goals and effectively allocate and coordinate resources to achieve the identified goals. These objectives might be accomplished through the use of instruments and dynamics typical of international relations, including common working and technical languages, common expertise, a permanent and structured dialogue, and an interdisciplinary and innovative methodology.

Finally it is worth noting that, embedded in the Security Governance approach, there is the need to maintain a vision of security, ethical issues and respect for human rights. This is fully consistent with the United Nations mandate and fundamental principles in conjunction with recent attempts to strengthen the participation of the civil society organisations and actors in the UN activities. As stated by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, “today, no walls can separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in another. What begins with the failure to uphold the dignity of one life all too often ends with a calamity for entire nations”.

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Opinions 1
* John Howie

Industry Opportunities

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?
Today’s geopolitical climate and incertitude, made more complicated by the recent economic global crisis, can only be tackled with a common policy and shared response.

Such a complex arena requires an equally complex policy response. Such a policy should recognize that there are many interdependent entities that share the burden of responsibility for the overall security of the international community.

Governance itself is not a new concept, and has recently been embraced (some would say re-embraced) by enterprises and governments worldwide, particularly in response to financial scandals and renewed government regulation. Sound governance practices have shown themselves to be beneficial through the identification of common goals, reduced costs, and compliance with statutory and regulatory obligations. Governance helps industries by enabling them to focus themselves, whilst dispensing with distractions in order to compete effectively and deliver value to its customers and shareholders. A governance approach to the new and evolving security environment at the national and international level can bring comparable benefits, and assist major security actors to focus on what matters to them. It would furthermore allow them to cooperate with each other and coordinate their activities, resulting in improved security.

The UNICRI Security Governance model is such an approach. The conceptual model shows that there is a ‘Common Zone’ at the intersection of responsibilities and areas of activity, in which there is:

- Identification of common goals;
- Synchronization of resources; and
- Establishment of a common language.

The UNICRI Security Governance approach makes it easier for governments and industries to train and prepare for situations by providing an opportunity to identify commonalities and unified approaches and solutions to problems. It should be recognized that today’s security threats cannot be met and addressed by governments and agencies alone, even those with a tool such as Security Governance at their disposal, and nor should they be expected to. Industries, particularly in the area of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), have a part to play both as partners and as beneficiaries of stable, secure and prosperous economies.

Further, the ICT industry’s involvement is recommendable to effectively address the increasing use of ICT to launch attacks against countries in cyberspace with the potential for resulting in disruption in the delivery of utilities and the availability of public and private sector services online and to reduce the added potentiality for disastrous consequences such as the failure of medical technologies, or even an explosion at power generation facilities, in the real world. When the Public and Private Sectors come together to solve often common challenges, it is usually not difficult to find success stories. Whether it is practical advice that stems from the use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software, rather than often-expensive custom solutions for facilitating secure collaboration through video conferencing and document management, analyzing large volumes of data for patterns and connections, training and learning, or defending critical infrastructure (to name but a few), or in the form of more specialized relationships, it can be shown that Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mutually beneficial to all parties.

The experience that Microsoft has with PPPs is convincing since they provide tangible benefits to all involved. Governments and agencies gain advantage from access to solutions, technology and Subject Matter Experts that they may not otherwise be able to benefit from. Private enterprises also gain insight into the challenges and problems at the national and international level on scales typically not found in their enterprise customer base, and which can spur new research and development efforts into next generation solutions that could result in new marketable products. Lastly, through PPP, it is not uncommon to find that private citizens can become empowered via the application of technology to better improve the social fabric and the delivery of Government to Citizen Services.

For more information on Microsoft’s stance on PPP and its application of technology to improve society, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/citizenship.

* John Howie is Director of the Office of International Affairs, Trustworthy Computing Group, Microsoft Corporation.
It is now very rare to come across, or even to write an article on such issues like dialogue, Terrorism, and Radicalization without expanding on theoretical definitions and ideological arguments which most likely make it difficult to get any clear idea about the nature, impact and perspectives of these issues. Moreover, it gives the impression of repetition, polemics and rather useless rhetoric that we find in almost every piece of literature in this field. Since this article is no exception, we will try to limit as much as possible the notional dimensions of the issues it will tackle and stress the practical aspects of their analysis. We will not, therefore, risk any definition of ‘dialogue’ or ‘Radicalization’ but we will focus on the challenges that these two concepts raise, both on the level of understanding and their application to reality. The term ‘dialogue among cultures and civilizations’, regardless of its origin, has nowadays become linked with the United Nations initiative and with the announcement of 2001 as the year of Dialogue. Still, we need to remember that this year experienced another event which drastically affected the whole international community and gave new dimensions and orientations to this initiative. It is not very difficult to guess that this event was the 9/11 attacks. Does this ‘coincidence’ mean...
The interaction of ideas and exchange of views - the basic acts of dialogue - necessitate that each party is in possession of a vision of its own, which is worth introducing and defending

that the enthusiasm for opening up Dialogue was one of the manifestations of the new era since the end of the cold war? Or was it a hidden indication, if not an intuition, that we strongly needed to act before anything of the sort can happen? In other words, were we in an unconscious state forgetting and ignoring the tensions that could motivate such an act or were we in some preventive context trying to save the world from such a catastrophe? How was the process of Dialogue going to proceed without these attacks and how did they impact it philosophically, ideologically and maybe politically? Other questions that can be posed in this regard are manifold, but I think it is important to remember that the spirit in which ‘dialogue’ was first initiated was totally different from the context in which it was carried out.

Another factor of relevance to these questions relies on the regular linkage between dialogue and Radicalization, Extremism and Terrorism. Are these issues intrinsically linked or is it the coincidence we spoke about which is making it inevitable to dissociate them? Does this connection imply that they are two sides of the same coin?

As was the case of the term dialogue, the concept of Radicalization certainly needs the same degree of elucidation and contextualization. We will not, however, elaborate on the historical background of this term when it referred to the ‘reformers’, to revolutionary alternatives and to resistance to totalitarian authorities. The meaning of Radicalization has certainly come a long way since then, but one common semantic feature remains - the status of refuting a given system and embracing positions that may require the use of strongly, affirmed means of action. Taking the present manifestations of Radicalization, especially in the Islamic world, as it is our area of interest, we can say that it is not accurate to speak about one Radicalization. In fact, there are as many radicalizations as the so-called radicals themselves. Every process of radicalization carries with it all the individual, subjective and also objective motives, expectations and convictions of the radicalized person, even if we can speak about the phenomenon in its general and common manifestations. In this way, is it possible to speak about positive and negative attitudes of Radicalization? Is there anything wrong with Radicalization as long as it does not lead to violence and terrorism? Not all forms of Radicalization are actually condemnable. We might take some forms of radicalization as part of the established values and principles, which for one reason or another is not ready to question or challenge. In fact, I do not believe that dialogue can be achieved without what we can call at this stage ‘truth claims’. Unless each party involved in the dialogue process believes in clear and articulate ideals or positions and is ready to defend them as his convictions, dialogue will actually loose its vigor and even its spirit and goal. The interaction of ideas and exchange of views - the basic acts of dialogue - necessitate that each party is in possession of a vision of its own, which is worth introducing and defending. Seen from this angle, truth claims do not undermine Dialogue but rather enrich it. They more than likely lead to much more compound, sophisticated and multi dimensional results. Of course, it goes without saying that the expression of these claims should be within the legitimate instruments and the suitable mechanisms of dialogue.

Another question we would like to raise here is related to whether ‘moderation’ is the right answer to Radicalization. From a purely geometrical point of view, if we put extremes (radicals) at both ends of the line, moderation, being in the middle, cannot be considered as the counterpart of either end. From a philosophical point of view, moderation might be associated with hesitation and uncertainty. Truth claims are on the contrary active and dynamic, while moderation could be seen as passive and static. Moreover, many researchers consider that moderation can be only one step from radicalization, and question the capacity of the moderate to resist and keep the equilibrium of their position. This swing space is always the target of the competing forces, and constitutes the most vulnerable part of the chain. We can therefore see that the dichotomy Radicalization-Moderation is not valid in all cases and that the response to negative attitudes of Radicalization is much more complex than we believe.

De-radicalization is often suggested as the natural response, but we believe it is not the optimal action to undertake against radicalization. On the one hand, even if we have implicitly established a gradient for the identification of radicalization, we do not possess any criteria to define when a “radical” can be considered as de-radicalized. On the other hand, the very means and also actors of de-radicalization...
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are often themselves the forces that once drove the individuals towards radicalization or, at the very least, they are subject to suspicion and mistrust. The answer to Radicalization should certainly be deeper and should transcend the religious and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon. For example, in my view, it is useless to repeat over and over to Muslim radicals that Islam is a religion of peace and brotherhood, which it certainly is. Unless we integrate all the extra religious factors (psychological, socio economic, political), we will not be in a position to introduce a sustainable response to Radicalization. What is needed at this stage is in fact a de-islamization of radicalization rather than de-radicalization. In other words, it is not because you are a good Muslim that you become radical and it is not because you are a true radical that you become terrorist.

Once again, we see that the dichotomy Radicalization-Terrorism does not apply in all contexts. Studies on the terrorist groups are very careful when it comes to identifying the “pre act” stage which leads individuals to commit acts of terrorism. This stage is not necessarily within the boundaries of radicalism and, empirically, not all terrorists have gone through the radical phase. Radicalization and terrorism are therefore not organically linked. Both phenomena, despite their mutual relevance, keep their own specificities, complexities and even secrets and mysteries.

The limitations of context and space certainly did not allow a comprehensive overview of all related issues, and my main attempt here was to show that the dimensions of and the relationships between the process of dialogue, the phenomenon of terrorism and the forms of radicalization are much more complex than they may appear, and that without challenging our understanding of these dimensions and relationships, we will make little progress in the pursuit of finding an efficient solution to these issues.

* Ahmed Said Ould Bah is the Head of the Cabinet of the Director General of the Islamic educational, scientific and cultural Organization (ISESCO), which is based in Rabat, Morocco.

**In Brief**

“Estimates for the total number of extremists who have received weapons training and religious instruction at al-Qaeda camps, mostly in Afghanistan, have ranged from 20,000 to 70,000.”

4,000 in UK trained at terror camps by Ben Leapman, The telegraph, 19 April 2008
Mentioning security policies, young generations and globalization in the same breath might appear as an attempt to tar issues that are fundamentally different with the same brush. The reason these three issues have often been ‘lumped together’ is the underlying concern that young people might become the main actors in activities which could potentially pose a threat to security (defined as a peaceful community life), above all in urban areas such as cities.

In other words, in order to nip any ‘trouble’ in the bud, the authorities have had to ‘keep an eye’ on gatherings of young people, either because of their natural unruliness or because they could turn out to be confrontational.

In our era, with its now sinister connotations of globalization, the linking of security policies with the role of young generations takes on a new meaning.

Upcoming generations are indeed those more deeply steeped in the globalized world and have a greater capacity to travel the (geographic or virtual) spaces with a natural aplomb, often unknown to previous generations.

It is true that the modern growth in means of transport and communications and their appropriation by the masses have shortened geographic distances and now allow a larger majority of people access to experiences and knowledge that until several decades ago were the privilege of a few special categories of people. However, it is also true that young people do not perceive this new dimension as revolutionary, but as a natural space surrounding their existence and their relations.

This transition has made contact and comparison between radically different cultural realities a matter of routine. It is in this context that it is necessary to seek the basic framework of the discussion and the possible connection between security strategies and the role of young generations.

The shortening, as it were, of spatial distances is accompanied by a parallel shortening of the cultural distances. However, not in the sense that the latter are eliminated but rather that their reference frameworks are ‘relativized’. In other words, in a shrinking world, everyone discovers that their own universe of reference is not the only one, nor is it the absolute.

This process, as fascinating as it is, has elicited (or may elicit in the future) two opposite reactions.

In some cases, for fear of losing one’s ‘secular’ identity, the reaction has been to accentuate the latter and to oppose it to all the rest. This is the well-known phenomenon of the
radicalization of identities and the consequent attempt to assert them in a fundamentalist fashion, using all available means, including violence. The well-known theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ used to describe the prospects of the immediate future of the world is merely an extrapolated description of this reaction.

The other hypothesis, on the other hand, resides precisely in the opportunity that may arise from a confrontation between absorbing but not totalizing realities. The fact of continuously interacting with people that differ from us in various ways brings analogies and differences to the forefront. It shows that each identity (even my own) is complex and capable of expressing itself in different ways depending on the various relationships in which it is involved.

Taking this as our starting point, we discover that globalization, by creating opportunities for learning and comparison, does not necessarily involve the substitution of peculiar identities with a single ‘mongrel’ identity, but rather the possibility of understanding the different identities. I discover how strong my identity is in the precise moment in which I interact with the bearer of another identity. The inevitable consequence of all this is that all these identities (along with my own), including all that is indispensable for each of us, will be able to survive only on the basis of a ‘pact of mutual respect’.

The younger generations, we have said, are those that are more inclined to immerge themselves in this process, almost without realizing it. The developments that have taken place in educational and communications models have actually placed these new generations under the focus of an immense system characterized by the ordinary and extraordinary circulation of people and experiences whose genetic origin is rooted in cultures distant from one’s own. Let us take an example. The increase in the number of school and university syllabi that now allow students to spend part of their training period in a foreign country has transformed the centres where they study into melting pots. These become places where individual identities, different learning methods, life styles and cultural critical points can be compared to each other as well as with a ‘dominant’ culture (that of the place in which they happen to be at that moment). The latter aspect is particularly interesting. By relating from several different standpoints to cultural realities that are ‘dominant’ only on that occasion and not in an absolute fashion (that is, simply because we happen to be in Paris, or Rome, or New York or Rabat, etc.) we learn that belonging to a given culture does not in itself mean one is destined always to be a cultural majority or minority, but rather that the very concept of majority or minority is a relative one.

In such a new and complex situation, young people, precisely because they play a leading role in the global world, are also the principal stakeholders in policies tending to support the interaction between and integration of identities, and opposing their radicalization. They can work “horizontally”, among themselves, or “vertically” with their predecessors, who feel more strongly attached to their own identities. This throws up a few challenges at the practical level.

First, it is necessary to take action to promote the integration of the new generations into the contexts in which they live. This brings to mind those who, to use an absurd oxymoron, call the second generation of immigrants. In some countries, like Italy, the procedure for acquiring citizenship is still based on the criterion of ius sanguinis and has produced one generation (and perhaps even two) of “substantial, but not formal, citizens”. These are persons who were born, have gone to school, grown up and work in a country – have absorbed its culture – but who have retained the citizenship of their family’s country of origin. This produces a dangerous rift in identity, which could conceivably be patched up by seeking refuge in radicalized identities. This could all be avoided not only through reform of citizenship policies, but also by means of social policies to avoid ghettoization and to facilitate access to the instruments and opportunities for growth and community sharing.

Furthermore, it is extremely important to create as many opportunities as possible for the new generations to interact freely, cross-pollinating each other, comparing respective life styles and ambitions, as well as their expectations of society and of the world at large. This must be done both at the educational and training level, as well as at that of the participation of ‘young adults’ in the processes of programming and planning their (economic, political, social, etc.) future.

Bearing this in mind it is important also to allow access to and interaction between young people and the (national and international) institutions. This is because young people could provide the key to interpreting and resolving the problems, and show themselves capable of supporting and strengthening the role of governance of the institutions. This would also revive a pact of mutual knowledge and respect among new citizens and the institutions that would definitely prove to be virtuous.

In view of these reflections, let me conclude by describing the experience I had as Italian Minister of the Interior, when, jointly with the Minister for Youth, Giovanna Melandri, we formed the Youth

It is extremely important to create as many opportunities as possible for the new generations to interact freely, cross-pollinating each other, comparing respective life styles and ambitions.
Council for Religious and Cultural Pluralism. A group of 16, all under 30 (8 men and 8 women), were selected from 11 of the more important religious denominations in Italy by size and by historical tradition. Two interesting aspects emerged from their working together.

In the first instance, these young people found themselves for the first time having to discharge the responsibility of striking a balance between the culture of origin they represented and the need to come up with opinions, proposals and evaluations regarding measures and choices ultimately affecting the whole of Italian society regardless of the cultural background of the individual citizens. This exercise in co-responsibility taught them the need for a broader outlook.

The second point of interest was the fact that for the first time this was a public space, not a private space. It was the State, in other words, that accepted to listen to what the different identities might say to each other in order to seek a mode of respectful civil coexistence for all in which no single identity prevailed over the others.

This initiative demonstrated that security policy is more than ever a matter of heading off conflict rather than of repressing it. This prevention signifies listening and sharing responsibility in dealing with the problems and deciding what can or cannot be done to try and solve them. Security and prevention, as ever, entail the constant exercise of democracy. A democracy that must have the aim of reaching out to the entire global village and, for this very reason, can no longer afford to exclude the new methods and above all the new inhabitants of this village.

* Giuliano Amato was Prime Minister of Italy twice, first from 1992 to 1993 and then from 2000 to 2001. He was more recently Vice President of the Convention on the Future of Europe that drafted the new European Constitution. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Minister of the Interior in Romano Prodi’s government.

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**In Brief**

“During the past 15 years, the increasing number of jobless among the youth and the resulting desperation of these unemployed youths have undermined peace, security, and economic progress in West African countries”

The International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC), founded in Siracusa in 1972, is a public foundation devoted to studies, research, and to the advancement of criminal sciences in the widest sense, including human rights. It is registered as a not-for-profit foundation under Italian Law (Organizzazione Non Lucrativa di Utilità Sociale – ONLUS). As a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the United Nations, ISISC is one of the organizations comprising the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network. The Institute also enjoys consultative status with the Council of Europe through the AIDP.

Since its foundation, the Institute conducted 380 conferences, seminars, committees of experts, training programmes, and technical assistance projects in the field of criminal law. These activities had a cumulative participation of about 27,000 jurists from 160 countries, including over 4,500 academics from 460 university faculties, with the collaboration of 140 inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The Institute has been involved in extensive technical assistance programmes regarding rule of law, due process, criminal procedure issues and human rights in a number of different countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These programmes were funded by the Council of Europe, UNODC, UNDP, International Monetary Fund, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other international organizations.

ISISC offers young researchers and practitioners the opportunity to engage in the field of international criminal law through a range of educational and training programmes. Since 2003, the Institute accomplishes with its scientific and educational mandate organizing in Siracusa a ten-day Specialization Course in International Criminal Law for young penalists, which has become one of the most well known and appreciated events yearly organized. Additionally, the Institute regularly hosts international seminars and conferences on subjects of contemporary interest to the international scholarly community, gathering the world’s leading authorities and experts in the criminal sciences.

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For more info on our activities, please visit us at:
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The reconstruction of post-conflict societies requires the creation of national institutions responsible for justice, security, economic and social development.

It is a complex task including different synergies among different sectors of society and the identification and introduction of innovative ways to improve the management of available resources (human, natural and financial).

Areas characterised by weak government institutions and a lack of state sovereignty are potential sites for exploitation by criminal organizations and terrorist networks seeking staging areas to support international terrorist activities. Cooperation with international and regional entities is essential in order to facilitate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of national bodies in charge of security in post-conflict areas, particularly those affected by peacekeeping operations.

Support of these entities is crucial, and can be given through applied research, technical assistance, and implementation of the UN’s strategic mission to build institutional capacity in post-conflict areas. It is vital that the international community assists states affected by conflicts, enhances inter-agency strategies for investigating and prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide: in order to make a direct contribution to restoring peace and security, as well as deterring future atrocities.

In the post 9/11 world, the distinction between conflict and post-conflict societies has become increasingly imprecise, as interventions made with inadequate preparation can precipitate outcomes that were either anticipated and ignored or merely unanticipated, resulting in unintended consequences.

The UN Security Governance Laboratory’s approach is intended to assist governments and international agencies to improve the planning of their security and counter-terrorism activities. This can and should also be applied in post-conflict realities where the urgency of multilateral action is crucial to gaining stability.

* Doris Buddenberg

“No rule of law reform, justice reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or sustainable”

Kofi Annan - The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies
Report of the Secretary-General
23 August 2004
The Failure of Untested Preconceptions

A recent study of efforts at state building during peacekeeping operations in Haiti showed that the inability of the UN to achieve its goals was in part due to the fact that the UN took for granted that governance models developed in entirely different political and socio-economic environments could be transplanted effectively to Haiti. The article concluded that, while purporting to build an independent, democratic, and well-functioning state, the imported political models fostered disorder and dependence, whilst at the same time reinforcing instruments of control in the hands of international actors.

The application of the security governance model in Haiti with a focus on the common purposes at an early stage of the peace keeping operations could have enabled the UN to modify its plans together with the Haitian authorities and other actors to take account of the conditions prevailing in the country, thus substantially increasing the chances of a successful outcome.

The Role of Security Governance

The current state of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, with national and international actors struggling to establish and then work together on a common agenda, provides an excellent example of the potential role of the security governance model to deconstruct and analyse the security sector in a specific country context.

As part of a 2004 global study of the reform and reconstruction of the security sector, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) reported that reconstruction in Afghanistan was characterised by:
- insecurity, inadequate coordination, insufficient administrative capacity and resource shortfalls;
- a lack of coordination among donors, other external actors, and Afghan stakeholders which undermined efforts to design and implement a unified strategy;
- the limited capacity of the Afghan government; and
- the unwillingness of donors to make long-term commitments of funds.

Furthermore, the 2004 study highlighted constraints and short-comings in several key issues crucial to effective security governance: local ownership and consensus; co-ordination; local capacity building; investment in traditional structures; donor funding; regional security; and international security support within Afghanistan.

Local ownership and consensus programmes were largely donor-driven, which reduced legitimacy. Ethnic imbalances were institutionalised in the ministries responsible for security which had damaged the legitimacy of the security reconstruction process and ‘undermined efforts to establish democratic accountability’.

Defective co-ordination was apparent at each level in the development framework – lack of donor-donor, donor-government, intra-government and inter-agency coordination contributing to a lack of progress in all key sectors of the reconstruction agenda.

According to the DCAF, after the virtual collapse of the state, local state building has seen ‘the current government... beset by problems of bureaucratic inefficiency, disorganisation and nepotism.”

Although, it is well understood that ‘the ability to implement the principles of good governance in the security sector is reliant on the existence of well-functioning institutions and capable human resources” despite the fact that the necessary institutional reforms and the building of government capacity had not been implemented effectively.

The international community had made insufficient effort to build on investment in traditional structures, especially those traditional structures that remained largely intact and could contribute to promoting security and stability in many areas of the country.

Problems with donor funding, particularly funding shortfalls had been compounded by the lack of government capacity to process funds with the result that donors were ‘circuitventing government institutions’.

Interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by regional and other states had long been part of the country’s history. Despite the signing of several declarations, there was no evidence of reduced interference; rather the opposite was the case.

International security support within Afghanistan has seen the expansion of responsibilities and coverage of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whilst at the same time, bedevilled by a lack of commitment by member states.

The 2004 report concludes, somewhat pessimistically, that:

The reality of the current situation in Afghanistan is that despite modest achievements made since the fall of the Taliban, conditions in the country are simply not conducive to security sector reform (SSR). SSR is widely portrayed in Afghanistan as a panacea for the country’s immediate security woes, a task it is inherently ill-equipped to confront. It has been thrust into this unfortunate role due to the international community’s reluctance to deploy a significant peace support operation, but regardless it represents a fundamental obstacle to the process. Expediency has forced compromises and delays on some of the core principles of democracy and good governance. (...) The success of the state building process is intricately tied to the success of SSR, however, with the international community unwilling to commit the necessary political, economic and military resources to ensure its success, its margin for error has been reduced considerably. In light of Afghanistan’s broadening security dilemma, the need for a shift in course on SSR has never been more apparent.
The stabilisation and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan has suffered from a series of problems, not the least of which has been the impact on Afghanistan of the deteriorating strategic situation in Iraq and the failure of Western actors involved in Afghanistan to see the growing interdependence of developments in these two theatres. From its outset, however, the reconstruction effort has suffered from a lack of capacity, which has in turn been worsened by shortcomings in the area of cooperation.

NATO, the leading intergovernmental organisation on the stabilisation side, has not succeeded in acting as a platform for ensuring effective burden-sharing and cooperation among its members. But even if it had proved more effective in this regard, there would still have been limits on what it could do as an institution by and of its own efforts. NATO has no expertise in two areas that are critical for the stabilisation of Afghanistan: policing programmes, which aim to produce a sufficient number of well-trained and capable policing elements that can move into an area once the military have stabilised it, and reconstruction programmes, vitally necessary to accomplish a host of tasks related to domestic stability, such as repairing infrastructure, relaunching rural development and returning children to classrooms. It is only in 2007, more than five years into the campaign against the Taliban, that the EU, UN and NATO have started working together on police training programmes with the creation of an International Police Coordination Board Secretariat and a plan to standardise hitherto disparate approaches to police training. At the same time, NATO has not been involved in the leading multilateral reconstruction effort, namely, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by the World Bank, which has been in operation now since 2002. This is despite the fact that in the twenty-odd Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Afghanistan, NATO member states play a dominant role.

Finally, this study, as many others before it, has also made clear that SSR cannot be successful unless intergovernmental organisations and their member states summon the necessary political will to ensure that a comprehensive and cooperative approach is taken to reform reconstruction efforts, which includes ensuring that the necessary resources are forthcoming to implement SSR in an effective and sustainable manner.

Conclusion

The problems faced by the international efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan with insufficient resources, inadequate planning, and weak cooperation at all levels in the face of increasing insecurity, showcase perhaps the most complex national reconstruction effort ever attempted by the international community. There are evidently systemic weaknesses that have yet to be addressed effectively after more than five years of effort. The different (and changing) agendas of the various groups of actors, massive external interference, and inadequate practical long-term commitment from many of the players, further complicate the situation. The lack of a security governance framework, which could provide a comprehensive overview and hence facilitate an analysis of, and insights into, the key issues, is evident. The greater the complexity of a post-conflict situation, the greater the potential benefits could be for a security governance based approach.

* Doris Buddenberg is Senior Manager at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). She currently manages the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT).

In Brief

International donors contributed $10 million annually for five years (1997-2002) following the genocide in Rwanda in order to support domestic prosecutions. In this period the government conducted almost 7,000 trials. During a similar period the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) was given close to $400 million to conduct its proceedings, which resulted in fewer than 10 final convictions and contributed almost nothing to building judicial and legal capacity in Rwanda.

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Handling the Terrorism Globally

* Robert Orr

Terrorism is a global threat. It can affect anyone, anywhere, at any time. Countering terrorism requires global coordination and global solutions. It is for this reason that Member States brought terrorism to the agenda of the United Nations more than three decades ago. The terrorist attacks of September 11th brought a new sense of urgency to the work already underway. Within weeks, the Security Council adopted a comprehensive resolution which outlined a wide-range of counterterrorism measures to be taken by all Member States. These were legally binding for all states under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations system in turn, augmented its operational support to Member States in order to assist them in meeting these new commitments.

In September 2006, the United Nations reached an important milestone in its efforts to address terrorism with the General Assembly’s unanimous endorsement of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the Strategy”). The Strategy’s adoption signaled that Member States were willing to move beyond the political debates that had stymied operational cooperation in the past and commit themselves and the United Nations system to a comprehensive and holistic global framework and action plan for countering terrorism. It was also an important institutional achievement in that it demonstrated that the General Assembly had a vital role to play in mobilizing action on key issues related to peace and security.

In September 2008, Member States reviewed the UN Global

Some other initiatives that the Task Force is actively pursuing include ...countering the use of internet for terrorist purposes, [and] protecting human rights while countering terrorism
Counter-Terrorism Strategy and renewed their unwavering commitment to strengthening international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They unequivocally asserted their commitment to implementing the Strategy, and demonstrated concrete progress in this regard.

The Strategy identifies four pillars of action: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.

The Strategy acknowledges that Member States have the most important role to play in implementation. It spells out concrete measures that states need to take individually as well as collectively at regional and global levels. The Strategy also highlights the supporting role that the United Nations system should play in assisting Member States in their implementation activities, particularly through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).

The Secretary-General established the CTITF in June 2005 in response to requests made by Member States at the 2005 World Summit who urged the Secretary-General to strengthen the capacity and enhance the coordination of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism. Initially, the CTITF functioned as a forum for discussing strategic issues and ensuring coherent counter-terrorism action. Over time, the Task Force, composed of 23 United Nations Systems entities plus Interpol, has embarked on joint programs of work. Members of the Task Force contribute to the United Nations counter-terrorism effort according to their specific organizational mandates. In addition, the Task Force has identified some cross-cutting areas of work where the implementation of the Strategy requires cooperation across several system entities, where the United Nations can provide added value, and where there is a geographically broad-based demand for assistance from Member States. The work in these cross-cutting areas is organized and managed by Task Force Working Groups. At present, there are eight Working Groups.² For example, the Working Group on Supporting and High-

Members of the Task Force

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More on the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and wider-ranging UN actions to counter terrorism can be found at [http://www.un.org/terrorism](http://www.un.org/terrorism)
In February 2007, the Task Force set up a Counter-Terrorism Online Handbook to centralize and disseminate information on UN system counter-terrorism related activities.

lighting Victims of Terrorism organized a Secretary-General’s Symposium on Supporting Victims of Terrorism on the 9th of September 2008. The Symposium helped put a human face to terrorism by giving a voice to victims. It also provided a forum to discuss concrete steps to assist victims. Participants called on the United Nations to provide leadership in building international solidarity with victims. The event was well attended by Member States and civil society and received widespread media coverage around the world. One victim participant wrote to me after the symposium: “we all felt privileged to be offered such a dignified platform to share our tragic experiences as well as recommendations.”

Some other initiatives that the Task Force is actively pursuing include fostering private-public partnerships for the protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks, countering the use of internet for terrorist purposes, protecting human rights while countering terrorism, and tackling the financing of terrorism.

To date, the Task Force Working Groups have focused on gathering lessons learned, through questionnaires sent to Member States, literature reviews, and stakeholder workshops. They have also begun to identify some best practices that can be useful for Member States. A few have taken steps to develop tools that can assist Member States in their counter-terrorism implementation efforts. Thus, for example, in February 2007, the Task Force set up a Counter-Terrorism Online Handbook to centralize and disseminate information on UN system counter-terrorism related activities and resources (available at www.un.org/terrorism).

Looking forward, a key priority for the Task Force in 2009 and beyond is to facilitate integrated implementation of the Strategy. This initiative aims to enhance the capacity within the UN to help interested Member States, upon their request, to implement the Strategy across the four pillars of action. So far, two countries—Madagascar and Nigeria—have made requests to be beneficiaries of integrated technical assistance coordinated by the Task Force. A number of other states have given a preliminary indication that they may be interested in exploring this type of assistance in the near future.

From my vantage point as Chairman of the Task Force, I have had the opportunity to witness the emergence of effective system-wide cooperation and coherence in counter-terrorism work. Over time, I have seen participating entities increasingly share information, harness synergies and maximize existing comparative advantages. This positive dynamic has been central to advancing the counter-terrorism agenda within the United Nations system.

As I look to the future, I anticipate a continued deepening of the partnerships we have formed within the United Nations system. I further see us increasing efforts to expand and strengthen partnerships between Member States, the United Nations system, regional and other organizations and civil society.

As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently said to an audience at Harvard University, “terrorism is deeply personal. It kills our sons, daughters and mothers, our fathers, sisters and brothers.” While, the United Nations has come a long way in advancing multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, we still have much work to do if we are to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism.

*Robert Orr is United Nations Assistant-Secretary-General for Policy Planning. He has been Chair of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force since its creation in June 2005.

In Brief

TESAT - EU Terrorism and Trend Report 2008

During 2007, 583 terrorist attacks were committed in the EU. Of these, 91 percent were perpetrated by separatist terrorists.

In the UK, an increasing amount of right-wing extremists are involved in activities linked to explosive devices and homemade explosives.

General trends from 2007

In 2007, European animal rights extremists were involved in arson attacks, letter bombs, and product contamination, as well as wide-spread acts of vandalism.

Activities by right-wing terrorists and extremists in the EU are increasing.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have a large impact on the security environment of the EU.
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Last November a group of extremists attacked the historic Taj Mahal hotel located downtown in one of the most symbolic Indian city, Mumbai. The final official count put death toll at 171 bodies: a level of carnage that again raises questions surrounding the necessity of facing these kinds of threats, and whether it is concretely possible to prevent such random killings in our cities.

In terms of ensuring security, knowing to which matrix the terrorist group who carried out the Mumbai attack belongs, does matter, but only to a small extent. More important, is to have an understanding of the modus operandi and the choice of target. With particular regard to the latter, the terrorist’s plan was to aim at large, crowded venues in order to spread fear and avoid a coordinated response by the security services. This was clear from previous major attacks such as London, Madrid, Beirut, and New York, and it is also the same reason for which improving the management of the security and safety of the citizens is becoming increasingly crucial.

In order to explore these considerations, we posed some questions to Brian Powrie, Senior Consultant on security at the United Nations and former security planning director for 2005 Gleneagles G8 in Scotland, to investigate how far a renewed approach to the security can affect the fight against terrorism and the broader dimension of security.
Mr. Powrie, the Mumbai terrorist assault has shown us how operating with a different military strategy, compared to those implemented in other cases, can bring a protracted siege to vulnerable targets. What are the lessons we can learn from this experience?

There were significant differences in terms of the organization and execution of the attacks in Mumbai. What it seems to be emerging is the existence of a number of groups that are operating autonomously without necessarily central direction of control from groups like Al-Qaeda while claiming to be operating underneath that banner. It seems obvious from London, Glasgow, and other attacks that have taken place in the world that these individuals are working together in much smaller groups and planning and executing these attacks, using means that they are relatively comfortable with, but which in reality do not require significant skills, and money to fund and deliver.

To what extent do the different sizes and organizational structures of these groups affect the policy that has to be put on the table in order to cope with such groups?

According to the security perspective there are 4 different phases in terms of attempting to overcome the challenges presented by these threats. The first is obviously in terms of intelligence information gathering and dissemination; the second in terms of prevention on a daily basis; the third is the effectiveness of the responses in the event of an attack; and the fourth is the capacity of the victims to recover from such an attack.

These are the four different stages that have to be considered in terms of any contingency planning and operational activity. As has been shown in a certain number of occasions, with respect to these more autonomous groups, perhaps the traditional methods of information intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination which have developed from the more traditional means of delivering operational responses to traditional criminal cases are not sufficient. This may be given when you look at the background of the individuals that have become involved, such as the attack in Glasgow airport where a lot of medical doctors were engaged; and the previous attacks in England, one involving a school teacher. Of course we have to be very careful when dealing with new and innovative strategies to combat those forms of terrorism, as it is obviously likely to have an effect on the human rights of individuals. There is the need for balance. But there is probably significant community intelligence that needs to be inculcated into the more traditional methods of gathering information and then making sure that this information is disseminated as widely as possible. Obviously, bearing in mind from time to time the reason for confidentiality, people need to be kept informed and objectively appraised. Not scared, not frightened but objectively appraised of what the real risks are. Confronting and curbing such complex and articulated organizations and groups, which are all related by a common purpose and modus operandi, requires at least the same degree of cohesion and sharing of knowledge and information.

Is the international intelligence system as organized and integrated as the terrorist sphere seems to be?

In terms of international cooperation and sharing I think there is a significant work going on that the general public observes, but might not be entirely aware of. There is a consistent work of prevention that has been done to prevent such attacks taking place, and this work seldom receives any exposure. There are a number of different methods of prevention going on as a result of international cooperation, much of which never reaches the eyes and ears of the public.

In fact, I would stress the fact that the number of attacks carried out in the world is relatively low when compared with other crimes. I am sure there is a lot of very good cooperation which has been translated into positive effects in terms of preventing such attacks.

For obvious reasons the people who are working in that regard do not always receive the acclaim they perhaps deserve. The strikes on Mumbai called into question the necessary cooperation, coordination and mutual commitment of the public and private sector when it comes to security and prevention matters. Without going deeper into what happened during the Indian terrorist attack, one should consider the crucial importance of prevention.

To be absolutely effective in terms of preventing such attacks while ensuring the rights to freedom of the individuals, there is the need to be ready to respond rapidly.

To respond to your question as to whether the relation between the public and private sector has to be reviewed, I am convinced that the role of the law enforcement agencies should perhaps be examined. In fact, the police alone do not have sufficient resources to protect vulnerable targets 24h a day.

So let’s move away from the perspective that the police can do everything towards another attitude of sharing responsibilities, and work together with security companies in the private sector (in terms of controlling soft targets) to bring a larger and much more secure environment.
How far can a new approach to security (as you suggest with the security governance) affect the fight on terrorism, and how?

Public and private partnerships can make a real contribution to the prevention of terrorist attacks. The concept creates a dynamic and mutually advantageous security governance environment across which the combined action and joint utilisation of resources of all the different stakeholders involved can deliver a much more effective preventative response than the sum of the individual component’s actions.

Are there examples of private-public best practices? Where? What they have brought in terms of significant changes?

The English Griffin Operation is an example of a public-private partnership. Resulting from an older and strong experience form the Northern Ireland, leading onto the more recent in the cities, this project that has been created, brings together the public sector, the police, the metropolitan police, the city of London police, the largest institutions that operates within particular areas such as banks and private companies and the private security companies within identified areas with the specific purpose of making a lot of soft targets into one much more secure individual entity.

The project consisted in disseminating information available to each single entity to all the others in order to enable them to plan their activities to block and avoid all illegal and terrorist actions. This means that, in terms of prevention, there is a much bigger blanket in place, that there is dialogue and communication. In this way, security is seen as an investment and not as a cost, and both the economic and social elements are taken into consideration in the implementation of such a strategy. This also takes into consideration that this sort of policy does not only involve the area in which public-private sector coordination is provided and operating, but it clearly extends much further into the count.

This kind of program has been adapted to be used in other regions and countries of the world. Around the world there are very few other examples of effective public-private partnerships in terms of security, and that’s obviously what we should seek to promote.

There is also another area where the public-private partnerships have an impact in terms of security, which is the security during major events. Such big events can involve massive gathering of people. What are the main problems to be analysed when it comes to organizing such events, and what is the importance of having this kind of cooperation between the private and public spheres?

When one has to start analysing the critical points of such events, of course the anti-terrorist units have to be alerted, but there are also elements such as the prevention of crime, safety and security, the threat of public disorder and, clearly the continuation of day-to-day business. These are all the different elements, and they are all the individual pieces of the jigsaw that have to be implemented; there are clearly constraints to consider, the available money to carry it out, the skills and expertise available, and the fact that the community has to continue around these issues.

And again its about prevention, it’s about making sure that the security is structured in such a way that it facilitates individuals to attend these events, and enjoy them, for the purpose that they’re meant to be there but at the same time it provides a certain level of security but that we don’t feel that security starts at the boundary of the event. What we’re talking about there is taking the security blanket much further out even to the borders and including border security for these truly mega-events. It’s about early detection of the threats and it’s about developing strategies to counter these threats at locations that are appropriate when it’s suitable, with the aim of preventing loss of life obviously.

So it is mainly about coordinating with all the stakeholders?

It’s about coordinating with the widest imaginable amount of stakeholders. It’s about making sure that there is understanding as to what each other’s roles are. It is important to understand what each individual group has to achieve, in terms of their role in that particular major event, and it’s about continuing to talk to make sure that their aims can be met as well as is reasonable, while at the same time providing an adequate level of security. It’s about major critical infrastructure; it’s about water, electricity, gas, transport. It’s about making sure that attacks that are displaced from the principle venues, that other vulnerable areas are protected and it’s about ensuring that the community are properly in-
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formed and are playing their part in terms of providing information that the professional security providers can thereafter act upon effectively, can take effective action. It’s about taking that blanket out to make sure that as many vulnerable targets as possible are covered. There are many resources in the private sector that are very well equipped and capable to assist in that effort but they have to be provided with accurate, reliable and timely information so they can properly plan, train and brief their security personnel, and deploy them in an intelligence-led approach.

To come back to the Mumbai attacks, looking at the images, we saw young people carrying guns. This was carried out in a different way. No more bombings, planes, kamikazes. They were aware of the possibility of dying, but they did their best to avoid it. What is the main difference in this way of attacking vulnerable targets, from the point of view of police forces?

In terms of the method of attack, I think it’s much deeper than just analysing the method of delivery. I mentioned before that individuals so motivated to carry out these attacks will use whatever means available to them, if they feel they can, with a fairly good probability of causing massive disruption and chaos and getting maximum exposure, which is what these attacks are all about.

Clearly this situation, however the individuals became radicalized, is no exception. There is always the likelihood that others will, having seen what occurred in Mumbai, seek to copy these attacks. This is something we see all along. This is one of the problems we mentioned before. While it is somewhat simpler to profile a criminal, in terms of their modus operandi, it is very difficult for people who operate in a very objective professional basis on a day-to-day basis, to get inside the heads of these individuals, to try to understand their motives and to try to develop the appropriate responses in the future.

* Brian Powrie is Senior Advisor for the International Permanent Observatory (IPO) programme at UNICRI. Prior to joining UNICRI he was the National Security Planning Director for the 2005 G8 Summit at Gleneagles.
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Building ideas for peace and security
Addressing the threat of illicit trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material in today’s world is different from addressing the legacy of Cold War in the Former Soviet Union. The growing nuclear energy demand, biotechnology development and pandemics will without doubt be accompanied by increased non-proliferation challenges, and in particular the threat of illicit trafficking of CBRN material. Moreover, these new threats are expanding to new regions. Therefore, the objective pursued by the European Commission, together with its partners, will be to consolidate what has already been done, in terms of assistance to countries to enhance their capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to illicit trafficking of CBRN material, in Russia, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia while expanding in the coming years.
A concept of Regional CBRN Centres of Excellence has been developed to address local ownership, regional and international partnerships, an integrated approach recognizing the increasing links between terrorism, anticipating risks and developing a “methodology” to assess future CBRN risks and threats are more than ever required.

In order to develop a coherent approach to fighting WMD proliferation, and to preventing ‘reinventing the wheel’, best practices and information sharing on CBRN are essential.

The European Commission relies on UNICRI to develop regional Knowledge Management Systems, which promote sharing of information, best practices, and lists of national and regional experts. Designed to improve coordination between countries and international/regional organisations, the innovative Systems will make a significant contribution to implementation of the EU concept of Regional CBRN Centres of Excellence.

(This article is drawn out of Bruno Dupré’s intervention at UNICRI, dated 16 October 2008)

* Bruno Dupré is WMD Desk Officer at the Security Policy Bureau, External Relations Directorate, European Commission.
Tokyo - 35 million, Mexico City - 20 million, Sao Paulo - 19 million and Mumbai - 18 million are the world’s four biggest mega cities that have, according to UN Habitat, possibly a third or maybe even half of the population of some G8 countries. In fact, there are 163 countries with populations smaller than Mumbai.

Modern cities are like magnets; they attract everything from flows of people and goods to commercial exchange and ideas. The World Bank estimates that the biggest 10 mega cities generate 20% of world’s GDP, while representing only 2% of its population. If the last century was regarded as “the century of city consecration”, the new-century city could be the place where the sustainability and future of mankind will be determined.

In 1950, 30% of the world’s population was living in cities. By 2030, according to a UN Populations Fund estimate, 60% of the world’s population will be living in urban areas. Modern cities are expected to absorb not only all the population growth expected over the next four decades but also some of the rural population, through rural-urban migration or via the transformation of rural settlements into urban centers.”

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs- population Division

Modern cities are like magnets; they attract everything from flows of people and goods to commercial exchange and ideas.
In May 2008, for the first time in history, the countryside/city resident ratio was reversed meaning that most of the world’s population does not live in the countryside. In May 2008, for the first time in history, the countryside/city resident ratio was reversed meaning that most of the world’s population does not live in the countryside. Thus, like any nerve center, the city becomes the new frontier of risk and opportunity. International issues are reflected in local policies, and municipalities need to find local solutions for international problems.

Tokyo, New York, London, Madrid, Mumbai, Moscow, Istanbul – some of the world’s biggest cities – have each experienced at least one devastating terrorist attack in the past 15 years. However, terrorist acts represent only a small fraction of the total number of crimes committed on a daily basis. Crime in urban areas and associated safety and security problems present significant challenges.

Cities must be sustainable on various levels: economic, social, environmental, and in terms of human rights. But the first pillar of citizens’ well-being is ensuring their safety and security. City leaders who cannot deliver safety and security for their citizens may well face real difficulties promoting almost any other political issue on their agenda. It does not mean that safety and security are more important than environmental preservation or social equity, but it does mean that without safety and security, goals like improving environmental quality or social protection are unlikely to be achieved.

Every day, in cities around the world, large amounts of data and information on criminal activity is delivered to the tables of urban policymakers. This data is often compiled into reports and analyzed to produce a range of statistical returns. Advisors that work closely with city leaders face the ongoing challenge of quickly analyzing the available information and presenting it in an easily accessible format. Usually, the generated information ends up being useful for long term policy making, but there are often shortcomings in terms of its usefulness to design effective responses to more immediate events or for conducting real-time crime pattern analysis activities.

Technology can provide useful tools for making sense of incidents as they arise, individually and collectively. We have already witnessed the very fruitful use of remote sensing systems in cities as they, for example, deliver detailed satellite maps that are presented in a user-friendly way online. But technology has also started to be used in an indirect way. The increasing deployment of sensors and hand-held electronics has allowed for a new approach to the study of the built environment. Technology can be used to understand the patterns of different dynamic flows in the city such as people’s movements, events, and environmental conditions and thus map the macro dynamics taking place in a city at any given time.

Real-time analysis of such comprehensive systems could contribute greatly to crime prevention as it can assist in anomaly detection and disaster management and response scenarios. Still, the same digital infrastructure can be used to encourage the public to report crimes as well as to provide information to the public that is both location-specific and in real-time.

Cities, on one hand, are the new frontier for threats and challenges, but, on the other hand, they are a frontier for innovation. Partnerships between academia, public organizations, and private entities could pioneer the transition of innovation in science, engineering, and policies into solutions that could significantly improve the quality of life in our biggest population centers.

In Brief

The partnership

UNICRI and the M.I.T SENSEable City Laboratory are engaged in a collaborative effort to assist cities in developing strategies for improving urban security. Both institutes are leaders in their field of operation: UNICRI innovates in policies for advancing security governance and its Lab is a pioneer in the study of cities through distributed technologies, and in designing systems that integrate technologies into the built environment.

The project

In 2009, a joint project will be developed through the collaboration between UNICRI and the SENSEable City Lab. CrimeWatchOut.org aims to assist municipalities and citizens in countering crime. The project is centered on an online system that will enable citizens to report and receive information about crimes in the city through a user-friendly and easily-accessible application.

* Francesco Cappé is the Head of the Security Governance/Counter-Terrorism Laboratory at UNICRI.

Carlo Ratti is the Director of the SENSEable City Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

Assaf Biderman is the Associate Director of the SENSEable City Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
One of the key challenges that have changed security decision-making post 9/11 has been the menace of a mass casualty event. This has regularly taken the form of synchronized terrorist incidents carried out without warning aimed at civilian targets.

This challenge has impacted judgments that need to be made in the course of pro-active counter terrorist investigations in pursuit of suspected terrorists. For example, considerations of public safety may cause an investigation to be concluded by arrests at an earlier stage than would be the case if the danger of large scale public casualties was not so pressing.

The menace of a mass casualty terrorist event or series of incidents has had similar implications for major event security. In a different era, it could be claimed that media coverage of a major event was successful if the main news was of the event itself rather than the security that made it possible. Such an ambition appears much less realistic in 2008.

Ironically, the changed operating context has highlighted important elements of major event security planning which include:

1. National implications
2. Global reality and
3. Structural and visionary legacy

No modern major security event can be regarded as restricted in its implications to the actual venues of the event. A major security event heightens the profile of the country (and possibly the region) in which it is held. Thus, the period leading to the major event is pertinent in terms of events which may
occur and the resulting implications which follow. This is an additional element of vulnerability which must be addressed in major event planning. Next, a major security event provides a global stage and will inevitably involve both expected and unexpected international dimensions. The implications of the global reality of major events are very significant for event preparation but this realization is not universal. Postponement of international engagement can lead to a barrage of diplomatic and public/private issues too close to the delivery of the event. Finally, significant major events are important not only for the main focus of the event but also for the structural legacy that hopefully will have been created and will be sustained over time. Many events also contribute vision and inspiration across a range of agendas. Achieving balanced security in an era of heightened threat where the factors of national implications, global reality and legacy are of increased significance is a formidable challenge. For these reasons, it is even more vital that contemporary major event planning and delivery is conducted in full knowledge of this developing background and achieved on the basis of proven professional knowledge. There is now a premium upon sound principles and high levels of professional competence and experience. It is not feasible to achieve a safe modern major event on the basis of ad hoc arrangements. Thus, the contribution of organizations such as UNICRI working with a wide range of member states and key entities provides a vital foundation for events which are both secure and enduring.
Terrorism can hit anywhere at any time. They do not just strike critical infrastructure, but wherever people travel, congregate, relax, live or attend a major event. The bombings in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London (2005) and the latest in Mumbai (2008) are chilling reminders of this. Each of these incidents highlights the turmoil caused by terrorist attacks where the human, financial and other costs are immeasurable for individuals and entire families, businesses, corporations, communities and nations alike.

To date, soft targets, such as major events, have attracted less attention from the international community and national governments compared with critical infrastructure. Many forms of security that are applied to the protection of critical infrastructure may not be appropriate for protecting places where mass gatherings are taking place. Without the proper protection, these events can present terrorists with various potential opportunities for mass casualties, symbolism, and high-impact imagery that come with a major event and this can lead to significant economic loss.

**Stuart Page**

*In the Spotlight*

Soft targets can include the following places of mass gathering:

- major planned events
- hospitality venues, including hotels
- other major event venues, including convention centres and sporting complexes
- cultural facilities, including art galleries, museums and places of worship
- commercial and business precincts, including large retail complexes
- open-air gatherings, including market places and sporting events
- tourism operators, including entertainment venues and attractions
Moreover, governments have a public responsibility and the statutory authority to protect society against terrorism by ensuring the safety and security of their citizens. This means the development and delivery of terrorist prevention, protection, crisis management, and recovery measures.

In order to attract major events, governments must strive to provide an ‘environment conducive to hosting safe and secure events that is internationally recognised’. This encompasses not only the event itself but also the wide variety of interdependent sectors that support and rely on the event industry. Action by governments alone is not enough: private sector input is vital.

While many Member States have policies, programs and structures in place to counter acts of terrorism, few have well developed strategies for incorporating the private sector. Key factors in fostering partnership coalition building between public and private sectors in combating terrorism and, in particular, countering attacks against soft targets include the recognition of the investment value of security as cost-effective for businesses; undertaking new legislations and building counter-terrorism structures; allowing business taxation incentives and insurance leveraging; the promotion of intelligence and information exchange; and the establishment of a public-private sector security consultative framework comprising sectoral advisory groups reporting to a national council.

Recognising the cost, to both businesses and governments, of the consequences of a terrorist attack is important for promoting shared responsibility for the development of counter-terrorism measures. More work needs to be done in the area of quantifying the cost of terrorist attacks particularly in relation to costs resulting from the disruption to commercial business activity or attracting the right to host a major event. Presenting empirical cost data can be a persuasive lever in garnering private sector commitment by demonstrating the investment value of managing security.

An essential instrument in seeking the engagement of the wider community, including business, in the counter-terrorism effort is a nation’s legislative governance framework. This, however, requires the political will of governments to enact timely and relevant legislation that will underpin the policy direction and development of appropriate institutional structures to combat terrorism.

In Australia, the private sector is involved in various forums, such as the Australian Business-Government Advisory Group and the Trusted Information Sharing Network, which allow business and government to work together on national security issues. Within these bodies, business is encouraged to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack as part of their respective Business Risk Management Plans.

In an attempt to improve the preparedness and involvement of the private sector, the Federal Government, through Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Committee, has developed a ‘National Approach for the Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism’.
The National Approach provides a basis for:
- Identifying places of mass gathering that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and
- Devising risk management plans that are based on the roles and responsibilities shared amongst relevant private and public stakeholders that support a major event.

Information sharing underpins any terrorist attack prevention strategy. The value of the information exchanged will depend on the quality of the intelligence shared. In turn, this will depend on the level of trust built up between the parties involved.

Governments across the world are generally structured along sectoral lines. To engage effectively with the public sector, business and industry need to target proactively relevant arms of established government structures. For example, the transport sector will have its greatest leverage engaging directly with the relevant Minister for Transport and his or her administering department.

Sectoral Advisory Groups may comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, representation from:
- Business;
- Top industry bodies;
- Unions;
- Top community groups;
- Government, including intelligence collection agencies;
- Think tanks and institutions;
- Security professionals and experts, including academics.

To ensure the establishment and maintenance of effective links between sectors, and the achievement of a broad picture of counter-terrorism security planning and preparation between the government and private sectors, a high level of coordinating and national policy-setting body (the National Public-Private Sectoral Partnership Security Advisory Council) is required. This body would be made up of representatives from each sectoral group and their partner government agencies.

Member states’ national councils could be responsible for establishing and maintaining liaison with stakeholders, fostering the regular interchange of security information and intelligence, providing a forum for the identification of best practice and the development of tools required to respond to today’s security challenges.

Such a council might comprise representatives from 10-15 sectoral groups and their counterparts in government. Private sector members would be selected from their respective sectoral constituency bodies. Members might serve for two to four terms and meet quarterly. Council members would provide leadership and direction in the development of policy and programs. Councils would set forward- (say five-) year strategic plans which would be reviewed annually to ensure goals and objectives represented the prevailing interests of the constituency. Councils would monitor and evaluate progress, initiate and assign programs. They would delegate specific projects to secretariat staff committees headed by a Council member. Committees could draw on the expertise of technical advisors and specialist subject-matter experts from the private sector and the government.

The establishment of a structure that supports the development and delivery of terrorist prevention, protection, crisis management, and recovery measures to soft targets such as major events is equally as important to the national psyche as measures applied to the protection of critical infrastructure. Through the establishment of appropriate networks, governments can empower themselves and the private sector to not only ensure the safety and security of their citizens but also to enhance their international reputation in the major event industry and thus attract inwards investment of hosting a major event in times of unpredictability.

*Stuart Page, Australia Representative in UNICRI’s International Permanent Observatory on Major Events Security (IPO)*
The Post-Conflict Operations Study Center represents the strategic-operational think-tank which develops and promotes the Italian approach to the Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.

The activities performed by the PCOSC have gathered the appreciation of similar national and international Centers dealing with PCOs. As a consequence, the PCOSC has finalized bilateral and effective links with national and international military and civilian institutions and Organizations such as: IIHL, POTI, PKSOI, ISPI, SIPRI UNCR, ILO, UNSSC, University of Turin (UNITO), University of Bologna (UNIBO).

**Main Activities**
- To conduct PCOs high level courses, for military and civilian personnel, both nationals and foreigners;
- To contribute to the Army Staff College attendants education by providing them with lessons and seminars;
- To organize seminars, roundtables, workshop, VTCs, with national and international Universities and Institutes;
- To gather and rationalise studies and experiences on PCOs;
- To assist in developing the Army doctrine cycle, conducting researches and studies on issues identified by both the Defence and the Army General Staff.

**Education**

The PCOSC organizes the following courses:

The “Post-Conflict Rebuilding Management Junior Course” dedicated to military personnel (Majors and L-Colonels) and civilian (Officials), having the same purpose of the senior course but characterized by a more pragmatic approach.
On the International Agenda

10-11 February 2009
London, UK

Counter Terror Expo ‘09
Queen Elizabeth II (QEII) Conference Centre
Counter Terror Expo is a open and closed shop exhibition showcasing the latest specialist security technologies, products and solutions which form a crucial part of counter terror capabilities internationally. Counter Terror Expo offers a forum for senior buyers and specifiers to see the latest solutions available for the counter terrorism arena.

More information: www.counterterrorexpo.com

18-19 February 2009
Brussels, Belgium

EastWest Institute’s 6th Worldwide Security Conference: From the Global War on Terror to Common Security
World Customs Organization Headquarters
The sixth annual Worldwide Security Conference (WSC6) will help accelerate change by articulating new goals for global security and new approaches to achieve them. It will be based on an agenda of progressive improvement in the way security is conceived, managed and reviewed. WSC6 brings together leading policy makers, specialists, business executives, community leaders, and journalists for solutions-oriented discussions, debates and workshops.

More information: www.ewi.info

24-26 February 2009
Singapore, Singapore

International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR)
The International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation 2009 will aim to do as follows: draw from global best practices on terrorist rehabilitation and create a working model; provide a better understanding of the processes of de-radicalisation; create guidelines that will assist governments to put in place terrorist rehabilitation centres in their home countries; and provide a crucial network for governments and institutions that are presently involved in or would be involved in the process of de-radicalisation in the future.


4-5 March 2009
Warsaw, Poland

Border Security 2009
Marriott Hotel Warsaw
Border Security 2009 will examine the latest policies and procedures from international border security agencies, nations and border police. Assess their latest policies and discuss how new technologies and initiatives are helping to improve security at all levels. Effective border security and surveillance continues to be vitally important for protecting against external threats. This is a crucial event for security professionals who want to network with major international speakers and attendees dealing with land, air and maritime border security.

More information: www.smi-online.co.uk
22-27 March 2009

Honolulu, Hawaii

6th International Conference on Asian Organized Crime and Terrorism
Sheraton Waikiki Hotel

More information: www.icaoct.com

23-26 March 2009

Steyning, West Sussex, UK

Conference: China’s International Security Role
Wilton Park, Wiston House
What role will China take in a rule-based international security system: free rider, freelancer or responsible stakeholder? What are the likely future patterns on China’s military development, including those set out in the 2008 Defence White Paper? What role will China play in global security issues such as proliferation, terrorism and energy? What will China’s regional policy be in Africa, North East Asia, and Latin America? How will its bilateral relationship with the US be managed?

More information: www.wiltonpark.org.uk

24-26 March 2009

Stockholm, Sweden

Countering Insurgency and Terrorism Summit 2009
Muenchen Bryggeriet
At this important international conference in Stockholm, the Defence Academy of the UK and the Swedish National Defence College challenge conventional thinking oncountering fundamentalist terrorism. Delegates will receive an up to the minute world class briefing on tomorrow’s terrorist threat, new intelligence strategies and review effective military and police tactics in the light of recent attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and European cities.


14-16 April 2009

Tregynon, Mid Wales

First International Conference on the language of terrorists and terrorism in the 21st Century
Gregynog Conference Centre
The language of the law of terrorism; The language of ‘the war on terrorism’; The language of those who encourage or sponsor terrorism; Interviewing and assessing terrorist suspects; The rhetoric of modern terrorism, Foucaultian perspectives on inherited discourses in the language of terrorism.

The Book of the Month

Profiling Hackers
Raoul Chiesa, Stefania Ducci, Silvio Ciappi - 2008, Auerbach Publications

The Science of Criminal Profiling as Applied to the World of Hacking

Is it possible to apply criminal profiling techniques to hackers? It was from this question that the Hacker’s Profiling Project started a couple of years ago, and now some of the project’s findings have been published in Profilo Hacker, written by the ex-hacker Raoul Chiesa, aka ‘Nobody’, the criminologist Silvio Ciappi, a professor at the University of Pisa, and Stefania Ducci, former UNICRI Programme Officer.

The findings of the HPP staff are the partial result of a broader project to analyse the different motivations of hackers, observe the methodology of criminal hackers (i.e. crackers), and to provide a scheme of profiling to manage appropriately the different personalities of hackers and distinguish them from criminals in order to improve both computer security and legislation that could be effective and efficient. Because the book is the report of the first findings of the project’s research, its format is intended to underline and publicize the structure of the project.

After a brief introduction about the story and methodology of criminal profiling and cybercrime, the authors present some tools for understanding hacker culture, describing the origin, motivations and known categories of hackers. Then, after a short description of the HPP, the most substantial part of the book consists of interpreting the results of the questionnaires. The two main chapters point out who hackers are, how they behave, and which ethics lead their actions. So gender (8% of hackers are female), age (hackers are not just pimpled teenagers: half of the interviewed were almost in their 30s), social and economic background, social relationships, school and work careers, relations with authority, parents, peers and colleagues are examined as crucial dimensions of the questionnaire.

The analysis of the offline life of hackers has not always been debated in other books and reports, so Profilo Hacker presents a solid description of hackers’ identities in their everyday lives, disproving numerous myths, such as the one that would have it that hackers are socially marginalized, frail, junk food-eating teenagers. The authors underline the notion that hacking is not necessarily a political or counter-hegemonic activity against big corporations, although that is how it is depicted often in movies such as Hackers, Takedown, Warriors of the Net, or The Net. Here, hacking is depicted as something that people do because it is intellectually challenging.

There is also a focus to the online life of hackers. So the know-how, methods and places in which the knowledge is transmitted, role of mentors, modalities of attack, internal organization of groups and relationships between members of the same group, role of ethics in hackers’ relations and their perceptions of some behaviour as criminal are deeply analysed and described, carefully distinguishing between hackers, crackers, wannabe ‘lamers’ and other profit-oriented hackers.

Thus, the analysis of hackers’ world is focused not only on the criminal aspect, but on all aspects of their lives. From the ‘buddies’ and colleagues’ relationships to their perceptions of the big corporations and religious power, the authors delve deeper into the hackers’ scenarios and explain the data from downloaded from the questionnaires in a clear ad concise manner.

The authors are perfectly conscious of the damage that not just for-profit hackers (i.e. crackers) might create, but also of the damage and loss of money to system administrators and normal users that simply unskilled and inexperienced amateurs who claim to be hackers (the so-called ‘script kiddies’) provoke every day. Walking between the description of the ought-world of hackers and the reality of the sharply increasing number of cybercrimes, the authors examine the hackers’ world with disenchantment, resulting in a taxonomy of hackers: their psychology, motivations, aspirations, dreams, and ideologies. Thus, we meet the innocuous and angrily dangerous script kiddies and wannabe lamers; the unethical and narcissist crackers; the seeking-profit cyberwarriors, industrial spies and military hackers. The book takes you on a tour inside an underground world where good and evil are rethought and re-evaluated, outside the conventional world of laws, rules, habits and shared principles.

Profilo Hacker gives us a broader and deeper analysis of hackers’ motivation, pointing out that most of the so-called ‘pure’ hackers are still around, and are trying to bear the principles of ethical hacking. These people are potential allies in the war against cybercrime and the cybercriminal, smammers and robbers, cyberspies and cyberterrorists. A clear sense of the modalities of hacking is an important tool that could be useful and important for police and judges, as well as for hackers and systems administrators. After all, cracking and cybercrime cannot be fought simply with laws and punishments, but also requires understanding and collaboration, and respect for diversity and humility.

This volume is written in Italian, and has yet to be translated into English (the HPP website is fully in English). I hope that a translation will be published soon: this is not the nth book on hackers; it is something more – an ongoing project, a journey in the profiling and schematization of people who are often criticized and criminalized, but evidently not sufficiently understood. I hope this will be the first of a long series of books on the hacker phenomenon, a series that will help laypeople, police, politicians and all those who think of hackers as destructive or unethical agitators of our safe and secure society.

Reviewed by SALVATORE POIER
University of Milan, Italy
In this up-to-date assessment of the global efforts to combat terrorism, Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand give a rigorous analysis of the United Nations-led campaign of non-military measures to combat global terrorist threats, identifying some successes but also detailing the many shortcomings of the UN’s operation units and political bodies responsible for counter-terrorism. Offering specific examples of why the United States and other developed nations might be willing to support the creation of a dedicated organization, the authors also assess how this organization would be welcomed by nations in the global South.

Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Solutions to the Global Terrorist Threat examines and evaluates post–9/11 cooperative non-military responses to global terrorism. With a particular focus on efforts of the United Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, and a wide array of multilateral institutions, this book shows how these non-military responses, used widely throughout the world but often overlooked by the United States, can effectively address terrorism and promote global security.

In this up-to-date assessment of the global efforts to combat terrorism, Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand give a rigorous analysis of the United Nations-led campaign of non-military measures to combat global terrorist threats, identifying some successes but also detailing the many shortcomings of the UN’s operation units and political bodies responsible for counter-terrorism. Offering specific examples of why the United States and other developed nations might be willing to support the creation of a dedicated organization, the authors also assess how this organization would be welcomed by nations in the global South.
In this book, Brian Michael Jenkins draws on 40 years of research on terrorism, most of it conducted at the RAND Corporation. Starting with an analysis of where we are today in the struggle against terrorism, the author offers personal reflections on how some of our recent approaches to counterterrorism have been counterproductive, and finally proposes strategies to counteract the jihadists, particularly al Qaeda, and their operational code.

The tension between security needs and respect for civil rights is a fundamental issue in the fight against global terror. The new question that now arises is whether the existing system of principles and laws, developed through experience gathered in the real world, is applicable in the digital world as well. The book explains why the digital environment is a relevant theatre in the fight against terror and points out which areas of online activity might require re-examination; namely, security, monitoring and propaganda. Some technological issues are analysed, such as encryption methods, means of collecting information online and monitoring the Internet. An overview of the relevant international and national (Israeli) legal framework is also provided.

The core of the book are the extremist ideologies and the structural capabilities of violent non-state actors that employ terrorist means. With its central focus on Islamic terrorism, the author argues that the quasi-religious, supra-national ideology of violent Islamism, especially in its most ambitious transnational forms, cannot be effectively counterbalanced at the ideological level either by Western democratic secularism or by the use of moderate versions of Islam itself. Instead, it is more likely to be affected and transformed by radical nationalism. The study combines qualitative research with the analysis of available data on trends in modern terrorism and the use of primary sources and writings.

This No-Nonsense guide is a highly accessible history of terrorism that looks at core examples from the Middle East, instances of state terrorism, and terrorist fringes of political movements. It has been revised and updated to take account of the major changes in global terrorism over the past five years. In analyzing the dynamics of terrorism, Jonathan Barker - Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Toronto - scrutinizes the “war on terror” and its fateful consequences for political participation and real democracy.